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I. INTRODUCTION
Venue matters. Anyone who doubts it need only look to the venue wars
waged in the Missouri Supreme Court during the last decades. Understandably,
plaintiffs prefer unrestrictive venue rules so that they can file and try their cases
in counties with plaintiff-friendly jury pools. Just as understandably, defendants
prefer rules that restrict plaintiffs’ ability to choose between multiple venues and,
to the extent possible, rules that permit the defendant to select the counties in
which they can be forced to defend their actions.
The passage of Missouri’s 2005 Tort Reform Act1 represented an important
legislative victory for defendants in this struggle. The Act’s provisions
significantly restrict plaintiffs’ venue options and substantially increase
defendants’ control over the counties in which they can be sued. The wisdom of
these changes will be debated vigorously, but this article will not engage in that
debate. It has less ambitious goals: to explain the post-tort reform venue
provisions, to identify important issues that will face Missouri courts due to
ambiguities or gaps in those provisions, and to suggest the most appropriate
resolution of those issues based on neutral interpretive principles. The Tort
Reform Act has not ended the venue wars, but it has significantly reshaped the
territory on which those wars will be fought. This article is a map to the new
battlefield.
Part II of the article briefly outlines Missouri venue law as it existed prior to
the Tort Reform Act, focusing on those aspects of pre-tort reform doctrine that
will help the reader understand the post-tort reform changes.2 While Part II may
be a useful review for all readers, those with substantial background on the issue
may wish to begin with Part III.
Part III starts by presenting an overall description of the post-tort reform
venue regime. Subpart A explains the new venue rules for non-tort cases, those
in which no count alleges a tort.3 It shows that, as expected, the non-tort rules
reduce the venue options for suits against most corporations;4 but it also reveals
the surprising fact that those rules will actually increase the number of counties
in which nonprofit corporations can be sued.5 Subpart B discusses the new venue
rules for tort cases. After describing those rules,6 it discusses and resolves three

1

H.R. 393, 93d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005). An Act to repeal Sections 355.176,
408.040, 490.715, 508.010, 508.040, 508.070, 508.120, 510.263, 510.340, 516.105, 537.035,
537.067, 537.090, 538.205, 538.210, 538.220, 538.225, 538.230, and 538.300, RSMo, and to enact
in lieu thereof twenty-three new sections relating to claims for damages and the payment thereof,
2005 Mo. Laws 641, 641-57 (Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “H.B. 393”]. In the text, this article will
refer to the act by its popular name, the “Tort Reform Act,” or as “H.B. 393.”
2
See infra text accompanying notes 24-60.
3
See infra text accompanying notes 63-73.
4
See infra text accompanying notes 64-70.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 71-86.
6
See infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
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important interpretive questions: What it does it mean to say that a plaintiff was
“first injured” in a particular location?7 What does the statutory term “principal
place of residence” mean when the party in question is not an individual, or is an
individual whose main residence is outside Missouri?8 What is the scope of the
Act’s requirement that venue must be determined as of the date of first injury?9
Part III continues by identifying and attempting to resolve three latent
inconsistencies within the post-tort reform venue scheme. Subpart C discusses
the multiple-party venue problem.10 It explains how to determine venue when
the otherwise applicable rules, if applied to the various parties separately,
prescribe conflicting venues. Subpart D identifies the existence of “venue gaps,”
situations in which the Tort Reform Act appears to dictate that certain cases may
not be brought in any Missouri county.11 It concludes that the Court cannot
interpret the Act in a manner that fills these gaps and will need to decide whether
the existence of these gaps violates the Missouri Constitution. Finally, subpart E
explains how to resolve the conflict between the venue provisions of the Tort
Reform Act and the apparently incompatible provisions of special venue statutes
that apply to particular parties and specific types of civil actions.12
Part IV deals with additional issues that stem from provisions of the Act
that do not determine venue itself, but instead regulate the way venue can be
changed, manipulated, and contested. Subpart A discusses new section
508.011’s apparent partial repeal of Supreme Court Rule 51.03, the small county
change of venue rule.13 As a matter of statutory interpretation, Subpart A
concludes that the act has not repealed Rule 51.03 because—contrary to the
apparent assumption of the legislature—that rule is not inconsistent with the
provisions of Chapter 508.14 Subpart A then analyzes Article V, section 5 of the
Missouri Constitution, discussing its text, its enactment history, and case law
interpreting it.15 That analysis demonstrates that, if section 508.011 were
interpreted to modify or partially annul Rule 51.03, it would violate Article V,
Section 5 because the Tort Reform Act was not a “law limited to the purpose” of
making such a change. Finally, Subpart A concludes that, even if section
508.011 were interpreted to repeal Rule 51.03 and to comply with Article V,
section 5, it would necessarily violate the “original purpose” requirement of
Article III, section 21.16

7

See infra text accompanying notes 95-110.
See infra text accompanying notes 111-24.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 125-45.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 146-97.
11
See infra text accompanying notes 198-225.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 226-316.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 317-522.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 325-98.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 399-14.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 515-22.
8
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Subpart B of Part IV discusses new section 508.012’s requirement that
venue be redetermined whenever “a plaintiff or defendant, including a third-party
plaintiff or defendant, is either added to or removed from a petition.”17 It
concludes that, contrary to the expectations of many lawyers, section 508.012
will have only a modest effect, requiring venue redetermination only when
plaintiffs amend their petitions to add or drop a party.18 In light of the limited
reach of section 508.012, Subpart B argues that the doctrine of pretensive joinder
will still be necessary and may need to be expanded.19 Finally, Subpart B points
out that, while section 508.012 deals with a venue tactic—manipulation of
parties—that the Tort Reform Act has made less important, it has completely
ignored a similar tactic—manipulation of claims—that the act has made much
more important. The subpart concludes that the Court should deal with this new
tactic by creating a doctrine that requires trial courts to disregard pretensively
joined claims on much the same basis that they currently disregard pretensively
joined parties.20
Finally, Subpart C of Part IV analyzes section 508.010.10’s unusual rule
requiring that “[a]ll motions to dismiss or to transfer based upon a claim of
improper venue shall be deemed granted if not denied within ninety days of
filing.”21 That analysis leads to the surprising conclusion that section
508.010.10’s ninety-day rule applies to all motions to dismiss, regardless of the
basis of the motion, rather than merely to venue challenges.22 Subpart C then
suggests some practical steps for a plaintiff to take if a trial court’s inaction leads
to the unintentional “deemed dismissal” of a petition.23
II. MISSOURI VENUE PRIOR TO TORT REFORM—A BRIEF REVIEW
To understand the changes wrought by Missouri’s 2005 Tort Reform Act, it
is useful to have a brief review of the rules that governed venue prior to that act.
Before tort reform, there were three major sets of venue rules, the application of
which depended on the nature of the defendants in the case: the general venue
statute (applicable if at least one defendant was an individual and no defendant
was a not-for-profit corporation), the corporate defendant venue statute
(applicable if all defendants were for-profit corporations), and the not-for-profit
venue statute (applicable if at least one defendant was a not-for-profit
corporation). In addition, there were a large number of special venue
provisions—some contained in Chapter 508 and some contained elsewhere—that

17

See infra text accompanying notes 523-674.
See infra text accompanying notes 535-87.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 588-618.
20
See infra text accompanying notes 620-74.
21
See infra text accompanying notes 675-708.
22
See infra text accompanying notes 675-700.
23
See infra text accompanying notes 701-08.
18
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provided different rules for particular types of causes of action or for actions
involving particular types of parties.
A. The General Venue Statute (Former Section 508.010)
Under the general venue statute, section 508.010, the basic rule was that an
action could be brought in any Missouri county in which any defendant resided.24
If a defendant resided in the state, the action could also be brought in the county
where the plaintiff resided, but only if the defendant could be served in that
county.25 In addition, in any tort case, the action could also be brought in the
county where the cause of action accrued,26 which had been interpreted as the
county where the wrongful conduct was committed.27 Finally, if all defendants
resided outside the state, the action could be brought in any Missouri county.28
Since section 508.010 based venue primarily on the residence of parties, the
meaning of “residence” was crucial. An individual’s “residence” was defined as
a place in which he or she was physically present with some “degree of
permanency,” but not necessarily the same level of “intent to remain indefinitely”
required for domicile.29 As a result, an individual could have more than one
residence for venue purposes (e.g., a winter and a summer home).30 On the other
hand, most for-profit corporations were deemed to have only one residence, the
county in which its registered office was located.31 Finally, there were special

24

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(2) (2000) (where defendants are residents of different Missouri

counties); § 508.010(3) (where some defendants are residents and some are non-residents).
The general venue statute applied when the defendants were individuals or a mix of individuals
and for-profit corporations. State ex rel. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-America v. Gaertner, 681
S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1984) (overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1994)).
25

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1) (2000). See, e.g., State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Manners, 161
S.W.3d 373, 375 (Mo. 2005) (statutory language that requires that defendant be “found” within the
county satisfied only if the defendant is served in the county). The court may have left open the
question of whether this provision applies only to cases in which there is a single defendant. Id. at
375 n.3 (assuming but not deciding that the rule applies to multiple defendant cases). But see, State
ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W. 2d 393, 395 (1951) (stating that the rule
applies in multiple defendant cases) (overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. DePaul Health
Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820,821 (Mo. 1994)).
26

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(6) (2000).
State ex rel. Mo. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Brown, 900 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
28
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(4) (2000).
29
State ex rel. Quest Commc’ns Corp. v. Baldridge, 913 S.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
30
Id. at 370.
31
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2(2005); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 198
(Mo. 1991).
The same rule appears to apply to limited partnerships. MO. REV. STAT. § 359.041.4 (2005)
(providing that a limited partnership’s residence “shall be deemed for all purposes to be in the
county where its registered office is maintained”).
27

2007]

VENUE IN MISSOURI AFTER TORT REFORM

599

rules defining residence for other entities, such as insurance companies32 and
limited liability partnerships.33
The general venue statute applied when all defendants were individuals or
when the defendants were a mix of individuals and for-profit corporations.34 It
did not apply when all defendants were for-profit corporations35 or when any
defendant was a not-for-profit corporation.36
B. The Corporations-Only Venue Statute (Former Section 508.040)
The general venue statute was subject to various special venue statutes, the
most important of which was section 508.040,37 the “corporations-only” statute
governing cases in which every defendant was a for-profit corporation.38 Under
that statute, if all the defendants were for-profit corporations, venue did not
depend on the residence (i.e., the location of the registered office) of the
corporations.39 Instead, venue was proper “in any county where such
corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of
their usual and customary business.”40 As a result, plaintiffs were not required to
file in the single county that the defendant had selected for its registered office,
but instead could file in any county in which the defendant conducted its business
operations.41
An unregistered foreign corporation is deemed to have no Missouri residence. State ex rel.
England v. Koehr, 849 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
32

State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (Insurance companies are deemed to
reside, and thus can be sued, in any county in which they have an office or agent for doing their
ordinary business.).
33

MO. REV. STAT. § 358.150.6 (2005) (defining a limited liability partnership’s residence for venue
purposes as “the county in which it has any office or agent for the transaction of its usual and
customary business activities or in which its registered office or registered agent is located”).

34

State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. 1984).
See infra text accompanying notes 37-44.
36
See infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
37
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000).
38
State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Bacon, 63 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Mo. 2002) (section 508.040 applies
if sole defendant is a corporation); Dick Proctor Imp., 671 S.W.2d at 274 (section 508.040 applies
where all defendants are corporations); State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 1212-13,
274 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 1954) (same); State ex rel. Harper Indus. v. Sweeney, 190 S.W.3d 541,
544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (section 508.040 applies rather than section 508.010(4) even if sole
defendant was an unregistered foreign corporation that had no Missouri residence).
35

39
Thus, if all defendants were corporations, the fact that a county was the location of the
defendants’ registered offices was not, by itself, enough to make venue proper in that county. State
ex rel. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-America v. Gaertner, 681 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Mo. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 822
(Mo. 1994).
40

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000) (emphasis added). As discussed below, the action could also
be filed in the county in which the cause of action accrued.

41
The section also permitted suits against railroads to be filed in any county through which the
railroad ran. Id.
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In addition, plaintiffs could file suit in the county in which “the cause of
action accrued,” and, unlike plaintiffs suing under the general venue statute,
could do so in both tort and non-tort cases.42 In tort cases, the cause of action
was deemed to accrue where the wrongful act was committed.43 In contract
cases, it was deemed to accrue where the breach occurred, rather than where the
contract was made.44
C. The Not-For-Profit Venue Statute (Former Section 355.176.4)
Suits involving not-for-profit corporations were governed by a third set of
rules that trumped both the general venue statute and the corporations-only venue
statute.45 Under section 355.176.4, suit could be brought only in the county in
which the cause of action accrued, in the county in which the not-for-profit
corporation maintained its principal place of business, or the county in which its
registered office was located.46 This not-for-profit corporation venue statute
governed all cases in which a not-for-profit was a defendant, even if individuals
or for-profit corporations were named as additional defendants.47
D. Special Venue Statutes
Finally, there were a considerable number of narrower special venue
statutes that governed actions involving particular types of parties or suits
asserting particular causes of action. For example, there were special rules that
applied if a plaintiff was a county,48 and others that applied if a defendant was a
county,49 a municipality,50 or a limited liability company.51 Similarly, there were

42

Id.
State ex rel. Mo. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Brown, 900 S.W.2d 268, 271-72 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
43

44

Id. at 272.
State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2002). The relevant
provisions are contained in section 355.176.4 which can be found in MO. REV. STAT. (1994) or at
1994 Mo. Laws 868. As discussed in SSM Health Care, section 355.176.4 was repealed in 1996,
but was reinstated when the repealing statute was held to be unconstitutional. As a result, it does
not appear in the revised statutes after 1994, but continues to be in effect except to the extent it has
been modified or superseded by the Tort Reform Act. For purposes of this article, we will refer to
the section as section 355.176.4 simpliciter.
45

46

SSM Health Care, 78 S.W.3d at 141.
State ex rel. St. John’s Mercy Healthcare v. Neill, 95 S.W.3d 103 (Mo. 2003); SSM Health Care,
78 S.W.3d at 141.

47

48
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(6) (2000) (suit by counties can be brought where any defendant
resides or in the plaintiff county if any defendant may be found in the county).
49

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.060 (2005) (suits against counties must be filed in the circuit court of the
defendant county).
50

§ 508.050 (suits against cities to be brought in the county in which the city is situated with
special provisions for cities that are situated in more than one county); § 70.320 (suits affecting
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special venue rules that applied if the suit asserted a cause of action for
replevin,52 for partition53 or possession of real estate,54 for violation of state antitrust law,55 or for illegal discrimination.56 There were special venue statutes for
defendants served and sued under particular statutes,57 for actions to review
various administrative proceedings,58 and for a variety of obscure causes of
action.59 These special venue statutes were usually held to supersede the
otherwise applicable general venue statute or the corporations-only venue
statute.60
III. MISSOURI VENUE AFTER TORT REFORM—THE BASIC
STRUCTURE
Missouri’s 2005 Tort Reform Act drastically altered the previous rules for
determining venue sharply reducing the number of options available to plaintiffs.
In tort cases, it changed the venue decision from one that focused primarily on
contracts with cities may be brought in the county in which the city is located or in the county in
which any party to the contract resides); Control Tech. & Solutions v. Malden R-1 Sch. Dist., 181
S.W.3d 80, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that section 508.050 is not exclusive and that section
70.320 provides additional venue options when a suit against a city is based on contract).
The venue rules regarding municipalities may also apply to school districts. See State ex rel.
Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. 2006) (not deciding issue, but
noting that lower courts had held that school districts should be treated as municipalities for venue
purposes).
51
MO. REV. STAT. § 347.069.2 (2005) (suits against limited liability companies (LLCs) to be
brought in the county in which the cause of action accrued or in any county where the LLC has an
office or agent for the transaction of its usual and customary business, or in the county in which its
registered office is located).
52

§ 508.020 (replevin actions to be filed where the property is located).
§ 528.040 (partition actions to be filed in county where property is located with special
provisions if property is located in more than one county).

53

54

§ 508.030 (suits for possession of real estate to be brought in county where real estate is located).
§ 416.121.1 (civil anti-trust actions for damages or injunctions may be brought where any
defendant resides; has an officer, agent or representative; or where a defendant, agent, officer or
representative may be found); § 416.131 (civil and criminal anti-trust actions generally may be
brought in county in which any defendant resides, engages in business or has an agent).
55

56

§ 213.111(1) (civil actions under Missouri Human Rights Act may be brought in county in which
the unlawful discriminatory practice allegedly occurred); Igoe v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.
Relations, 152 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. 2005) (section 213.111(1) trumps the broader provisions of
section 508.010(2); State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 91, n.18 (Mo. 2003) (same).
57

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 506.290.1 (2005) (venue in cases brought under non-resident
motorist statute); § 506.330 (2005) (venue in cases brought under non-resident watercraft statute).

58

See statutes cited infra note 345.
See, e.g., § 60.355 (venue for actions alleging damage to surveyors’ markers); § 560.290.2
(venue for actions alleging identity theft); § 84.015 (venue for actions involving the St. Louis
Board of Police Commissioners).
59

60

Igoe v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 152 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. 2005); State ex rel.
Wasson v. Schroeder, 646 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Mo. 1983) (overruled on other grounds in State ex rel.
DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1994)).
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the location of the defendants to one that focuses primarily on the location of the
first injury. This section will outline the basic structure of the venue rules
created by tort reform. The following sections will analyze a number of issues
raised by the Act.
Under the Tort Reform Act, there will now be two quite different sets of
venue rules: one applicable to tort cases (actions in which any count alleges a
tort)61 and a second set of rules applicable to non-tort cases (actions in which no
count alleges a tort).62 Both restrict the options available to plaintiffs, but the
non-tort restrictions are substantially less drastic.
A. Venue for Non-Tort Cases
For non-tort cases, the Tort Reform Act retained the basic provisions of the
pre-tort reform general venue statute.63 Thus, non-tort cases may still be brought
(a) in any Missouri county in which any defendant resides,64 (b) in the county in
which the plaintiff resides and the defendant can be served,65 or (c) in any
Missouri county if all defendants are non-residents.66 Thus, with the exception of
the possibility that a defendant’s residence will now be determined as of the date
of first injury rather than the date suit is brought,67 the general venue statute’s
rules for non-tort cases remain the same.
However, the class of non-tort cases covered by those rules has been
substantially expanded, and, as a result, plaintiffs will sometimes have fewer
alternative venues. Since the Tort Reform Act repealed the corporations-only
venue statute (prior section 508.040),68 the general venue statute’s rules now
apply to non-tort cases even if all defendants are for-profit corporations. As a
result, a plaintiff in such a case will no longer be able to pick among the various
counties where the defendant has offices or agents “for the transaction of their

61
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005) (tort cases in which the first injury was suffered within
Missouri); § 508.010.5 (tort cases in which the first injury was suffered outside Missouri).
62

§ 508.010.2 .
Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1)-(4) (2000) with MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2(1)-(4)
(2005).

63

64

See § 508.010.2(1) (single resident defendant); § 508.010.2(2) (multiple resident defendants in
residing in different counties); § 508.010.2(3) (mix of resident and non-resident defendants).
65

§ 508.010.2(1). See also authorities cited supra note 25.
§ 508.010.2(4).
67
Compare § 508.010.9 (providing that “[i]n all actions, venue shall be determined as of the date
the plaintiff was first injured”) with State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857 (Mo.
2001) (venue determined as it stands when brought); State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Sweeney, 920
S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1996) (residence of parties determined as of the date case is brought); State
ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (venue determined as it
stands when brought); State ex rel. Palmer by Palmer v. Goeke, 8 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) (venue not affected by post-filing change of party’s residence).
66

68

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000).
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usual and customary business,”69 but will instead be limited to the single county
in which the corporate defendant has chosen to place its registered office.70
In addition, since the Tort Reform Act also repealed the special venue
provisions for not-for-profit corporations,71 the general venue rules will apply to
non-tort cases against those corporations as well. Plaintiffs will no longer have
the tripartite option of suing a not-for-profit in the county where the cause of
action accrued, the county in which the corporation’s registered office is located,
or the county where it has its principal place of business.72 Instead, a plaintiff in
a non-tort case will be able to sue only in the county or counties in which the notfor-profit corporation resides.73
Ironically, this change may have unintentionally expanded the number of
available venues for suing not-for-profit corporations since such corporations
will be deemed to reside in every county in which they have offices for
conducting their normal operations. To understand why this is true, it is
necessary to trace an obscure aspect of the convoluted history of Missouri notfor-profit corporation law.
Under the common law, unless a statute decrees otherwise, a corporation is
deemed to reside in all counties where its ordinary business is done.74 However,
in 1953, Missouri adopted a new General Not For Profit Corporation Act,75 under
section 10 of which a not-for-profit corporation’s residence and location were
defined “for all purposes to be in the county where its registered office is
maintained.”76 (An essentially identical definition had been adopted for general
business corporations in 1943.)77 Thus, from 1953 until 1994, a not-for-profit

69

Id.
§ 351.375.2 (for-profit corporations reside where their registered office is located); State ex rel.
Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Mo. 1991) (same).
It would also be possible to sue in the county where the plaintiff resides, but only if the corporate
defendant could be served in that county. See MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2(1). In addition, if all
defendants are non-residents (e.g., unregistered foreign corporations) plaintiff could sue in any
Missouri county. § 508.010.2(4); State ex rel. England v. Koehr, 849 S.W.2d 168, 169-70 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) (unregistered foreign corporation has no Missouri residence). In multiple defendant
cases, venue will be proper in any Missouri county in which any defendant resides.
70

71

H.B. 393 repealed the previously existing MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176 (1994), which contained
four subsections, and replaced it with a new section 355.176, which omits former subsection
355.176.4, the subsection that contained the not-for-profit venue statute. See also, MO. REV. STAT.
§ 508.010.12 (2005) (providing that “[t]he provisions of this section [508.010] shall apply
irrespective of whether the defendant is a for-profit or a not-for-profit entity”).
72

Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (1994) with MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176 (2005) (containing
no subsection 4) and with § 508.010.2 (setting forth venue alternatives for non-tort cases).

73

For additional available venues, see supra note 70.
State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998).
75
See General Not For Profit Corporation Act, 1953 Mo. Laws 322, 322-66.
76
Id. § 10, 1953 Mo. Laws at 330 (subsequently codified as MO. REV. STAT. § 355.170.2 (1959)).
77
The General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri, § 10, 1943 Mo. Laws 410, 419-20. The
current version of this provision is MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2005).
74
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corporation was, like a general business corporation, deemed to have a single
county of residence, the one it chose by selecting its registered office. However,
since not-for-profit corporations were often covered by section 508.040 (the
corporations-only venue statute) under which residence was immaterial, they
could often be sued wherever they (or co-defendant corporations) had offices or
agents for doing their ordinary business.78
In 1994, the General Assembly gave not-for-profit corporations additional
venue protection when it enacted a general revision of the laws governing
nonprofit corporations.79 Section 351.176.4 of that revision explicitly limited
venue in suits against a not-for-profit corporation to the county in which the
corporation had its principal place of business, the county in which the cause of
action accrued, or the county in which the corporation’s registered agent was
located.80 At the same time, the revision repealed the previous definition of a
not-for-profit corporation’s residence.81 Thus, since 1994, there has been no
statutory definition of the residence of a not-for-profit corporation;82 but, until the
2005 Tort Reform Act became effective, the absence of such a definition was
irrelevant since venue for such corporations was governed solely by section
351.176.4.83
However, since the Tort Reform Act repealed section 351.176.4, venue in
non-tort suits against not-for-profits is now governed by the general non-tort
venue rules; and, under those rules, residence is often determinative.84 In State
ex rel. Smith v. Gray, the Missouri Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, the common law definition of corporate residence controls
and dictates that a corporation resides wherever it has offices or agents for the
conduct of its ordinary business.85 While Gray dealt with insurance corporations
rather than not-for-profits, the two situations appear to be legally
indistinguishable.86 As a result, it seems likely that, in non-tort cases, section

78
State ex rel. Vaughn v. Koehr, 835 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, if joined as
defendants with individuals, they could be sued wherever any defendant resided. MO. REV. STAT. §
508.010(2) (1986).
79

Missouri Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1994 Mo. Laws 854.
Id. § 355.176.4, 1994 Mo. Laws at 869.
81
Id. § A, 1994 Mo. Laws at 856 (repealing § 355.170). See also, id. at 908, 915 (same).
82
Not-for-profit corporations are not governed by the definition of residence for general business
corporations, per MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2005), because the General Business Corporation
Act explicitly excludes them from its coverage. § 351.690(3).
80

83

State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 140-41 (Mo. 2002) (discussing
previous, unconstitutional attempt to repeal section 351.176.4); State ex rel. St. John’s Mercy
Healthcare v. Neill, 95 S.W.3d 103, 105-06 (Mo. 2003).
84

See MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(2) (2005).
State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (insurance corporations governed
by common law rule since no applicable statutory definition exists).
85

86

One could argue that Gray is undermined by the repeal of section 508.040 since Gray relied on
previous cases that relied, in part, on reading section 508.010 in pari materia with section 508.040.
Id. However, the Court appears to have principally relied on the common law definition of
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508.010 will be interpreted as permitting not-for-profit corporations to be sued
wherever they maintain an office or agent for conducting their ordinary affairs.
B. Venue for Tort Cases
The Tort Reform Act radically changed the venue rules for all actions in
which any count alleges a tort.87 For such cases, the act has shifted the focus
away from the traditional concepts of a party’s residence and a cause of action’s
place of accrual. Instead, under the new regime, venue determinations depend
primarily on the location of the plaintiff’s first injury. In some cases, it will also
depend on the “principal place of residence” of individual parties or the location
of the registered agent of corporate defendants.88 These three new determinative
factors—place of first injury, principal place of residence, and location of
registered agent—are statutorily defined terms of art and their meanings are not
always what one might expect. Section 1 below will discuss the basic venue
rules for tort cases. Section 2 will discuss the meanings of various terms used in
those basic rules.
1. The Basic Tort-Case Venue Rules
The Tort Reform Act’s tort case venue rules apply to all actions in which
any count alleges a tort.89 If the plaintiff was first injured within Missouri, there
is only one prescribed venue, “the county where the plaintiff was first injured by
the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action.”90
If the plaintiff was first injured outside the state of Missouri, a plaintiff’s
choices are more complicated.91 First, “[i]f the defendant is a corporation, then
residence and the legislature’s decision to change that definition for general business corporations
but not for insurance companies. If anything, the argument for using the common law definition is
stronger for not-for-profit corporations since the legislature affirmatively repealed a pre-existing
statutory definition of their residence, while it merely failed to enact such a definition for insurance
corporations.
87
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005) (tort cases in which the first injury was suffered within
Missouri); § 508.010.5 (tort cases in which the first injury was suffered outside Missouri).
88

§ 508.010.4; § 508.010.5.
§ 508.010.4; § 508.010.5. The distinction is not necessarily as clear as it seems. Whether the
“tort-case” rules apply to cases in which tort claims are added by post filing amendments is
discussed infra Part III, text accompanying notes 635-61.

89

90

§ 508.010.4 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there is any
count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured in the state of Missouri, venue shall
be in the county where the plaintiff was first injured by the wrongful acts or negligent conduct
alleged in the action.”).
91

§ 508.010.5 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there is any
count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured outside the state of Missouri, venue
shall be determined as follows: (1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any
county where a defendant corporation's registered agent is located or, if the plaintiff's principal
place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue
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venue shall be in any county where a defendant corporation’s registered agent is
located. . . .”92 Second, “[i]f the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in
any county of the individual defendant’s principal place of residence in the state
of Missouri. . . .”93 Third, regardless of whether the defendant is an individual or
a corporation, “if the plaintiff's principal place of residence was in the state of
Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the
county of the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was
first injured.”94
2. Interpretive Problems Under the Basic Tort-Case Venue Rules
a. The Location of “First Injury”
Under the tort case venue rules, it is crucial to determine “where the
plaintiff was first injured by the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the
action.”95 In the typical bodily injury case, the meaning of this phrase appears
may be in the county of the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first
injured; (2) If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in any county of the individual
defendant's principal place of residence in the state of Missouri or, if the plaintiff's principal place
of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may
be in the county containing the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was
first injured.”).
There will be cases that fall into gaps, for example, cases in which there appear to be no proper
venue in Missouri. See infra, text accompanying notes 168-74, 198-220. In addition, there may
also be cases in which the plaintiff has more than two options because of the existence of multiple
parties. See infra, text accompanying notes 161-66.
92

§ 508.010.5(1).
§ 508.010.5(2).
94
§ 508.010.5(1) (as to corporation defendants); § 508.010.5(2) (identical language as to individual
defendants).
The rather awkward language of the out-of-state injury provisions has led some to suggest that
this third option is only available if neither of the first two options can be used, for example, that a
corporate defendant could be sued in the county of the plaintiff’s principal place of residence only
if the corporate defendant did not have a registered agent in Missouri. However, this suggestion
does not seem to follow from the language or logic of these provisions. The sentence is the
grammatical equivalent of telling a shopper, “If you go to the store on Tuesday, buy pot roast or, if
sirloin is on sale, you may buy sirloin.” No one would suggest that this sentence permitted the
shopper to buy sirloin only if it was on sale and the store was out of pot roast. The initial
dependent clause (“If the defendant is a corporation,”) conditions the entire sentence, i.e. it says
that neither option is available unless the defendant is a corporation. The second dependent clause
(“if the plaintiff’s principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri . . .”) conditions the
second independent clause (“then venue may be . . .”), i.e. it says that the plaintiff’s principal place
of residence is not an available option unless it is located in Missouri.
93

95
§ 508.010.4. In a number of places, the statute refers to the place where (or the time when) “the
plaintiff was first injured” simpliciter. See, e.g., § 508.010.4 (“in which the plaintiff was first
injured in the state of Missouri”); § 508.010.5 (“in which the plaintiff was first injured outside the
state of Missouri”); § 508.010.5(1) (“on the date the plaintiff was first injured”); § 508.010.5(2)
(same); § 508.010.8 (“the plaintiff shall be considered first injured”); § 508.010.11 (same); §
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self-evident. The victim of an automobile collision is first injured at the location
and at the time of the collision. The victim of a typical battery is first injured
when and where he or she was first struck.
However, as used in the Tort Reform Act, “first injury” is, at least in part, a
statutorily defined term of art. In some situations, the statutory definition
recognizes and resolves ambiguity in the ordinary usage of the term. In some, it
redefines “first injury” in a way that does not conform to ordinary usage at all but
apparently serves an unidentified policy objective. Finally, there are a range of
situations in which the phrase will need to be defined by subsequent case law.
For example, absent a statutory definition, one could have debated whether
a victim of defamation or invasion of privacy was “first injured” where the
defamation itself was first published, where the victim was physically located at
the time of first publication, where the publication first had an effect on the
victim’s reputation, or where the victim first learned of the defamation. The Tort
Reform Act preemptively resolves this debate in favor of the location of first
publication.96 Similarly, the act treats wrongful death plaintiffs as first injured in

508.010.14 (“A plaintiff is considered first injured”). See also, § 538.232 (“the plaintiff shall be
considered injured by the health care provider”). In context, it appears that the more truncated
phrase is simply a shorthand version of the more explicit, longer phrase. It would make no sense
for the shorter version to be treated as referring to some previous or subsequent injury.
96

§ 508.010.8 (“In any action for defamation or for invasion of privacy, the plaintiff shall be
considered first injured in the county in which the defamation or invasion was first published.”). In
doing so, the act conforms to the pre-tort reform rule that treated the location of first publication as
the place of accrual for venue purposes. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(6) (2000).
Under section 508.010.8, a difficult question is raised if a claim for defamation or invasion of
privacy is joined with an additional claim alleging an injury that predated the publication of the
defamation. The section’s use of the phrase “any action for defamation” could be interpreted as
meaning any civil action containing a count asserting a claim of defamation, in which case the
county of first publication would be treated as the place of first injury for the entire civil action.
Alternatively, the phrase could be interpreted as meaning any count containing a claim of
defamation, in which case the county of first publication would be the place of first injury for that
count but not necessarily for the case as a whole.
While this issue is not free from doubt, it appears most likely that the Tort Reform Act uses the
word “action” as shorthand for “civil action,” i.e., uses it to refer to the entire lawsuit. In sections
508.010.4 and 508.010.5, the Act refers to “all actions in which there is any count alleging a tort”
thus necessarily using “actions” to refer to the civil action as a whole as opposed to the separate
counts that make up that action. See also 508.010.2 (“all actions in which there is no count
alleging a tort). This conclusion is reinforced by the language of the second sentence of section
508.010.11 which states that “In any spouse’s claim for loss of consortium, the plaintiff claiming
loss of consortium shall be considered first injured where the other spouse was first injured by the
wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action”—thus treating a “claim” as a part of an
“action.” Similarly, section 508.010.7 (“In all actions, process shall be issued by the court in
which the action is filed and process may be served in any county within the state”) and 508.010.9
(“In all actions, venue shall be determined as of the date the plaintiff was first injured.”) appear to
use the word “action” to refer to the civil action as a whole since process is issued for for an entire
civil action rather than for individual count and venue is the location for trial of the case as a whole.
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the county where the decedent was first injured97 rather than where the death
occurred,98 where the wrongful conduct was committed,99 or where the plaintiffsurvivors suffered injury from the death.100 It treats a spouse who makes a
derivative claim for loss of consortium as first injured where the other (directly
injured) spouse was first injured101 rather than where the consortium claimant
suffered his or her actual loss.102 The tort reform act treats victims of torts that
inflict latent injuries as “first injured where the trauma or exposure occurred
rather than where symptoms are first manifested.”103 In each of these situations,
the act has made a reasonable choice—albeit one with which others might
disagree—among plausible ordinary understandings of “first injury.”104
As a result, it seems most likely section 508.010.8’s definition of first injury requires that, in any
civil action containing a claim of defamation or invasion of privacy, the county of first publication
will be treated as the place of first injury for the entire civil action.
97

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.11 (2005).
The time of death might be suggested by the fact that wrongful death actions are deemed to
accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, at the time of death. See, e.g., Dzur v. Gaertner, 657
S.W.2d 35, 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
98

99

The location of the wrongful conduct might be suggested by pre-tort reform case law that held
that wrongful death actions accrued, for venue purposes, in that location. See id.

100

Survivor-plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their own losses “having regard to the pecuniary
losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services,
consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which
those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such death . . . .” MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2005). These injuries may be suffered far from the place that the decedent
was first injured. While the survivor-plaintiffs may sometimes also recover, “such damages as the
deceased may have suffered between the time of injury and the time of death,” those damages are
not always available since the deceased may have been killed instantly. Id.
101

§ 508.010.11.
For example, a husband may be injured in a car wreck in Iowa, depriving his wife of
companionship and services the husband would have provided to her solely in their home state of
Missouri.
102

103
§ 508.010.14 (2005) (“A plaintiff is considered first injured where the trauma or exposure
occurred rather than where symptoms are first manifested.”). The same section could also be read
as producing a rather counterintuitive result in situations in which the plaintiff purchases a product
with a latent defect (e.g., a defective drill bit). In such a situation, it can be argued that the
statutorily defined place of first injury is the location where the product is first used by the plaintiff
rather than where it malfunctions, causing physical injury. The statute provides that a “plaintiff is
considered first injured where the trauma or exposure occurred” which suggests that, where there is
both exposure and trauma, the earlier should govern. Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiff, by using
the product, is “expos[ed]” to the risk even if the malfunction and injury occur later and at a
different location. Alternatively, one could argue that such a plaintiff is first “injured” (in the sense
of “damaged”) as soon as he or she purchases the defective product since the plaintiff is injured by
receiving a product that is less valuable than impliedly warranted.
104

This does not mean that the definitions were selected for neutral lexicographical reasons—one
might suspect that the defamation rule is intended to force suits against the media to be brought in
their home counties or that the loss of consortium rule was intended to reduce the venue options
available to married plaintiffs—but the definitions are not ones that are outside the range of
ordinary usage; and, there is nothing inherently improper about the majoritarian branches using
statutory definitions as a way of effectuating policy choices.
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There is, however, one statutory definition that does not seem to conform to
any ordinary usage of “first injury.” The Tort Reform Act provides that, for
purposes of determining venue in medical malpractice actions, “the plaintiff shall
be considered injured by the health care provider only in the county where the
plaintiff first received treatment by a defendant for a medical condition at issue in
the case.”105 As a result, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs may be “first
injured” in counties in which they were not, in any ordinary meaning of the word,
“injured” at all. For example, a doctor might first treat a patient for a shoulder
injury in an office in Johnson County, Kansas, and later perform surgery on the
shoulder for the same condition106 at a hospital in Jackson County, Missouri. In a
subsequent suit against that doctor, the patient will be treated as injured solely in
Kansas, even if the petition alleges that the only negligence and the only injury
occurred during the surgery at the Jackson County, Missouri hospital. Where
several health care providers are named as defendants, the definition treats all of
them as having injured the plaintiff in the same county, even if some of the
defendants never examined or treated the plaintiff in that county.107
While the Tort Reform Act defines “first injury” in some situations and
ordinary usage provides a reasonably clear answer in others, there are a range of
torts for which there is no self-evident location of first injury.108 For example,

105

§ 538.232.
As the example may suggest, courts will face difficult questions about whether to treat the
“medical condition at issue in the case” narrowly or broadly. See id.
106

107

Id. (“only in the county where the plaintiff first received treatment by a defendant for a medical
condition at issue in the case”) (emphasis added).
Unlike an earlier version of the bill, the definition directs the court to consider only treatment by
health care providers who are named as defendants. Thus, if the plaintiff does not name a referring
physician as a defendant, the location where that physician examined or treated the plaintiff will be
disregarded for venue purposes. Id. Under the earlier definition, a plaintiff could have been
considered first injured in a county where he or she was never seen or treated by any of the named
defendants. H.B. 393 (Introduced and Read First Time, Journal of the House, 1st Reg. Sess., 93d
Gen. Assem.185-86 (Jan. 31, 2005)) (emphasis added), available at www.house.mo.gov/
bills051/biltxt/intro/HB0393I.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (medical malpractice “plaintiff[s]
shall be considered injured by the health care provider in the county where the plaintiff was first
examined for the medical condition at issue in the case”) (emphasis added).
For reasons discussed infra note 96, section 538.232’s introductory phrase (“In any action
against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the rendering
of or failure to render health care services,”) should be interpreted as covering any civil action
containing a count alleging such a claim.
108
It does not seem tenable to argue that the word “injury” is limited to physical (or physical and
psychological) injury. See, e.g., State ex rel. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc. v. Ross, 163 S.W.3d 922, 925,
927-28 (Mo. 2005) (holding that the tort of “injurious falsehood,” which protects only against
pecuniary loss, is governed by section 516.120(4), the five year statute of limitation for an “injury
to the person or rights of another”).
In addition, such an argument would lead to the conclusion that the Tort Reform Act does not
provide any venue for torts that result in only economic harm since there would be a class of cases
that would be covered neither by section 508.010.2 (because they contain “a count alleging a tort”)
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the courts will face difficult interpretive issues in cases asserting causes of action
such as tortious interference, unfair competition, injurious falsehood,109 or
securities fraud that involve primarily economic injuries.110 But the need for this
type of case-by-case delineation of boundaries is the necessary result of
change—of the legislative decision to replace a fully fleshed out regime with one
that considers new factors that are seen as better serving the General Assembly’s
goals.
b. The Meaning of “Principal Place of Residence”
Under the tort venue rules, if the plaintiff was first injured outside the state,
it will often be necessary to determine the location of a party’s principal place of
residence.111 “Principal place of residence” is a newly created term of art,
statutorily defined as follows:
As used in this section [508.010], “principal place of residence” shall mean
the county which is the main place where an individual resides in the state of
Missouri. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the county of voter
registration at the time of injury is the principal place of residence. There
shall be only one principal place of residence. 112

This new term of art appears to have been created to avoid the effect of
previous Missouri case law that held that individuals resided wherever they were
physically present with some “degree of permanency” and therefore that they
could have multiple residences.113 Under the Tort Reform Act, an individual may
still have more than one residence, but he or she is limited to a single principal
place of residence, and venue will depend on principal place of residence rather
than residence simpliciter.
Under this definition, only an individual can have a principal place of
residence for venue purposes.114 Thus, a corporation, a limited liability company,
nor by either section 508.010.4 or section 508.010.5 (because the plaintiff would not be considered
to have been “injured” anywhere). While venue gaps do exist under tort reform, see supra, text
accompanying notes 206-09, there is no reason to distort the statutory language to create them
unnecessarily.
109

Injurious falsehood is not governed by section 508.010.8’s “first published” rule since it is not a
form of defamation. See Ross, 163 S.W.3d at 929.
110
For example, there are arguments that the first injury to a securities fraud victim occurs at four
different points in time—when deceived, when the stock is purchased, when the market learns of
the fraud, and when the stock is sold—and it is entirely possible that the stock certificates or the
victims could be in different locations at each of those times.
111

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(1) (2005). See supra, text accompanying notes 91-94.
§ 508.010.1.
113
See, e.g., State ex rel. Quest Commc’s Corp. v. Baldridge, 913 S.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996).
112

114

If the General Assembly had intended for corporations or other entities to be treated as having a
“principal place of residence,” there would have been no reason for it to use the narrowing word
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or other entity may have a residence, but does not have a principal place of
residence for purposes of section 508.010.115 This fact will have important venue
implications for corporate plaintiffs who are first injured outside the state.116
There is at least one set of situations in which the meaning of “principal
place of residence” is ambiguous. Suppose that an individual plaintiff has
multiple residences and that one of the out-of-state locations is the “main place”
that he resides. Section 508.010.1 nonetheless seems to require a finding that the
individual’s main in-state residence be treated as his “principal place of
residence” since it “is the main place where [he] resides in the state of
Missouri.”117 The italicized final words of the sentence appear to require the
court to identify the individual’s dominant Missouri residence, so long as he has
at least one residence within the state. This interpretation has practical
consequences since it will mean that any individual plaintiff who has any
residence in Missouri, even a secondary residence, may have an additional

“individual” in the definitional phrase “the main place where an individual resides in the state of
Missouri,” rather than using either the more generic word “party” or the word “person” which is
statutorily defined to include corporations and other entities. Compare, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020(11)
(2005) (“The word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to
partnerships and other unincorporated associations”) with § 1.030(2) (distinguishing between
“bodies corporate” and “individuals”).
Well known Missouri cases dealing with venue have, of course, regularly used the word
“individual” to refer to human parties as distinguished from corporate ones. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. 1991) (“The general venue statute, § 508.010,
is applicable when one or more corporations are sued together with one or more individuals”); State
ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 145,145-46 (Mo. 2002) (repeatedly
distinguishing between “individuals,” “nonprofit corporations,” and “for-profit corporations”);
State ex rel. Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. 2004) (“The plaintiffs sued
both resident and nonresident corporations and individuals “); id. at 506 (Benton, J., dissenting)
(“corporations must act through individuals”).
115

While the language of the statute is unambiguous, there are at least two structural arguments that
support the same conclusion. First, if corporations were deemed to have a principal place of
residence, there would have been no need to subdivide section 508.010.5 into separate subsections
for corporate and individual defendants. Second, section 508.010.1’s “rebuttable presumption that
the county of voter registration at the time of injury is the principal place of residence” would make
no sense if applied to a corporation.
It may seem odd that the General Assembly adopted a definition under which a general business
corporation, which by statute resides exclusively at its registered office, has no “principal place of
residence” for venue purposes. However, the legislature appears to have been well aware of this
anomaly. The defined term “principal place of residence” is used only in section 508.010.5, the
venue provision for out-of-state first injury tort cases. That section clearly distinguishes between
individuals and corporations. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(1) (2005) (applicable if “the
defendant is a corporation”) with § 508.010.5(2) (applicable if “the defendant is an individual”).
The only reason for the existence of a separate subsection 508.010.5(1) is to deal with the fact that
corporate defendants have no “principal place of residence” and to provide an alternative venue for
suits against them, the location of their registered agent.
116
117

See infra text accompanying notes 203-14.
§ 508.010.1 (emphasis added).
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available venue in tort cases involving out-of-state injuries.118 Similarly, it will
mean that individual defendants who have any Missouri residence will be subject
to suit in one additional venue in such cases.119
While this interpretation is the most literal reading of the language of the
Act, there is some indication that the drafters may have believed that an
individual could have a principal place of residence outside Missouri. The Act
explicitly creates “a rebuttable presumption that the county of voter registration
at the time of injury is the principal place of residence.”120 Such a presumption
may not be logically inconsistent with the literal reading,121 but it does seem to
cast doubt on that reading since it will sometimes dictate that the court should
presume, albeit rebuttably, that a party’s principal place of residence is in a
county outside the state. In addition, section 508.010.5 twice uses the phrase, “if
the plaintiff’s principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date
the plaintiff was first injured.”122 Similarly, section 508.010.5(2) uses the phrase
“any county of the individual defendant’s principal place of residence in the state
of Missouri.” 123 In both phrases, the words “in the state of Missouri” might seem
redundant unless a principal place of residence could sometimes be outside the
state. However, those words appear redundant regardless of whether one adopts
the literal interpretation, since Missouri state court venue could never be proper
in a county outside the state.124 Thus, while the question is not free from doubt,
these arguments against the literal interpretation seem insufficient to justify
departing from the plain meaning of the statutory text.

118

§ 508.010.5(1)-(2) .
§ 508.010.5(2).
120
§ 508.010.1.
121
One could simply decide that the presumption is automatically rebutted whenever the county of
voter registration is outside Missouri.
119

122

§ 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added) (as to cases against corporate defendants); § 508.010.5(2)
(emphasis added) (as to cases against individual defendants).
123
§ 508.010.5(2) (emphasis added). This phrase’s omission of the words “on the date the plaintiff
was first injured” may also suggest that venue is proper in any Missouri county where defendant
has ever had his or her principal place of residence. Compare § 508.010.5(2) (“venue shall be in
any county of the individual defendant’s principal place of residence in the state of Missouri”)
(emphasis added) with § 508.010.5(1) (“venue may be in the county of the plaintiff’s principal
place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured”) (emphasis added). But see §
508.010.9 (“In all actions, venue shall be determined as of the date the plaintiff was first injured”).
124

In addition to the textual argument, there may also be another reason to reject the literal
interpretation. It fails to reverse the outcome of cases like State ex rel. Quest Commc’ns Corp. v.
Baldridge, 913 S.W.2d 366, 369-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)—a reversal that may have been much of
the drafters’ motivation for adopting the new “principal place of residence” concept. Quest
Commc’ns held that the individual defendant, who was domiciled in Texas but had a second
residence in Missouri, resided in Missouri for venue purposes. Id. at 370. Under the literal
interpretation of the new Act, the result would not change since that second residence would be
treated as the defendant’s principal place of residence.
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c. Determining Venue as of the Date of First Injury
Under long-standing pre-tort reform case law, venue was determined as of
the time the case was “brought.”125 A case was deemed to have been “brought”
when filed or on the date of any subsequent amendment adding an additional
defendant.126 However, various provisions of the Tort Reform Act change this
rule. In three subsections, the Act specifically states that a particular predicate
for venue shall be determined as of the date of plaintiff’s first injury.127 More
generally, new section 508.010.9 provides, “[i]n all actions, venue shall be
determined as of the date the plaintiff was first injured.”128
The purpose, meaning, and application of this more general provision is not
entirely clear. Some crucial predicates for venue simply cannot be determined as
of the date of plaintiff’s first injury. For example, the question of whether there
is a “count alleging a tort”129 and the identities of the parties to the action cannot
be determined until suit is filed.130 The question of where a defendant “may be
found”131 cannot be determined until service has been effectuated since a
defendant is only “found” in a county if served in that county.132
On the other hand, when the predicate for venue is a time-variable fact
about a party, it is entirely possible to determine that fact “as of the date the

125

State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857-58 (Mo. 2001).
Id. at 858.
127
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005) (venue placed “in the county where the plaintiff was first
injured by the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action”); § 508.010.5(1)
(“plaintiff’s principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured”); § 508.010.5(2)
(same).
126

128

§ 508.010.9.
See, e.g., § 508.010.2; § 508.010.4; § 508.010.5.
130
The fact that a party could have asserted a particular claim does not make that claim a “count” in
the action since, in civil cases, a “count” is a subdivision of a petition (or similar pleading) that
asserts a separate and distinct claim. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 375 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “count” as “[i]n a complaint or similar pleading, the statement of a distinct claim”); MO.
R. CIV. P. 55.11 (distinguishing between underlying claims and the counts through which they are
asserted). A potential defendant never becomes a defendant until named in a pleading, and a
potential plaintiff does not become a plaintiff until he or she brings suit. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
450 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a “defendant” as “a person sued in a civil proceeding”); id. at 1188
(defining a “plaintiff” as “[t]he party who brings a civil suit in a court of law”). As a result, subsection 508.010.9 cannot be used to resolve issues of strategically deferred joinder of claims. See
infra text accompanying notes 635-74.
129

131

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2(1) (2005) (non-tort actions); § 508.010.6 (actions brought
by counties).

132

State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Manners, 161 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Mo. 2005) (statutory language
that requires that defendant be “found” within the county satisfied only if the defendant is served in
the county). See also § 508.020 (suits by attachment or replevin to be brought where property in
question may be found); § 416.121.1 (civil anti-trust actions for damages or injunctions may be
brought where, inter alia, a defendant, agent, officer, or representative may be found).
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plaintiff was first injured.” For example, the residence of the plaintiffs133 or
defendants,134 the location of a corporate defendant’s registered agent,135 the
principal place of residence of the plaintiff,136 the size of a municipal
corporation,137 or the location of various offices of a limited liability company138
are all facts that may change between the date of first injury and the date the
action is brought. Section 508.010.9 seems to dictate that all of them should be
determined as of the date of first injury rather than when a suit is filed.139
This result does lead to some grammatical awkwardness. Virtually all of
the provisions apparently affected by section 508.010.9 are worded in the present
tense;140 and it is odd, for example, to read a phrase like “[w]hen all defendants
are nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county” 141 as meaning
“[w]hen all defendant’s were nonresidents of the state at an earlier time, suit may
be brought in any county.” This awkwardness is aggravated in the new out-ofstate-injury tort case provisions142 because they mix present and past tense.
Section 508.010.5(1), for example, states:
If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any county where a
defendant corporation's registered agent is located or, if the plaintiff's
principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the
plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county of the plaintiff's
principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured.143

Considered alone, it is difficult not to read this section as requiring the
location of the defendant’s registered agent to be determined as of the present
time while requiring the principal place of residence of the plaintiff to be
determined as of the date of first injury.
Nonetheless, such a reading should be rejected. It would make section
508.010.9 a nullity, and would violate Missouri courts’ longstanding rule against

133

§ 508.010.2(1).
§ 508.010.2(1)-(3); § 508.010.6; § 508.072 (suits against issuers of bad checks to the department
of revenue).
134

135

§ 508.010.5(1).
§ 508.010.5(2).
137
§ 508.050 (providing special rule for cities containing more than four hundred thousand
inhabitants).
136

138

§ 347.069.2. See also, § 416.121.1 (civil anti-trust actions for damages or injunctions may be
brought, inter alia, where any defendant, officer, agent or representative may be found).
139

Section 508.010.9 specifically states that it is to apply “[i]n all actions . . . .” Unlike other
provisions of the Tort Reform Act, there is nothing in 508.010.9’s language or structure that limits
its application to actions governed by section 508.010 or to actions governed by Chapter 508.
Compare § 508.010.9 (“in all actions”) to § 508.010.1 (“As used in this section”) and to
§ 508.010.12 (“The provisions of this section”) and to § 508.011 (“the provisions of this chapter”).
140

See authorities cited at notes 133-39.
§ 508.010.2(4) (emphasis added).
142
§ 508.010.5(1)-(2).
143
§ 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added).
141
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interpretations that assume that the legislature inserted “superfluous or
meaningless words in a statute.”144 It would also refuse to give the words of the
section their ordinary comprehensive meaning. Section 508.010.9 begins with
the phrase, “In all actions.”145 Those words are general, but they are not vague or
ambiguous, and they should—to the extent possible—be given the allencompassing meaning they naturally convey.
C. Multiple Party Problems After Tort Reform
1. Pre-Tort Reform Principles for Multiple Defendant Cases
Prior to tort reform, Missouri courts had adopted a set of principles to cover
the venue issues that arose when multiple defendants had been joined in the same
case. The defendants in such cases frequently argued that the venue rules should
be applied separately to each defendant, and that venue would be proper only
where the separately determined venues overlapped.146
As a general rule, the Court rejected those arguments. For example, when
multiple not-for-profit corporations were sued, venue was proper under former
section 355.176.4147 in the county where any one of them had its principal place
of business, even if the cause of action accrued elsewhere and the other
defendants had neither their principal places of business nor their registered

144

Dodd v. Independence Stove & Furnace Co., 330 Mo. 662, 671, 51 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Mo.1932)
(“Legislature will not be presumed to have intended using superfluous or meaningless words in a
statute.”). See also, Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of St. Louis v. Members of Bd. of Aldermen of
City of St. Louis, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. 2003) (court should not assume that legislature inserted
“idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.” (quoting Hyde Park Hous. P’ship v. Dir. of
Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. 1993)). Knob Noster Educ. Ass’n. v. Knob Noster R-VIII Sch.
Dist., 101 S.W.3d 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“We should not interpret statutes in a way which will
render some of their phrases to be mere surplusage.”) (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Local Gov't. Ret.
Sys. v. Bill, 935 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
Admittedly, there is some rule against surplusage problem even if one interprets section
508.010.9 broadly since such an interpretation makes section 508.010.5’s explicit “on the date the
plaintiff was first injured” language redundant. (If section 508.010.9 means that all questions of
parties’ status are determined as of the date of first injury, there was no need for the out-state-injury
provision to specify that plaintiff’s principal place of residence was to be determined as of that
date.) However, it seems more likely that the specific language of section 508.010.9 represented a
“belt and suspenders” form of cautious redundancy than that the general language of section
508.010.9 was inserted for no purpose at all.
145

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.9.
State ex rel. BJC Health Sys. Christian Hosp. v. Neill, 121 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. 2003)
(multiple not-for-profit defendants; venue asserted under former 355.176.4); State ex rel. Jinkerson
v. Koehr, 826 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Mo. 1992) (multiple individual defendants and multiple for-profit
corporation defendants; venue asserted under former section 508.010(2); Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d
113, 115 (Mo. 1978) (multiple for-profit corporation defendants; venue asserted under former
section 508.040)).
146

147

MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000).
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offices in that county.148 Similarly, when multiple for-profit corporations were
sued, venue was proper under former section 508.040149 in the county where any
one of them had an office or agent even though the other defendants had no
office or agent in that county.150 As a general rule, venue was considered proper
over all defendants if venue was proper as to any defendant.151
This general rule was, however, subject to a significant restriction; it
applied only if the defendants were jointly or commonly liable.152 If the injuries
to the plaintiff were “inseparable and indistinguishable,” venue was proper for
one defendant if it was proper for any defendant.153 On the other hand, if the
injuries were separate and distinct, venue over the multiple defendant suit would
be proper only if it would have been proper as to each defendant if they had been
sued separately.154 As a result, a plaintiff who was injured in an automobile
accident and further damaged by the malpractice of a hospital that treated her for
those injuries could sue both defendants in any county where either resided since
the defendants were jointly liable for any damage resulting from the
malpractice.155 On the other hand, a plaintiff who was injured by two defendants
in separate automobile accidents could only sue in a county where venue would
have been proper as to both defendants, since neither would have be liable for
any of the damage caused by the other.156
2. Post-Tort Reform Rules for Multiple Defendant Cases
These pre-tort reform principles clearly continue to apply to non-tort cases
governed by 508.010.2 since the language of that section is functionally identical
to the language of former 508.010(1)-(4).157 Equally clearly, new section
538.232 renders pre-tort reform principles irrelevant in most multiple defendant

148

BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530.
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (2000).
150
Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Mo. 1978).
151
For those inclined to think in Venn diagrams, venue was not limited to the intersection of the
sets of separately determined proper venues. Instead it was proper anywhere in the union of those
sets.
149

152

BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530. It was enough that the defendants were jointly or
commonly liable for a part of the plaintiff’s damages. See State ex rel. Bitting v. Adolf, 704
S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. 1986) (venue proper where defendants “share liability for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against them”).
153

BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530; Jinkerson, 826 S.W.2d at 348.
BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530; Jinkerson, 826 S.W.2d at 348.
155
See State ex rel. Bitting v. Adolf, 704 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. 1986).
156
See Jinkerson, 826 S.W.2d at 348. See also, State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d
290, 291-92 (Mo. 1979) (same result where accidents were six days apart). The fact that it may be
proper to join the two defendants in the same lawsuit under Rule 52.05’s permissive joinder rule
does not itself make venue proper. MO. R. CIV. P. 51.01; Turnbough, 589 S.W.2d at 291-92;
Jinkerson, 826 S.W.2d at 348; BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530.
154

157

Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005) with MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1)-(4)(2000).
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medical malpractice cases since it dictates that all injuries shall be deemed to
have taken place “where the plaintiff first received treatment by a defendant for a
medical condition at issue in the case.”158 Similarly, 508.010.4 provides a
chronological priority rule that trumps pre-tort reform principles when the
plaintiff is first injured within the state. For example, a plaintiff who is injured in
a Jackson County automobile accident and then taken to a Clay County hospital
where she is further damaged by malpractice will have no choice of venues.
Since the first injury was in Missouri, 508.010.4 dictates that “venue shall be in
the county where the plaintiff was first injured by the wrongful acts or negligent
conduct alleged in the action,”159 i.e., in Jackson County. Even though the
liability is joint or common, the plaintiff cannot sue in Clay County, a venue that
would have been available under pre-tort reform principles.160
Slightly more difficult issues are raised by multiple-defendant cases
covered by the out-of-state first injury provisions. If all defendants are
corporations, the text of 508.010.5(1) indicates that venue is proper in any county
where any defendant’s registered agent is located. That subsection begins by
referring to “the defendant,” but it then goes on to say that venue will be proper
“in any county where a defendant corporation’s registered agent is located.”161
The use of the indefinite article “a” denotes membership in the class and is
considered a synonym for “one” or “any.”162 Its use in this provision,
particularly in conjunction with the earlier use of “any county,” recognizes that
there may be more than one corporate defendant and that venue would be proper
where any such defendant’s registered agent is located.

158

MO. REV. STAT. § 538.232 (2005). Since each defendant will be deemed to have first injured the
plaintiff in the same county, the tort venue rules will prescribe the same venue for each defendant
so long as the first treatment by a defendant took place in Missouri. If the first treatment was
outside the state, the rules for multiple defendant out-of-state first injury cases will apply. See
infra, text accompanying notes 161-68.
One article has suggested that 538.232 should be read to provide that malpractice plaintiffs
should be considered inured“only in the county where the defendant first received treatment by
[that] defendant for a medical condition at issue in the case.” Paul Passante & Dawn Mefford, The
Effect of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice, 61 J. Mo. Bar. 236, ___ (2005)(bracketed change in
the article). However, the article cites no authority or reason for the this reading and it appears to
be entirely inconsistent with the language of the section.
159

§ 508.010.4 (emphasis added). Section 538.232 does not dictate a contrary result since it only
specifies the county where “the plaintiff shall be considered injured by the health care provider”—
not the county where the plaintiff will be considered first injured in the action as a whole. See
supra note 96.
160

For a caveat regarding cases in which joinder is improper under Rule 52.05 (because the cases
against the two defendants do not arise out of the same transaction or share no common questions)
or in which joinder is proper under Rule 52.05 but there would be no joint or common liablity, see
infra section 4.
161
162

§ 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 3 (8th ed. 2004).
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If all defendants are individuals, the out-of-state injury provision’s text is
somewhat less clear, but nonetheless indicates that venue will be proper where
any defendant’s principal place of residence is located. Section 508.010.5(2)
provides that, “[i]f the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in any
county of the individual defendant’s principal place of residence.”163 If read
literally and in isolation, that language suggests that a single individual defendant
could have more than one “principal place of residence,” a conclusion that is
belied by 508.010.1 which explicitly provides that there can be only one.164
Instead, the language should be read in light of Missouri’s statutory dictate that
language describing a party in the singular should be interpreted as including the
plural unless the context makes such an interpretation unreasonable.165 Read in
this way, 508.010.5(2) is entirely consistent: If the defendants are individuals,
venue is proper in any county that is the principal place of residence of a
defendant.166
Finally, the out-of-state injury venue provisions contain an apparent lacuna:
they appear to provide no venue at all if plaintiff was first injured outside
Missouri and the defendants are a mix of individuals and corporations. Even if
one reads 508.010.5(1) as covering situations in which “the defendant[s are one
or more] corporation[s]” and 508.010.5(2) as covering situations in which “the
defendant[s are one or more] individual[s],” there is no 508.010.5(3) covering
situations in which the defendants are a mix of corporations and individuals.167

163

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
§ 508.010.1 (2005) (“There shall be only one principal place of residence.”)
165
§ 1.030(2) (2005) (“When any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to by
words importing the singular number or the masculine gender, several matters and persons, and
females as well as males, and bodies corporate as well as individuals, are included.”); State ex rel.
BJC Health Sys. & Christian Hosp. v. Neill, 121 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. 2003) (singular terms to be
interpreted as including the plural unless that interpretation would be “repugnant to” the context);
State ex inf. Gentry v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S.W.2d 64, 80 (Mo. 1928) (same).
164

166

This reading is consistent with interpretive principles set forth in pre-tort-reform case law. See,
e.g., BJC Health Sys., 121 S.W.3d at 530 (reading the sentence “[s]uits against a nonprofit
corporation shall be commenced only in . . . the county in which the nonprofit corporation
maintains its principal place of business” as meaning “[s]uits against [one or more] nonprofit
corporations shall be commenced in . . . the county in which any of the nonprofit corporations
maintains its principal place of business”) (emphasis added); Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 11415 (Mo. 1978) (reading the phrase “any county where such corporations shall have or usually keep
an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary business" MO. REV. STAT. §
508.040 (2000) (emphasis added) as meaning “where one or more of the corporations has an office
or agent of the specified type”) (emphasis added).
For the special problems posed if some of the defendants are not properly joined or if they are
properly joined but do not have joint or common liability to the plaintiff, see infra, section 4.
167
§ 508.010.5 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, there is no other statute that would apply to such a situation if
508.010.5 does not cover it.168
Pre-tort-reform case law does not fill this gap. In State ex rel. Dick Proctor
Imports, Inc. v. Gaertner,169 the Court interpreted former section 508.040 as
applying only if all defendants were for-profit corporations, and stated that the
more general provisions of former 508.010(2) would apply where such
corporations and individuals were sued together.170 However, Dick Proctor
Imports provides no solution to the present problem, since there is no longer a
catch-all statute comparable to former 508.010(2).171 Reliance on State ex rel.
SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill,172 would be similarly unavailing. In that
case, the Court held that the former not-for-profit venue statute173 was the
exclusive statute applicable to cases in which any not-for-profit corporation was
a party even if individuals or for-profit corporations were also named
defendants.174 However, even if 508.010.5 were given equally exclusive effect,
there is nothing in it that prescribes venue in cases against a mix of individual
and corporate defendants.
Faced with this gap, the Court should choose to fill it by interpolation.175
The General Assembly, through its “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law” language, has expressed its intention that 508.010.5 should be the sole
source for venue rules in all cases in which a plaintiff is first injured outside
Missouri, and the Court should honor that intention to the extent that it is

168

Section 508.010.2 only applies to cases in which “there is no count alleging a tort,” and section
508.010.5 declares itself to be the exclusive by stating “Notwithstanding any other provisions of
law, in all actions in which there is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was injured
outside the state of Missouri, venue shall be determined as follows.” § 508.010.5 (emphasis
added).
169

671 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984).
Id. at 274-75.
171
See supra note 168.
172
78 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2002).
173
MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2005).
174
State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2002). It based its refusal
to apply any other venue statute on the statutory language stating that “suits against a nonprofit
corporation shall be commenced only in specified counties.” Id. at 141 (italics and bold face in
the original).
170

175

Construing statutes through interpolation has long been recognized as a legitimate role for the
courts. See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933) (proper for court to decide
“which choice it is more likely that Congress would have made” if it had directly dealt with the
issue); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 388 (1948) (proper for court to decide issue
as legislators would have if they had “acted at the time of the legislation with the present situation
in mind”). See also, OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 303 (1881) (court must “work out,
from what is expressly said and done, what would have been said with regard to events not
definitely before the minds of the parties [to a contract], if those events had been considered”). For
a Missouri example dealing with venue, see State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 274
S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Mo. 1954) (interpreting former sections 508.040 and 508.010(2) and applying
the former even though the court claimed that neither expressly covered the situation).

620

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

possible to do so. The text of 508.010.5 does not itself identify the rule for
proper venue in cases filed against a mix of corporate and individual defendants,
but it strongly points toward the contours of such a rule.176 The most reasonable
inference is that the General Assembly intended to authorize venue in any county
which was either the principal place of residence of at least one individual
defendant or the location of the registered agent of at least one corporate
defendant.177 While one cannot be sure that this rule precisely reflects the
legislative will, it seems more likely to do so than the alternatives. “Here as so
often there is a choice between uncertainties. We must be content to choose the
lesser.”178
3. Post-Tort Reform Principles for Multiple Plaintiff Cases
The Tort Reform Act’s tort-case venue rules raise at least three troublesome
questions regarding cases in which there are multiple plaintiffs. First, which
subsection applies, 508.010.4 or 508.010.5, if some plaintiffs were first injured
within the state and some were first injured outside the state?179 Second, what is
meant by “the county where the plaintiff was first injured” if some plaintiffs were
first injured in one Missouri county and others were first injured in another?180
Third, what is meant by the “county of the plaintiff’s principal place of
residence” in cases in which plaintiffs injured outside the state have different
Missouri principal places of residence?181 The first two questions can be

176

In addition, unlike some of the situations to be discussed elsewhere in this article, there is no
reason to believe that the legislature would have wanted there to be no venue available in Missouri.
It would be odd indeed to provide that suits can be brought in Missouri against corporations that
have registered agents in the state, and that suits can be brought in Missouri against individuals
with principal places of residence in the state, but that suits cannot be brought in Missouri if
plaintiff joins the two types of defendants in a single action. It would be equally odd to think that
the legislature intended to force plaintiffs to divide such suits and file them in separate counties.
177
If the Court believed that the General Assembly intended to be more restrictive it could adopt a
two stage rule under which (1) venue was proper only in any county which was both the principal
place of residence of at least one individual defendant and the location of the registered agent of at
least one corporate defendant, and (2) if no such county existed, venue was proper in any county
which was either the principal place of residence of at least one individual defendant or the location
of the registered agent of at least one corporate defendant.
178

Burnet, 288 U.S. at 288 (Cardozo, J.).
While situations in which a tort inflicts injuries on different plaintiffs in different states or
counties are infrequent, they do occur. Of course, typical automobile accident cases or assaults
rarely do so except in the imaginative hypotheticals sometimes invented by law professors to
bedevil students on final exams. However, business or environmental torts frequently cause
injuries to multiple victims in multiple locales. It is not unusual, for example, for consumer fraud
to injure victims in many states. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th
Cir. 2002)(nationwide consumer fraud and breach of warranty plaintiffs.
179

180
181

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005).
§ 508.010.5.

2007]

VENUE IN MISSOURI AFTER TORT REFORM

621

answered with some degree of confidence using essentially the same analysis.
The third is more puzzling.
The Tort Reform Act provides two sets of venue rules for tort cases, one
applicable “in all actions . . . in which the plaintiff was first injured in the state of
Missouri”182 and the other applicable “in all actions . . . in which the plaintiff was
first injured outside the state of Missouri.”183 On its face, the act does not seem
to indicate how these rules apply in actions in which some plaintiffs are first
injured within the state and some outside it. However, the Missouri legislature
has mandated184 that singular terms in its statutes should be construed as
including their plural forms “unless there be something in the subject or context
repugnant to such construction.”185 Under this canon, the two sections must be
construed as if they read respectively “in all actions . . . in which the plaintiff [or
plaintiffs were] first injured in the state of Missouri” and “in all actions . . . in
which the plaintiff [or plaintiffs were] first injured outside the state of Missouri.”
Construed in this way, the criterion for selecting between the two sections is
reasonably clear.186 Plaintiffs collectively were first injured where the first

182

§ 508.010.4.
§ 508.010.5.
184
§ 1.030(2) (“When any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to by words
importing the singular number or the masculine gender, several matters and persons, and females as
well as males, and bodies corporate as well as individuals, are included”).
183

185

State ex rel. BJC Health Sys. & Christian Hosp. v. Neill, 121 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. 2003)
(quoting State ex inf. Gentry v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 321 Mo. 461, 12 S.W.2d 64, 80 (Mo.
1928)).
186

Even reading the sections in this way, it would still be possible to construe “plaintiffs” in each
section distributively, i.e., to construe the sections as applying only if all the individual injuries to
the plaintiffs were suffered either in the state or outside it. However, if the legislature intended the
sections to be interpreted distributively, one would have expected it to convey that intent explicitly,
for example by providing that 508.010.4 applied “in all actions . . . in which [every rather than] the
plaintiff was injured outside the state.” This is particularly true for two reasons: First, the
distributive reading is inconsistent with pre-tort reform case law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bartlett v.
McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W. 2d 393, 395 (Mo. 1951) (stating that the word “defendant” in
former section 508.010(1) should be interpreted in the collective sense) (overruled on other
grounds by State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820,821 (Mo. 1994)).
Second, the distributive interpretation would lead to a venue gap since neither section would apply
to cases in which there were both in-state and out-of-state first injuries.
Even more paradoxically, the distributive interpretation would create a venue gap even where the
two sections, applied to the two types of plaintiffs separately, would dictate the same Missouri
venue. For example, if the in-state first injuries and the defendant’s registered agent were both in
Jackson County, Missouri, 508.010.4 would seem to authorize venue in Jackson County for the instate plaintiffs (because it was the place of their first injury) and 508.010.5 would seem to authorize
the same venue for the out-of-state plaintiffs (because it was the location of defendant’s registered
agent). But under the distributive interpretation, neither section would apply (since the action is
neither one in which every plaintiff was first injured in the state nor one in which every plaintiff
was first injured outside the state) and there would therefore be no proper venue in Missouri.
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plaintiff was injured.187 The court should identify the first injury suffered by any
of the plaintiffs and utilize 508.010.4 if that injury occurred in Missouri and
508.010.5 if it occurred outside the state.
A similar analysis leads to the parallel result in cases in which all plaintiffs
were first injured within the state but they suffered their first injuries in different
Missouri counties. In that situation, section 508.010.4 provides that “venue shall
be in the county where the plaintiff was first injured by the wrongful acts or
negligent conduct alleged in the action,”188 but the singular words “the plaintiff”
must be read as including the plural.189 The plaintiffs collectively were first
injured in the Missouri county where the first plaintiff was injured and venue
should be limited to that county. This conclusion is reinforced by the final words
of the section which suggest that venue should be limited to the location of the
first injury caused by “the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the
action,” i.e., the first injury suffered by any of the plaintiffs due to that conduct.
The two previous multiple plaintiff venue problems could be resolved
textually because the statute, by focusing on the chronologically first injury,
provides a criterion for choosing among alternative interpretations. The third
problem—proper venue when multiple victims of an out-of-state tort have
different Missouri principal places of residence—is more difficult because it does
not have an obvious, text-based prioritizing principle. Section 508.010.5
provides that venue in such cases “may be in the county containing the plaintiff’s
principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured.”190 As the
previous discussion suggests, Missouri law requires the Court to construe the
phrase “plaintiff’s principal place of residence” as if it read “plaintiff’s [or
plaintiffs’] principal place[s] of residence,” but that does not resolve the matter.
Unlike the previous situations, in which the plaintiffs—treated collectively—
were first injured in a single location, the plaintiffs in this situation—treated
collectively—have no single principal place of residence. The plaintiffs must
necessarily be treated distributively, i.e., as having separate principal places of
residence. As a result, the Court will face a choice: 191 It can interpret 508.010.5
as permitting venue in every county in which any plaintiff’s principal place of
residence is located—thus giving the plaintiff a variety of optional venues.
Alternatively, it can interpret the section as permitting venue only in a county in
which every plaintiff has his or her principal place of residence—thus forcing the
plaintiffs (who, by hypothesis, do not share a single county of principal place of
residence) to file their suits separately. There is something to be said in favor of
187
See, e.g., Bartlett, 238 S.W.2d at 395 (stating that the word “defendant” in former section
508.010(1) should be interpreted in the collective sense) (overruled on other grounds by DePaul
Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 821.
188

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005)
See supra authorities cited at notes 165-66.
190
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5 (2005).
191
Under either interpretation, if the defendant’s principal place of residence or registered agent is
located in a Missouri county, the plaintiffs could assert venue in that county.
189
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each of these interpretations. Consider, for example, the Missouri passengers of
a van struck in Kansas by a Kansas resident drunk driver. On the one hand, it
seems unlikely that the legislature intended to require the passengers to file
separate suits just because they reside in different Missouri counties. At the same
time, since one goal of the Tort Reform Act was to restrict plaintiffs’ ability to
shop for venues, the legislature may not have wanted to permit them all to file
suit in the most plaintiff-friendly county in which any of them reside.
4. A Caveat Regarding Multiple Party Cases After Tort Reform
This discussion of venue in multiple party cases is subject to an important
caveat: it assumes that the parties have been properly joined. In cases in which
joinder is improper under Rule 52.05 (because the cases by or against multiple
parties do not arise out of the same transaction or share no common questions),
State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr192 would continue to suggest that the proper
remedy is to sever the claims under Rule 52.06 and to transfer any claims for
which venue would not be proper.193
More difficult questions are raised in the relatively rare cases in which
joinder of defendants is proper under Rule 52.05 even though there is no joint or
common liability. State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner194 suggests that an
overlapping venue would have to be found since Rule 51.01 forbids interpreting
a civil rule to expand venue.195 However, after tort reform, it is the enactment of
statutory provisions (508.010.4 and 5)—rather than the interpretation of a civil
rule (Rule 52.05)—that extends venue in such cases; and there is, of course,
nothing that forbids the legislature from extending or restricting venue. It is
unclear whether the courts’ repeated statements that the “common or joint
liability, not joinder, is the touchstone for the determination of whether venue
may be predicated on the residence of a co-defendant”196 continue to apply after
the enactment of the Tort Reform Act’s venue provisions. Similarly, the Court
will face the problem of whether there is any constraining principle other than the
joinder rules when venue of one plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the principal
place of residence of a co-plaintiff.197

192

826 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1992).
Id. at 348.
194
589 S.W.2d 290 (Mo. 1979).
195
Id. at 291-92.
196
State ex rel. BJC Health Sys. & Christian Hosp. v. Neill, 121 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Mo. 2003); State
ex rel. Farrell v. Sanders, 897 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); State ex rel. Sims v. Sanders,
886 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
193

197

The concept of common or joint liability cannot provide such a constraint since it describes the
liability of multiple defendants to a single plaintiff rather than the rights of multiple plaintiffs
against one or more defendant.

624

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

D. Gaps in the Post-Tort Reform Venue Structure
The pre-tort reform version of section 508.010 contained a comprehensive
residual venue scheme. Since each defendant must necessarily be a resident or a
non-resident, and since 508.010(1)-(4) covered every combination of resident
and non-resident defendants,198 those sections were always available to supply a
venue if more specific venue statutes failed to do so.199 Venue gaps were
impossible since 508.010 was always available to fill them.
However, since the Tort Reform Act repealed the residual venue provision,
this is no longer the case. As indicated in the previous section,200 there are a
number of situations in which an apparent venue gap exists but can be filled
either by a plausible interpretation of the relevant post-tort reform statutes201 or
by interpolation.202 Unfortunately, there are also some venue gaps that are so
clearly commanded by the statutory that no such simple solution exists.
The difficulty centers on the new venue provisions for tort cases in which
the plaintiff is first injured outside the state of Missouri.203 Section 508.010.5
states:
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there
is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured outside
the state of Missouri, venue shall be determined as follows:
(1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in any county
where a defendant corporation's registered agent is located or, if the plaintiff's
principal place of residence was in the state of Missouri on the date the
plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the county of the plaintiff's
principal place of residence on the date the plaintiff was first injured;

198

The only possible literal exception to the comprehensive coverage of former section 508.010
(1)-(4) was the situation in which there were several defendants, all of whom were residents of the
same Missouri county. However, this situation has long been held to be covered by section
508.010(1). State ex rel. Bartlett v. McQueen, 361 Mo. 1029, 238 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1951) (stating
that the section applies in multiple defendant cases) (overruled on other grounds by State ex rel.
DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Mo. 1994). But see, State ex rel. Ford
Motor Co. v. Manners, 161 S.W.3d 373, 375 n.3 (Mo. 2005) (assuming but not deciding that the
second option provided by former section 508.010(1) is available in multiple defendant cases).
199

By its own terms, former section 508.010 applied to all suits begun by summons unless venue
was “otherwise provided by law.” MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000). See, e.g., State ex rel. Dick
Proctor Imp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. 1984) (former section 508.010 applicable
when former section 508.040 inapplicable).
200

See supra Part III.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
202
See supra text accompanying notes 190-91.
203
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(1)-(2) (2005).
The other provisions present no significant gap problems. The non-tort provisions of §
508.010.2 are modeled after former sections MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1)-(4) (2000), and are
equally comprehensive. Current MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005) prescribes the county of first
injury as the proper venue for every tort cases in which the first injury was within Missouri and—
with the avoidable exceptions noted supra Part III.C—leaves no apparent venue gaps.
201
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(2) If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in any county
of the individual defendant's principal place of residence in the state of
Missouri or, if the plaintiff's principal place of residence was in the state of
Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in the
county containing the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date the
plaintiff was first injured.204

This section is unequivocally exclusive. It begins by stating that its rules
apply “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” and that (at least if the
defendants are individuals or corporations)205 those rules cover “all actions in
which there is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff was first injured
outside the state of Missouri.”206 It continues by stating that “venue shall be
determined” according to the rules it prescribes.207 The General Assembly has
emphatically stated its intention that, for tort cases where the plaintiff was first
injured outside Missouri and the defendants are either corporations or
individuals, the exclusive available venues are those prescribed by 508.010.5(1)
and (2).
However, while 508.010.5 is exclusive, it is not comprehensive. If the
plaintiff has no principal place of residence in Missouri and the defendant is
either a corporation with no Missouri registered agent or an individual with no
Missouri principal place of residence, the statute provides no venue at all. If the
defendant is a corporation, section 508.010.5(1) authorizes venue in the county in
which the corporate defendant’s registered agent is located; but an unregistered
foreign corporation will have no registered agent located in any Missouri
county.208 If the defendant is an individual, section 508.010.5(2) authorizes
venue in the county in which the defendant’s principal place of residence is
located; but non-resident individuals have no principal place of residence in
Missouri.209 If the defendant is either a corporation or an individual, the two
subsections also permit venue in the county in which the plaintiff’s principal
place of residence is located. However, many plaintiffs will have no principal
place of residence, either because they are not individuals—and only individuals
can have principal places of residence210—or because they did not, at the time of
first injury, have any residence within the state.211 As a result, there is a class of
cases for which section 508.010 provides no available venue at all.

204

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5 (2005).
The applicability of section 508.010.5 to non-corporate entities is discussed infra Part III.E.
206
§ 508.010.5 (emphasis added).
207
Id. (emphasis added).
208
§ 508.010.5(1). The possibility that wrongs might be committed by unregistered foreign
corporations or nonresident individuals was recognized by former MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(4)
(2000) (providing venue in any county if all defendants were nonresidents).
205

209

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.1 (2005); § 508.010.5(2).
As discussed in Part III.B.2.b, “principal place of residence” is a specifically defined term that
only applies to individuals.
210

211

§ 508.010.5(1)-(2).
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A few examples may illustrate the problem. Suppose that a Missouri
corporation is defamed by a national newspaper published by a Florida
corporation not registered in Missouri. The newspaper is widely distributed in
Missouri; but, since the paper is first published in its home state, the plaintiff
corporation is statutorily deemed to have been first injured in Florida.212 Even if
all of its operations are in Missouri, the plaintiff corporation has no principal
place of residence213 and cannot base venue on its own location. Since the
newspaper has no registered agent in Missouri, the plaintiff cannot base venue on
the location of the defendant’s registered agent. Under the Tort Reform Act,
there is simply no Missouri county in which venue is proper.214
Similarly, suppose a cabinetmaker who resides in Kansas orders a power
saw from an unregistered foreign corporation215 and asks it to ship the saw to his
shop in Kansas City, Missouri. If the saw malfunctions and injures the
cabinetmaker while he is working at his home or on a job in Kansas, there will be
no Missouri county in which venue will be proper under section 508.010.5.216

212

§ 508.010.8.
§ 508.010.1. See infra, note 114-16, and accompanying text.
214
While the example involves a plaintiff corporation, the same result would be reached if the
plaintiff was, e.g., a limited company or an individual who did not reside in the state on the date of
first publication. The result would also be the same if the plaintiff added the reporters and editors
involved in the story unless at least one of them had a Missouri principal place of residence.
213

215

The fact that a corporation ships product into Missouri would not require it to register as a
foreign corporation in the state. § 351.572.2(8).
216

Neither alternative provided by section 508.010.5(1) will be available since the cabinetmaker
has no Missouri principal place of residence and the defendant has no Missouri registered agent.
The situation of the cabinetmaker is aggravated by the fact that he will probably not be able to sue
in Kansas either. Since the defendant corporation did not "purposefully avail[] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state” and since it was the “unilateral activity”
of the plaintiff cabinetmaker that brought the saw into Kansas, the defendant will likely be held not
to have had sufficient minimum contacts with the state to justify long arm jurisdiction. WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
There are rare situations in which the lack of a permissible Missouri venue may mean that there
will be no state or federal court in which the case could be brought. Suppose that a plaintiff
purchases a product from a defendant in Missouri and the product subsequently malfunctions and
injures plaintiff in Kansas. Suppose further that, at the time of the injury both parties were Kansas
residents, but before suit is filed both have become citizens of Missouri. Since the first injury was
suffered outside Missouri and since neither party had a Missouri principal place of residence at the
time of first injury, there is no proper venue in Missouri. Since both parties are citizens of the same
state at the time of filing, there will be no federal diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
And since the product was taken to Kansas by the unilateral act of the plaintiff, Kansas will not
have long arm jurisdiction over the defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. Unless
plaintiff is able to assert transient jurisdiction over defendant in Kansas by serving him there after
suit is filed, there appears to be no court—state or federal, Missouri or Kansas—in which suit could
be filed. Admittedly, this is a law professor’s hypothetical, but it illustrates the difficulties created
by the fact that the Tort Reform Act’s venue provisions often turn on the status of parties on the
date of first injury, while many related doctrines turn on their status as of the date of filing.
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Despite the unequivocally exclusive language of that section,217 the Court
might try to fill this gap by looking to other provisions, but there appear to be
none that can serve that purpose. There is no longer a comprehensive residual
statute such as former section 508.010(1)-(4).218 Current section 508.010.2
cannot serve the function since it is explicitly limited to “actions in which there is
no count alleging a tort.”219 There appears to be no other venue statute that one
could plausibly argue covers this class of cases.
Nor does there appear to be any plausible interpretation of section
508.010.5 under which the gap is closed. It simply is not possible to designate a
Missouri “principal place of residence” for an individual who has no Missouri
residence at all, or to locate the Missouri county “where a defendant
corporation’s registered agent is located” if it has no registered agent in Missouri.
One could shrink the gap slightly by treating plaintiff corporations as having a
“principal place of residence,” but doing so would require ignoring the statutory
text while only marginally reducing the problem.
Finally, interpretive interpolation does not seem appropriate in this situation
since it is entirely possible that the gap was intentional. The legislature explicitly
directed that, for plaintiffs who were first injured outside Missouri, the only
available venues are those prescribed by sections 508.010.5(1) and (2).220 Both
the text of H.B. 393 and its history suggest that the 93rd General Assembly
intended the bill to significantly reduce plaintiffs’ ability to choose favorable fora
in which to bring their cases. The members of the General Assembly may have
believed that it was appropriate to deny any Missouri state court forum to persons
they may have seen as out-of-state plaintiffs suing out-of-state defendants for
out-of-state injuries. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not appropriate
to fill a gap that the legislative intended to create. Interpretive interpolation
should be used to effectuate an imperfectly expressed legislative purpose, not to
frustrate the legislature’s intentions.
That does not, however, mean that the Court should leave the gap unfilled.
While courts must “give deference to legislative enactments, those enactments
must yield to constitutional mandates.” 221 Regardless of the General Assembly’s
intention, there are serious questions about whether the Missouri Constitution
permits the legislature to close all state court doors to plaintiffs asserting
recognized causes of action over which Missouri courts have subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs may argue that the existence of
such legislation violates the Missouri Bill of Rights’ open courts provision222 on
the ground that it “arbitrarily or unreasonably bars individuals or classes of
217

See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
Former MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000) was explicitly repealed by the Tort Reform Act. 2005
Mo. Laws 655, 655.
218

219

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005).
See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
221
Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 554 (Mo. 2000).
222
MO. CONST. art. I § 14 (“That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.”).
220
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individuals from accessing our courts in order to enforce recognized causes of
action for personal injury."223 They may also argue that it is inconsistent with
Article III, section 14(a)’s grant of “original jurisdiction over all cases and
matters, civil and criminal” to the circuit courts.224
A full explication or evaluation of the constitutional arguments is outside
the scope of this article. However, if those arguments are accepted, the Court
will face the puzzling task of defining what venue is appropriate in cases for
which the legislature has—albeit unconstitutionally—denied the propriety of any
venue. Given the lack of legislative guidance and the absence of any residual
venue statute, the Court will have little choice but to declare that venue over such
cases will be proper in any Missouri county,225 leaving it to subsequent
legislatures to restrict venue further if they deem it appropriate to do so.

223

Wheeler v. Briggs, 941 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Mo. 1997) (Holstein, C.J., dissenting); see also,

Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Mo. 2000) (quoting Wheeler dissent with approval).
At least intuitively, the open courts argument against venue gaps seems persuasive. Section
508.010 does not merely “‘[re]design the framework of substantive law’ by abolishing or
modifying common law or statutorily based claims.” Id. at 550 (quoting Harrell v. Total Health
Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1989)). Nor does it merely impose troublesome but
surmountable barriers to be overcome before filing suit. See Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs.,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991) (rejecting open courts challenge to requirement of affidavit
before filing medical malpractice case). Instead, the gap creates an insurmountable barrier,
absolutely preventing plaintiffs from bringing recognized causes of action in any Missouri state
court, regardless of how diligently they act. See Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.
1986) (striking down under open courts provision, a statute of limitations as applied to a minor who
was legally incapable of filing suit on his own behalf before the statute expired); Randolph v. City
of Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257 S.W. 449, 450-51 (Mo. 1923) (striking down, under open courts
provision, municipal notice of claim statute as applied to plaintiff who was physically incapable of
giving the notice and holding that “[n]o act of the Legislature would be valid which clogged or
incumbered [plaintiff’s] right to enforce such common-law right with impossible conditions”). See
also Schumer v. City of Perryville, 667 S.W.2d 414 (Mo. 1984) (striking down similar municipal
notice claim statute as applied to minors who did not reach majority until after the statutory time
for notice had run).
On the other hand, while there are exceptions, the creation of a venue gap will not ordinarily
prevent plaintiffs from suing in another state or in federal court; and the Court might conclude that
the existence of alternative fora is a factor to be considered in analyzing open courts challenges.
224

MO. CONST. art. III §14(a) (“The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases and
matters, civil and criminal”).
Plaintiffs may also argue that Article I, section 2’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
similarly implicated by the legislature’s creation of venue gaps. However, those arguments are
likely to be subsumed by ones under the open courts provision. See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d
545, 552 n.21 (Mo. 2000).
225

This outcome is somewhat consistent with pre-tort reform venue law under which suits could be
brought in any county if all defendants were nonresidents of Missouri. See MO. REV. STAT. §
508.010(4) (2000). See also § 508.010.2(4) (providing that, in non-tort actions, venue is proper in
any county if all defendants are non-residents).
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E. Special Venue Statutes After Tort Reform
Even after the Tort Reform Act, there continue to be a number of special
venue statutes.226 Prior to tort reform, the relationship between the general venue
provisions of former 508.010 and the various special venue statutes was
relatively straightforward: if the special statute covered the situation,227 it took
priority over the general statute. By its own terms, former section 508.010 was a
residual statute which defined venue only if no other statute applied.228 In
addition, longstanding canons of statutory interpretation dictated that, if two
statutes conflicted, the more specific should ordinarily be applied,229 and that, if
the specific statute was enacted later, it should be treated as creating an exception
to the earlier general statute.230 As a result, the Court consistently found that
former section 508.010 was effectively trumped by various special venue
statutes.231
The post-Tort Reform Act regime is not so simple. Section 508.010 no
longer begins with the modest disclaimer, “except as otherwise provided by
law.”232 Instead, section 508.010.2 begins “In all actions in which there is no
count alleging a tort,”233 and section 508.010.4 and section 508.010.5 each begin

226

The act specifically repealed some special venue statutes. See, e.g., 2005 Mo. Laws 655
(repealing former section 508.070, the special venue statute for suits against motor carriers); id.
(repealing former section 508.040, the special venue statute for suits in which all defendants were
corporations); id. (repealing former section 508.040, containing special venue provisions for suits
against railroads); id. (repealing former section 355.176 and reenacting it without former
Subsection 355.176.4, the special venue statute for not-for-profit corporations).
227
Of course, if the specific venue statute was held not to cover the particular situation, the general
statute would govern. See, e.g., State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo.
1979) (since section 508.040 did not apply to cases in which corporate defendants were joined with
individual defendants, the general venue statute should be applied).
228

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000) (“Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought . . . .”) (emphasis added).
229

See, e.g., Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Mo. 1996)
(“When the same subject matter is addressed in general terms in one statute and in specific terms in
another, the more specific controls over the more general.”); Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis v.
City of Brentwood, 360 Mo. 777, 230 S.W.2d 768, 769 (1950) (specific terms in a statute prevail
over more general terms unless the statute as a whole clearly demonstrates the opposite intent).
230

See, e.g., Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. 1968); State ex rel. McKittrick v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 346 Mo. 1049, 1059, 144 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Mo. 1940); State ex rel.
Buchanan County v. Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 247 S.W. 129, 131-32 (Mo. 1922).
231

See, e.g., State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo. 1985) (holding that
section 508.060 trumped former 508.010 and stating that “[g]eneral rules establishing venue are
subject to specific statutes which place venue elsewhere”); Igoe v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus.
Relations of State of Mo., 152 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. 2005) (holding that discrimination venue
statute trumped general venue statute).

232

Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000) (“Suits instituted by summons shall, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought . . .”) (emphasis added) with MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010
(2005) (containing no similar language).

233

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005) (emphasis added).
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even more aggressively with “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all
actions in which there is any count alleging a tort.”234 As a result, analysis of the
interrelationship between the Tort Reform Act’s basic provisions rules and
various special venue statutes must begin with an analysis of the effect of these
phrases.
The Missouri Supreme Court has long held that, whenever possible, even
apparently conflicting statutes should be harmonized in a way that makes it
possible to apply both.235 “Repeals by implication are not favored.”236 As a
result, the courts sometimes hold that two apparently conflicting venue statutes
act as alternatives, permitting cases covered by both statutes to be brought in any
county authorized by either.237 At other times, they hold that a more specific
venue statute, particularly if subsequently enacted, operates as an exception to a
more general one.238
However, if the text of a subsequent statute unambiguously conflicts with
an earlier one, it acts to repeal the earlier statute to the extent of that conflict.239
If the more recent statute is inconsistent with every aspect of the earlier statute,
the earlier one is repealed entirely.240
Finally, in resolving apparent conflicts between venue statutes, it is
important to determine whether one of them contains language demonstrating
that the legislature intended the statute to supply the exclusive available venues

234

§ 508.010.4-5 (emphasis added).
State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. 1997) (“Statutes which seemingly
are in conflict should be harmonized so as to give meaning to both statutes”); County of Jefferson
v. Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 1995) (“On their face, the statutes appear to be
inconsistent. Nevertheless, the Court's duty is to attempt to reconcile the statutes and apply them
both”); Poling v. Moitra, 717 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. 1986) (“Unless two statutes are irreconcilably
inconsistent, both must stand.”).
235

236

Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d at 490; Poling, 717 S.W.2d at 522.
Riordan, 956 S.W.2d at 260 (holding that §84.015 and §536.050—prescribing, respectively,
venue for cases involving the Board of Police Commissioners and for declaratory judgments
challenging the validity of administrative rules—should be interpreted as providing alternative
venues); Control Tech. & Solutions v. Malden R-1 Sch. Distr., 181 S.W.3d 80, 82-83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that § 508.050 and § 70.320—prescribing, respectively, venue for suits against
municipal corporations and venue for suits involving municipal contracts—should be interpreted as
providing alternative venues).

237

238
State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo. 1985) (by adopting special venue
statute, legislature created an exception to general venue statute).
239

Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d at 490 (“When two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions,
the later act, even without a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to
repeal the first.”); Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851,
859 (Mo. 1998) (“When two statutes conflict, the later enacted statute, even when there is no
specific repealing clause, repeals the first statute to the extent of any conflict with the second.”).
240

Corvera Abatement Tech., 973 S.W.2d at 859 (“If the two laws are irreconcilable, the latter
repeals the former.”); Bartley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 649 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Mo.
1983) (complete repeal by implication only if the two statutes are “so inimical to each other that
both cannot stand” and only if the legislature intended to repeal the earlier statute even though it
did not do so explicitly).
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for a particular class of cases. If neither statute contains such language, the Court
will often harmonize the two statutes by finding that they provide alternative
permissible venues.241 But if one of the statutes contains language expressing
exclusivity, that statute will be deemed to prevail over any other venue
provisions to the extent of the conflict.242
Sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5 each begin with the words
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions in which there is any
count alleging a tort . . . venue shall be” in particular counties.243 In ordinary
usage, these words unequivocally express the General Assembly’s intent that the
tort-case provisions of the act provide the “sole, exclusive venue”244 for all tort
cases to which they apply. Interpreting identical words in the context of a
different statute, the Supreme Court recently stated:
“The initial phrase [‘Notwithstanding any other provisions of law’], if it is to
be given any effect whatsoever, must be read to mean that [the section
containing it] controls and takes precedence over any other provisions that
might otherwise appear to [govern the situation].”245

As a result, if the act’s tort-case venue provisions cover a particular case,246 those
provisions prevail over any inconsistent special venue statute.
Section 508.010.2, on the other hand, begins with the less emphatic words,
“[i]n all actions in which there is no count alleging a tort, venue shall be
determined as follows.”247 While the Supreme Court has held that a venue statute
containing the phrase “all actions whatsoever”248 expressed an intent to create an
exclusive venue,249 it has never stated that the phrase “all actions” simpliciter

241

Riordan, 956 S.W.2d at 260 (since neither of the two statutes contains language prescribing an
exclusive venue, they should be treated as providing alternative venues); Control Tech. & Solutions
v. Malden R-1 Sch. Dist., 181 S.W.3d 80, 82-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (same).

242
State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 143-46 (Mo. 2002) (venue
provision that stated that suits against nonprofit corporations “shall be commenced only in”
particular counties held to be exclusive and to prevail over other arguably applicable venue
statutes); Kinder, 698 S.W.2d at 6 (Mo. 1985) (venue provision that stated that ‘[a]ll actions
whatsoever against any county shall be commenced in the Circuit Court of such county,” held to be
exclusive and to prevail over other arguably applicable venue statutes); See also State ex rel.
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Forder, 787 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo. 1990) (venue provision that stated
that suits against municipal corporations “shall be commenced only in” certain counties held to
recognize special needs of municipal defendants to be sued only in the counties in which they are
situated).
243

MO. REV. STAT. §§ 508.010.4-5 (2005).
Riordan, 956 S.W.2d at 260 (Mo. 1997).
245
Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851, 859 (Mo. 1998).
246
As discussed supra, the out-of-state first injury tort provisions may not, under their own terms,
govern cases against certain types of defendants.
244

247

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005).
§ 508.060 (2005) (emphasis added).
249
State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 143-46 (Mo. 2002) (“The use
of the word "whatsoever" [in the phrase ‘all actions whatsoever’] has also been interpreted as
248
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would have that effect. Similarly, while it has held that two venue statutes
stating that certain suits “shall be commenced only”250 in particular counties
created exclusive venues,251 it specifically rejected the argument that a venue
statute containing the phrase “shall be commenced” simpliciter should be treated
as doing so.252 While there are various ways the legislature could express its
intent that a venue provision should be treated as exclusive,253 the language of
section 508.010.2 is not one of them.
This is particularly clear when that section is viewed in context of the other
subsections of 508.010 that were enacted by the same General Assembly as part
of the same act. If the phrase, “In all actions . . . venue shall be determined” was
enough to make a venue provision exclusive in section 508.010.2, then there
would have been no need for the legislature to have added the phrase,
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law” before that language at the
beginning of sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5. In addition, if section 508.010.2
provided the exclusive venue for non-tort cases, then section 508.010.6 (the
special venue provisions for plaintiff counties) would be a complete nullity: for
non-tort cases, it would be trumped by section 508.010.2; and for tort cases, it
would be trumped by section 508.010.4 or section 508.010.5. To hold that the
members of the 93rd General Assembly intended section 508.010.2 to be an
exclusive venue provision, one would also have to assume that they inserted
entirely superfluous phrases at the beginning of sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5
and also that they inserted an entirely meaningless section 508.010.6 in the same
act. Such an assumption would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s
longstanding rule that the court should not assume that legislature inserted “idle
verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.”254 As a result, the post-tort reform
version of section 508.010 should be viewed as a general venue statute,255 but

mandatory and to provide the exclusive venue for suits against counties”); State ex rel. City of St.
Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo. 1985) (phrase “[a]ll actions whatsoever” in section 508.060
provides exclusive venue).
250

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.050 (2005) (emphasis added); MO. REV. STAT. § 355.176.4 (2000)
(emphasis added).
251

SSM Health Care, 78 S.W.3d at 143-44 (holding that former section 355.176.4 was exclusive
and noting that section 508.050 had been held to have the same effect); State ex rel. Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Forder, 787 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo. 1990) (holding that section 508.050 was exclusive).

252
SSM Health Care, 78 S.W.3d at 143-44 (discussing former section 508.040); State ex rel. Dick
Proctor Imp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. 1984) (holding that former section
508.040 was not exclusive).
253

SSM Health Care, 78 S.W.3d at 143-44.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of St. Louis v. Members of the Bd. of Aldermen of City of St.
Louis, 92 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Hyde Park Housing P’ship v. Dir. of Revenue, 850
S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. 1993). See also, e.g., SSM Health Care, 78 S.W.3d at 144 (rejecting
interpretation that would make the word “only” surplusage); Dodd v. Independence Stove &
Furnace Co., 330 Mo. 662, 671, 51 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Mo. 1932) (“Legislature will not be
presumed to have intended using superfluous or meaningless words in a statute.”).
254

255

One could argue that, viewed piecemeal, the various subsections of 508.010 are specific venue
provisions, one covering non-tort cases only, one covering tort cases with instate first injuries, and
one covering tort cases with out-of-state first injuries. However, that argument is inconsistent with
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one that prescribes exclusive venues for tort cases and non-exclusive ones for
non-tort cases.
The following subsections analyze the effect of the Tort Reform Act’s
venue provisions on various special venue provisions in light of the particular
language of those provisions.
1. Suits Brought by Counties (Section 508.010.6)
Section 508.010.6, the special venue provision for suits brought by
counties, provides:
Any action, in which any county shall be a plaintiff, may be commenced and
prosecuted to final judgment in the county in which the defendant or
defendants reside, or in the county suing and where the defendants, or one of
them, may be found.256

The section is unique in that it is the only special venue provision that was
enacted as a part of the Tort Reform Act itself, making it meaningless to ask
whether section 508.010.6 was repealed by that act’s general venue rules.
Instead, the question is how to reconcile the conflicting language of the various
subsections in light of the fact that they were all enacted simultaneously.
In tort cases, applying section 508.010.6 would permit suit to be brought in
circuit courts of the plaintiff county (if any of the defendants may be found
there), or in the county of any defendant’s residence even if the first injury was
not suffered in that county.257
However, in light of the exclusive,
“notwithstanding any other provision of law,” language of the tort-case
provisions, those provisions should be deemed to trump section 508.010.6.258
The plaintiff-county subsection contains no comparable exclusive language nor
does it contain any language suggesting that it was intended to be an exception to
the unequivocal exclusivity of sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5.259 Particularly
in light of the manifest intention of the General Assembly to restrict plaintiffs’
choice of venue in tort cases, the tort-case venue provisions should govern.
On the other hand, the plaintiff-county provision should be interpreted as
prevailing over (and as a supplement or exception to) the non-tort venue rules of
section 508.010.2. Section 508.010.6 is more specific than section 508.010.2,
and specific provisions are ordinarily interpreted as creating exceptions to more
pre-tort reform case law that treated section 508.010 as a general venue statute even though it too,
if viewed subsection by subsection, could be treated as a series of specific venue provisions.
256

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.6 (2005).
There will be situations in which the first injury will not occur in the plaintiff county. For
example, a county owned vehicle or other property could be damaged while outside the county. In
addition, the county might be one of several plaintiffs and the other plaintiffs could have suffered
earlier injuries in other locations.
257

258

See supra, notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
For example, section 508.010.6 does not contain phrases such as “Notwithstanding the other
provisions of this section” or “In addition to any venues specified in this section,” and does not
even state that actions by plaintiff counties “may also be commenced” in the specified counties.
259
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general ones.260 In addition, as discussed earlier, to interpret section 508.010.6 as
being trumped in both tort and non-tort cases would make the section a nullity
and violate the rule against surplusage.261
Finally, interpreting current section 508.010.6 as trumped by the tort-case
rules but not by the non-tort-case rules is most consistent with the historical
function of plaintiff-county venue rules. Prior to tort reform, former section
508.010(5)262 was essentially identical to current section 508.010.6.263 In the pretort reform venue scheme, it served a single, equalizing function: Former section
508.010(1) permitted to suit to be brought, inter alia, “in the county within which
the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found,”264 but a county is not
ordinarily seen as “residing” within itself. Former section 508.010(5), gave
plaintiff counties the venue option that former section 508.010(1) gave to
individuals or corporations, the option of suing in their local circuit court if the
defendant could be served there. Interpreting its post-tort reform equivalent as
being supplemental to the current non-tort venue rules (which include former
section 508.010(1)’s language verbatim) but as being trumped by the current tortcase venue rules (which contain no comparable language) lets the current
plaintiff-county rule serve the same historical function.
2. Suits Brought Against Counties (Section 508.060) or Municipal
Corporations (Section 508.050)
Section 508.060, the special venue provision for suits brought against
counties, provides:
All actions whatsoever against any county shall be commenced in the circuit
court of such county, and prosecuted to final judgment and execution therein,
unless removed by change of venue to some other county, in which case the

260

See supra, authorities cited at notes 229-30.
See supra, text accompanying note 254.
262
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(5) (2000) (“Any action, local or transitory, in which any county shall
be plaintiff, may be commenced and prosecuted to final judgment in the county in which the
defendant or defendants reside, or in the county suing and where the defendants, or one of them,
may be found”).
261

263
The only difference was the former section’s inclusion of the phrase “local or transitory.” The
elimination of the phrase was consistent with modern Missouri case law that recognizes that the
common law differentiation between local and transitory actions has been replaced by statutory
designation of appropriate venues. See, e.g., Mission Med. Group, P.A. v. Filley, 879 S.W.2d 743,
745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing cases). It is also consistent with current section 508.010’s
elimination of former section 508.010’s introductory phrase limiting the former section’s
applicability to “[s]uits instituted by summons.” Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2000)
(containing phrase) with MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (2005) (omitting phrase).
264
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(1) (2000) (“When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the
county within which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff resides, and
the defendant may be found.”).
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action or actions so removed shall be prosecuted to final judgment and
execution in the circuit court of such other county.265

Similarly, section 508.050, the special venue provision for suits brought
against municipal corporations, provides:
Suits against municipal corporations as defendant or codefendant shall be
commenced only in the county in which the municipal corporation is situated,
or if the municipal corporation is situated in more than one county, then suits
against the municipal corporation shall be commenced only in that county
wherein the seat of government of the municipal corporation is situated;
except that suits may be brought against a city containing more than four
hundred thousand inhabitants in any county in which any part of the city is
situated.266

The Supreme Court has held that the inclusion of the phrase “All actions
whatsoever,” demonstrates the legislature’s intent that section 508.060 should
supply the exclusive venue for suits against counties267 and that section 508.050’s
statement that cases against municipalities “shall be commenced only in”
particularly counties provides the sole venue rules for suits against cities.268
Given the absence of any similarly exclusive language in the Tort Reform Act’s
non-tort case venue provisions, it seems clear that the defendant-county rules and
the defendant-city rules should be applied in cases in which no count alleges a
tort.
However, the application of sections 508.060 and 508.050 in tort cases
presents a much more difficult problem. The Tort Reform Act’s tort-case venue
sections do contain language indicating that they should provide the exclusive
source for determining venue,269 and there is no obvious textual basis to prioritize
one set of expressions of exclusivity over the other. The canon that later statutes
repeal earlier ones suggests that the tort-case provisions should govern,270 but the
equally valid canon that more specific statutes should prevail over more general
ones suggests the opposite result—that the county-defendant and city-defendant
rules should be applied. 271

265

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.060 (2005).
§ 508.050.
267
State ex rel. SSM Health Care St. Louis v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 143-46 (Mo. 2002) (“The use
of the word "whatsoever" [in the phrase ‘all actions whatsoever’] has also been interpreted as
mandatory and to provide the exclusive venue for suits against counties”); State ex rel. City of St.
Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo. 1985) (phrase “[a]ll actions whatsoever” in section 508.060
prescribes exclusive venue).
266

268

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.050 (2005). See supra authorities cited in note 251.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
270
See supra authorities cited in note 238-40.
271
See supra authorities cited in note 229.
As this article was going to print, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District used somewhat
similar reasoning to conclude that section 508.050 prevailed over the contrary provisions of
508.010.4 and held that, even in tort cases, a city could be sued only in the county in which it is
269
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There is, however, at least one reason why the Court should resolve this
dilemma in favor of applying the county-defendant and city-defendant rules even
in tort cases. By enacting the special venue rules for cities and counties, the
legislature recognized that local governmental bodies have an interest in
defending cases in their local courts and expressed its belief that they should not
be forced to defend in courts spread out throughout the state.272 And, while the
located. State ex rel. City of Jennings v. Riley, --- S.W.3d ---, 2007 W.L. 656545 (Mo. Ct. App.,
March 6, 2007).
In the author’s view, the Riley court reached the correct result as to section 508.050 but did so
based on arguments that could lead to the incorrect result in cases involving other special venue
statutes which—unlike 508.050 and 508.060—contain no exclusive venue language of their own.
For example, the Riley court argued that the Tort Reform Act’s repeal of former section 508.040
(the old corporations-only venue statute) and former section 508.070 (the old motor carrier venue
statute) suggested that the Act’s failure to repeal the municipal venue statute implied that the
legislature intended that it should not be affected by the tort-case venue provisions. This argument
would be equally applicable to all special venue statutes, even those that—unlike 508.050 and
508.060—contain no language of exclusivity. But the argument is fundamentally flawed. First, if
it was correct, it would render 508.010.4’s “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law”
language a complete nullity since that language would always be trumped by any specific venue
statutes. Second, the corporations-only venue statute and the motor carrier venue statutes were
repealed because they were intended to have no effect after tort reform (i.e., to be abolished in both
tort and non-tort cases) and therefore should not remain in the revised statutes. However, as
discussed in the subsequent sections, most special venue statutes will continue to apply in non-tort
cases and are only trumped in tort cases. See infra, text accompanying notes 275-316. They were
not repealed because, while their scope is diminished, they continue to apply in contract cases.
Similarly, the Riley court misread State ex rel. Casey's General Stores, Inc. v. City of West
Plains, 9 S.W.3d 712, (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that “notwithstanding any other
provision of law” language could be trumped by provisions in separate, pre-existing statutes. In
fact, Casey’s General Stores interpreted a sentence that stated that “Notwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter to the contrary, any person who [met certain requirements should receive a
license]” and held that the “notwithstanding” language at the beginning of the sentence did not
negate the requirements contained at the end of the same sentence. Id. at 717-18.
Even more surprisingly, the Riley court suggested that State ex rel. City of Bella Vista v.
Nicholls, 698 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), a case interpreting section former 508.010 when the
section stated that it governed “except as otherwise provided by law” should control the
interpretation of current 508.010.4 which now explicitly governs “notwithstanding any other
provision of law.” It did not discuss (and the parties’ briefs did not cite) Corvera Abatement Tech.,
Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851, 859 (Mo. 1998) which held that such
“notwithstanding any other provision” language means exactly what it says, “that [the section
containing such language] controls and takes precedence over any other provisions that might
otherwise appear to [govern the situation].”
Riley’s broad arguments would, if applied generally, eviscerate the tort-case venue provisions’
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” language. As suggested in the text, the municipaldefendant and county-defendant special venue statutes may trump the tort-case provisions of the
Tort Reform Act. But if they do so, it is because they, unlike other special venue statutes, contain
their own exclusive venue language, and because there are policy reasons peculiar to suits against
governmental bodies that militate in their favor.
272
See State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Forder, 787 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo. 1990) (dealing
with municipal corporations); State ex rel. Milham v. Rickhoff, 633 S.W.2d 733, 735(Mo. 1982)
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Tort Reform Act’s venue rules certainly express the intent that tort cases be tried
in the location of first injury, the underlying purpose for that rule seems to have
been to limit plaintiffs’ ability to force defendants to defend in disadvantageous
fora. Section 508.060’s requirement that cases against a county be filed in the
circuit courts of that county seems to accomplish that purpose at least as
effectively as the tort-case place-of-first-injury rule.
There is an additional reason why the county-defendant rules should be
applied in preference to the tort-case rules: it is not at all clear that it is possible
to apply section 508.010.5’s out-of-state first injury rules to cases against
counties.273 That section prescribes the proper venue only for suits against
individuals or corporations. Counties are not individuals, and it is difficult to see
how they can be treated as municipal corporations under the venue statutes since
those statutes clearly distinguish between the two types of entities.274 If counties
are neither individuals nor corporations, then section 508.060 is the only statute
prescribing venue for out-of-state first injury cases against counties. As a result,
treating the tort-case rules as prevailing would lead to a peculiar patchwork: Suits
against counties would be governed by the county-defendant rules; but if they
contained a count alleging a tort, they would be governed by the tort-case rules;
but if the tort count alleged an out-of-state first injury, they would be governed
by the defendant-county rules. While it is conceivable that the legislature
intended this odd result, it does not seem likely.
3. Suits Brought Against Limited Liability Companies (Section 347.069.2)
Section 347.069.2, the special venue provision for suits brought against
limited liability companies, provides:
Proceedings against a limited liability company shall be commenced either in
the county where the cause of action accrued or in any county where such
limited liability company shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the
transaction of its usual and customary business, or in the county in which the
(discussing municipal corporations in the context of rejecting the argument that the Board of
Curators should be considered a municipality for venue purposes).
273
Of course, in many tort cases against counties, the place of first injury will be within the county
itself and therefore within the state. However, suits arising out of the operation of county motor
vehicles or suits in which the county’s sovereign immunity has been waived by the purchase of
insurance may involve injuries occurring outside the state.
274
Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 508.050 (2005) (prescribing venue for suits against municipal
corporations) with § 508.060 (prescribing venue for suits against counties).
There is one case stating in dictum that counties can sometimes be treated as municipal
corporations for some unidentified purposes. State ex rel. Caldwell v. Little River Drainage Dist.,
291 Mo. 72, 236 S.W. 15, 16 (Mo. 1921) (holding that a drainage district is a municipal corporation
for purposes of immunity from state taxation). A more recent decision—one similarly not dealing
with counties—quotes Caldwell, while holding that the Board of Curators is not a municipal
corporation for venue purposes even though it is statutorily defined as a “public corporation for
educational purposes.” Milham, 633 S.W.2d at 735.
St. Louis is, of course, sui generis since it is constitutionally defined as both a city and a county.
MO. CONST. art. VI, §31.
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office of the registered agent of the limited liability company is
maintained.275

The practical significance of the Tort Reform Act’s failure to repeal this
section should not be underestimated. In recent years, the number of LLCs
created in Missouri has vastly exceeded the number of general business
corporations.276 To the extent that section 347.069.2 continues to apply, it
significantly reduces the effect of the Tort Reform Act’s venue provisions,
particularly on newly created small businesses.
For non-tort cases, given the absence of exclusive venue language in either
statute, the more specific provisions of section 347.069.2 should govern and be
treated as an exception to the more general provisions of section 508.010.2.277
This will have a relatively minor effect on the options available to plaintiffs
since, even under section 508.010.2, they could have sued in the county
containing the LLC’s residence and LLCs would be deemed to reside in all
counties in which they had an agent or office for transacting their ordinary
business.278 The only additional venue that would be available under the special
LLC venue statute would be the county containing the LLCs registered office.
For tort cases, the question is more complicated. Since the tort-case venue
provisions of the Tort Reform Act contain unequivocally exclusive language,
they certainly should prevail over the non-exclusive provisions of the special
LLC venue—but only to the extent of any conflict. Since “[r]epeals by
implication are not favored,”279 the Court has the duty to harmonize apparently
conflicting statutes whenever possible so that both can be applied.280 “Unless
two statutes are irreconcilably inconsistent, both must stand.”281
For tort cases in which plaintiff’s first injury occurred in Missouri, such an
irreconcilable conflict exists. Section 508.010.4 explicitly covers “all actions”
and contains no language limiting its effect to cases against particular types of

275

MO. REV. STAT. § 347.069.2 (2005).
E-mail from Carol Fischer, Missouri Secretary of State’s Office, to Robert Downs, Professor of
Law, UMKC School of Law (Sept. 18, 2006, 04:39 P.M. CDT) (copy on file with author)
(including table showing total of 80,971 LLCs formed compared to 29,010 general business
corporations formed from Jan. 1, 2004 through Aug. 31, 2006). The disparity seems to be growing.
In 2004, LLCs represented approximately 70% of the combined total. In the first 8 months of
2006, they represented more than 77%. Id.
276

277

See supra authorities cited note 229-30.
Since there is no statutory definition of an LLCs residence, the common law rule that entities are
deemed to reside wherever they conduct their ordinary operations would apply. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (stating common law rule for corporations).
278

279

County of Jefferson v. Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 1995); Poling v. Moitra, 717
S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. 1986).
280
State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. 1997) (“Statutes which seemingly
are in conflict should be harmonized so as to give meaning to both statutes”); Quiktrip Corp., 912
S.W.2d at 490 (“On their face, the statutes appear to be inconsistent. Nevertheless, the Court's
duty is to attempt to reconcile the statutes and apply them both.”).
281

Poling, 717 S.W.2d at 522.
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defendant.282 There is no way to harmonize section 508.010.4 with the special
LLC venue rules and the former must prevail.283
However, there is no such conflict between the special LLC venue rules and
section 508.010.5, the out-of-state first injury venue rules of the Tort Reform
Act.
Section 508.010.5(1) covers cases in which the defendant is a
corporation,284 and section 508.010.5(2) covers cases in which the defendant is an
individual,285 but nothing in section 508.010.5 covers cases in which the
defendant is a limited liability company. For tort cases in which the first injury is
suffered outside Missouri, the Tort Reform Act says nothing about the proper
venue for LLC defendants; and, to that extent, it does not conflict with the special
LLC venue rules of section 347.069.2. As a result, the Court must harmonize the
two statutes “so as to give meaning to both.”286 It should apply the Tort Reform
Act’s venue provisions to those situations in which there is a conflict—all nontort cases and in-state first injury tort cases—and apply the special LLC venue
rules in situations to which they alone apply—all out-of-state first injury tort
cases.
To avoid this result, one might argue that limited liability companies should
be treated as corporations.287 In State ex rel. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance
Exchange v. Gaertner,288 the Court held that an inter-insurance exchange created
under sections 379.650-379.800289 should be treated as if it were a corporation
suable as an entity with venue determined under former section 508.040 based on
the location of its offices or agents, rather than as an unincorporated association
suable only as a class with venue determined under former section 508.010(2)
based on the residence of the particular members of the exchange named as
defendant class representatives.290 However, the reasoning of Auto Club does not
apply to limited liability companies. The Court based its decision to treat
reciprocal insurance exchanges as corporations on the fact that “[n]o purpose
[would be] served in proceeding against the individual members as a class” and
the fact that class action treatment would have the effect of “permit[ting] suit by

282

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005).
Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2dat 490 (“When two statutes are repugnant in any of their provisions,
the later act, even without a specific repealing clause, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to
repeal the first."); Corvera Abatement Tech., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851,
859 (Mo. 1998) (“When two statutes conflict, the later enacted statute, even when there is no
specific repealing clause, repeals the first statute to the extent of any conflict with the second.”).
283

284

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.5(1) (2005) (“If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be
. . .”).

285

§ 508.010.5(2) (“If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be . . .”).
State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. 1997).
287
For a case in which the defendant LLC initially took the position that it was a corporation
covered by former section 508.040, but argued on appeal that it was an LLC governed by section
347.069.2, see Duncan v. Am. Commercial Barge Line, LLC, 166 S.W.3d 78, 87-88 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004).
286

288

636 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1982).
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 379.650-800 (2005).
290
State ex rel. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gaertner, 636 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1982).
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or against a reciprocal insurance exchange to be brought in any county simply
because a member-subscriber resides there . . . .”291 But unlike an insurance
exchange, an LLC would not have to be treated as a class if it is not treated as a
corporation. Since the legislature has explicitly provided a special venue statute
for LLCs, the alternative to treating them as corporations is to treat them as the
legislature mandated—as LLCs governed by section 347.069.2. After all, if
LLCs were necessarily treated as corporations for venue purposes, it would have
made no sense for the legislature to have enacted section 347.069.2 in the first
place.292
A similar argument might be made based on the language of section
508.010.12. That section provides, “The provisions of this section [508.010]
shall apply irrespective of whether the defendant is a for-profit or a not-for-profit
entity.”293 This language appears to be intended to insure that, whenever a
subsection of section 508.010 covers a particular type of entity, it covers that
type of entity “irrespective of whether [it is] for-profit or not-for-profit.”294 Thus,
if a subsection such as section 508.010.4 covers all types of defendants, it applies
to both for-profit and not-for-profit defendants of any sort; and if a subsection
such as section 508.010.5(1) applies to corporations, it applies to all types of

291

Id. at 73.
There is language in Auto Club suggesting that Article XI, Section 1 of the Missouri
Constitution compels the Court to treat all jural entities as corporations. Id. at 74. Of course, it
does nothing of the sort, a fact that the Court recognizes in the following sentence by saying “This
does not mean that in other contexts a reciprocal [or interinsurance exchange] must or should be
treated as a corporation.” Id. at 74. Article XI, Section 1 provides a definition that applies only to
Article XI itself and does not purport to define the term when used by the General Assembly. Mo.
Const. Art. XI §1 (“The term ‘corporation,’ as used in this article, shall be construed to include all
joint stock companies or associations having any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals
or partnerships.”) (emphasis added). It would be impossible to treat the wide variety of Missouri
business entities—almost all of which have “powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or
partnerships” and each of which is governed by its own carefully tailored statutory provisions—as
being subject to every Missouri statute that uses the word “corporation.” Applying a constitutional
definition where it does not apply is no more permissible than refusing to apply it where it does.
292

293

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 508.010.12 (2005).
The fact that section 508.010.12 uses the phrase “irrespective of whether the defendant is a forprofit or a not-for-profit entity,” instead of the phrase “irrespective of whether the defendant is a
for-profit or not-for-profit corporation,” is not inconsistent with the conclusion that section
508.010.5(1) only applies to corporations. The phrase “not-for-profit corporation” is most properly
applied to corporations organized under the former General Not For Profit Corporation Act, 1953
Mo. Laws 322, subsequently codified as MO. REV. STAT. § 355.170.2 (1959). The phrase
“nonprofit corporations” could be construed to refer only to those not-for-profit corporate entities
organized under the more recently enacted Missouri Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1994 Mo. Laws
854, currently codified, as amended MO. REV. STAT. §§ 355.001-.881 (2005). Either phrase could
be construed to exclude other types of incorporated not-for-profit entities such as Health Services
Corporations incorporated under Chapter 354, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 354.010-354.380 (2005), or
Religious and Charitable Associations incorporated under Chapter 352. §§ 352.010-520. The
choice of the phrase “not-for-profit entity” was a reasonable way of assuring that all forms of notfor-profit corporations (in the generic sense) were included.
294
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corporations whether for-profit or not-for-profit corporations.295 On the other
hand, it is difficult to read section 508.010.12’s language as an effort to apply
section 508.010.5(1), which by its terms applies only to corporations, to noncorporate entities.296 If that had been the legislature’s intent, it could have
conveyed it far more clearly, by adding the sentence, “The word ‘corporation,’ as
used in this section, shall be construed to include all jural entities,” or by
replacing the word “corporation” in section 508.010.5(1) with the phrase “forprofit on not-for-profit entity,”297 Even more simply, it could have explicitly
repealed the special LLC venue statute just as it explicitly repealed the special
nonprofit corporation statute.
In any event, the question is not whether it is possible to construe section
508.010.5(1) in a way that creates a conflict with section 347.069.2 thus
rendering the entire special LLC venue statute a nullity, but instead whether it is
impossible to avoid such a construction.298 Repeals by implication are
disfavored, and it is the duty of the court to harmonize apparently conflicting
statutes whenever possible so that neither is rendered superfluous and both can be
applied.299 Fortunately, the language of the Tort Reform Act and the special LLC
venue statute make this task simple since the interpretation that is most consistent
with the text of the two statutes is also the one that harmonizes them and permits
the court to apply both. Under that interpretation, each statute continues to have
a function: the special LLC venue statute governs tort cases in which the first
injury is suffered out of the state, and section 508.010 governs all other cases
against LLCs.

295

§ 508.010.5(1). This section’s application to not-for-profit corporations is confirmed by the acts
repeal of the not-for-profit venue statute. See supra text accompanying notes 71-86.
296

It would be even more difficult, but no less logical, to read 508.010.12 as requiring that the word
“individual” in section 508.010.5(2) be understood to include all forms of for-profit and not-forprofit entities. If section 508.010.12 requires that every provision of section 508.010 be interpreted
as covering every form of entity, there is no logical reason to expand the meaning of word
“corporation” to cover LLCs than it is to expand the meaning of the word “individual” to do so.
297
With that change, section 508.010.5(1) would have begun, “If the defendant is a for-profit or
not-for profit entity, then venue shall be in any county where a defendant entity’s registered agent
is located . . . .” Of course, some non-corporate entities, such as counties do not have registered
agents; but that fact is a reason not to infer that section 508.010.5(1) was intended to apply to all
entities.
298
Poling v. Moitra, 717 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. 1986) (“Unless two statutes are irreconcilably
inconsistent, both must stand”).
299

State ex rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. 1997) (“Statutes which seemingly
are in conflict should be harmonized so as to give meaning to both statutes.”); County of Jefferson
v. Quiktrip Corp., 912 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 1995) (“On their face, the statutes appear to be
inconsistent. Nevertheless, the Court's duty is to attempt to reconcile the statutes and apply them
both.”).
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4. Suits Brought Under Miscellaneous Venue Statutes
The previous sections have focused on special venue statutes that prescribed
venue based on the nature of the plaintiff or defendant. However, there are a
number of special venue statutes—some contained in Chapter 508, but many
scattered throughout the Revised Statutes—that base venue on the type of cause
of action rather than the identity of the parties. The analysis for each of these
statutes would appear to be the same: In cases in which no count alleges a tort,
the special venue statute’s more specific provisions should prevail over the more
general non-tort case rules of section 508.010.2 However, in cases in which any
count alleges a tort, the mandatory “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law” language of sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5 require that the tort-case
venue rules of those sections prevail over the various special venue statutes.300
This result harmonizes the conflicting statutes, giving each some function and
recognizing that more specific provisions should prevail over more general
ones.301 At the same time, it complies with the legislative mandate that the tortcase venue rules should provide the exclusive method for determining venue in
the cases to which those rules apply.302
Under this analysis, some types of causes of action will continue, with rare
exceptions,303 to be governed by their own special venue statutes. For example,
since “suits for the possession of real estate, or whereby the title thereto may be
affected, or for the enforcement of the lien of any special tax bill thereon”304 or
suits for partition of real estate305 will rarely allege a tort,306 such suits will
ordinarily still need to be brought in one of the counties in which the real estate is
located.307 Similarly, there should be no change in the venue rules for suits

300

This would be true even for causes of actions that the common law might have described as
local rather than transitory. In Missouri, the common law differentiation between local and
transitory actions has been replaced by the statutory venue scheme. See, e.g., Mission Med. Group,
P.A. v. Filley, 879 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (citing cases).
301

See supra text accompanying notes 229-30, 235-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
303
The exceptions involve the unusual situations in which the plaintiff is able to join a nonfrivolous——tort count alleging a first injury that occurred in a different county. (Rule 55.06
permits plaintiffs to join all their claims against a defendant in a single action—even completely
unrelated claims.) For a discussion of pretensive joinder of claims, see infra, Parts IV.B.2.e and
IV.B.2.f.
302

304

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.030 (2005).
§§ 528.010-.640.
306
If a related tort is alleged in such a case, the first injury is likely to be suffered where the real
estate is located.
305

307

See § 508.030 (suit to be brought “where such real estate, or some part thereof, is situated”); §
528.040 (“Such petition shall be filed in the circuit court of the county in which such lands,
tenements or hereditaments lie; but if the same shall lie in two or more counties, whether in
detached parcels or otherwise, said petition shall be filed in the circuit court of the county in which
any portion of such premises is situate, and a majority of the parties entitled thereto reside; and in
case a majority of said parties do not reside in any such county, or all of them are nonresidents of
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brought against defendants served and sued under Missouri’s nonresident
watercraft statute,308 since that statute’s designated venue (“the county in which
the damage occurred”309) is essentially identical to the venue prescribed by
section 508.010.4.310
For other types of litigation, tort reform may eliminate formerly available
venues more frequently. For example, in replevin actions, venue will be proper
in the Missouri county in which plaintiffs were first deprived of their property
rather than the county where the property is found at the time of suit.311
Similarly, tort suits begun by attachment will need to be brought in the place of
first injury rather than the location of the attached property.312
However, the most drastic effect will be the implied repeal of the current
special venue provisions for many statutorily created causes of action. Missouri
courts have long recognized that civil actions for statutorily defined wrongs are
torts.313 As a result, the various special venue statutes formerly covering, for
the state, the proceedings for partition shall be had in the circuit court of that county in which an
equal or greater part of such premises may be.”).
308

§ 506.330.
Id.
310
On the other hand, the Tort Reform Act will substantially restrict venue in actions brought
against defendants served and sued under Missouri’s nonresident motorist statute. §§ 506.200.310. Since such actions necessarily allege an in-state tort, they will be governed by section
508.010.4 rather than by the more liberal nonresident motorist special venue provisions. See §
506.290.1 (“Any suit under the provisions of sections 506.200 to 506.320 shall be filed in the
county in which the cause of action accrues or in the county where the plaintiff resides, and if there
be other defendants in such action who are residents of the state of Missouri, then such action shall
be brought in any county in which any one of said defendants resides, or in the county within which
the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found.”).
309

311

Compare § 508.010.4 (placing venue in the county where plaintiff is first injured) with §
508.020 (placing venue “in the county in which such property may be found”). The tort-case rules
of sections 508.010.4 or 508.010.5 will apply since replevin is necessarily based on the tortious
deprivation or detention of the plaintiff’s personal property.
If plaintiffs were initially deprived of their property outside the state, the provisions of section
508.010.5 would apply.
312

Compare § 508.010.4 (placing venue in the county where plaintiff is first injured) with §
508.020 (placing venue “in the county in which such property may be found’).
This will sometimes create an unfortunate venue gap in situations in which an absconding out-ofstate tortfeasor has property in Missouri and the victim has no Missouri principal place of
residence. To make it possible for such a victim to recover to the extent of any of the defendant’s
Missouri property, the Court may want to fill this gap by treating section 508.020 as providing a
residual venue.
313

See, e.g., Lowery v. Kansas City, 85 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1935) (stating that “a tort is a breach
of a duty which the law in distinction from a mere contract has imposed” and recognizing that such
a duty “may be imposed by statute or ordinance.”); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Mayor's Comm'n
on Human Rights of City of Springfield, 791 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Mo. 1990) (recognizing the
existence of both “common law [and] statutory tort action[s]”); Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (“cause of action for wrongful death
conferred by the statute sounds in tort”); Bloss v. Dr. C.R. Woodson Sanitarium Co., 5 S.W.2d 367,
368 (Mo. 1928) (recognizing the longstanding rule that “the wrongful death statutes confer a cause
of action ex delicto, not one ex contractu.”); Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646,
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example, civil actions for employment discrimination,314 for identity fraud,315 or
for violations of state anti-trust laws316 have all been silently superseded by new
sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5.
IV. MISSOURI VENUE AFTER TORT REFORM—SPECIAL
PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE BASIC STRUCTURE
A. Small County Change of Venue After Tort Reform (508.011)
Missouri Rule 51.03 authorizes a change of venue as of right in civil jury
cases pending in a small county, i.e., a county with 75,000 or fewer
inhabitants.317 The small county venue rule provides, in relevant part:
51.03. Change of Venue from Inhabitants as Matter of Right in Counties of
Seventy-five Thousand or Less Inhabitants - Procedure

651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (statutorily created worker compensation retaliation action sounds in tort
and therefore is covered by sovereign immunity); Felts v. Ford Motor Co., 916 S.W.2d 798, 802
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (statutorily created worker compensation retaliation action is a form of “civil
tort liability”); Krasney, 765 S.W.3d at 651-52 (violation of service letter statute “gives rise to a
statutory action in tort” and therefore is covered by sovereign immunity); State ex rel. Diehl v.
O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 87 (Mo. 2003) (statutory employment discrimination action and suit for
retaliation sound in tort); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (statutory housing
discrimination suit “sounds basically in tort”) (quoted in Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 91 n.17).
314

MO. REV. STAT. § 213.111(1) (2005) (civil actions under Missouri Human Rights Act “may be
brought in any circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged
to have occurred”). In cases in which there were multiple unlawful discriminatory practices in
various counties and in cases in which the discriminatory practice occurred in a different county
than the one in which the first injury is suffered, the Tort Reform Act will trump the Human Rights
Act venue statute and will legislatively overrule Igoe v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 152
S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. 2005) (section 213.111(1) trumps the provisions of the general venue
statute) and Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 91, n.18 (same).
315

MO. REV. STAT. § 506.290.2 (2005) (“Any civil suit under the provisions of section 570.223,
RSMo, for [sic] a person charged with identity theft may be filed: (1) In the county in which the
offense is committed; (2) If the offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or
if the elements of the offense occur in more than one county, then in any of the counties where any
element of the offense occurred; (3) In the county in which the defendant resides; (4) In the county
in which the victim resides; or (5) In the county in which the property obtained or attempted to be
obtained was located.”).
316

§ 416.121.1 (civil anti-trust actions for damages or injunctions may be brought where any
defendant resides; has an officer, agent or representative; or where a defendant, agent, officer or
representative may be found); § 416.131 (civil and criminal anti-trust actions generally may be
brought in county “in which any defendant resides, engages in business or has an agent”).
317
Missouri has 115 counties ranging in population from Worth County (2,382) to St. Louis
County (1,016,315). Only twelve counties (including the city of St. Louis) have populations in
excess of 75,000 inhabitants. Almost 40% of Missouri’s population lives in the remaining 103
counties. (All population figures are based on the 2000 Census and are taken from the Missouri
Census Data Center's website at http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/dp3_2kmenus/mo/
Counties.html.).
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(a) A change of venue shall be ordered in a civil action triable by jury that
is pending in a county having seventy-five thousand or less inhabitants upon
the filing of a written application therefor not later than ten days after answer
is due to be filed; . . . The applicant need not allege or prove any cause for
such change. The application need not be verified and may be signed by any
party. . . .
(c) If a timely application is filed, the court immediately shall order the
case transferred to some other county convenient to the parties, first giving all
parties the opportunity to make suggestions as to where the case should be
sent.

Under Rule 51.03, parties who sue or are sued in a small county do not need
to allege or establish any grounds for the change of venue. The right to change
of venue from small counties is absolute, so long as a timely application for
change is filed. The rule recognizes that parties often challenge their ability to
obtain a fair trial in small counties in a particular case, and that “[a]llowing an
automatic change of venue upon timely application thus saves judicial resources
that would otherwise be spent in determining whether a party could get a fair trial
in the county in light of the prejudice that may have arisen in a particular case
due to publicity or familiarity with the parties or the issues involved.”318 At the
same time, abuse of the procedure is avoided by limiting each class of parties to
only one change of venue,319 by providing that the new venue must be
convenient, and by explicitly giving all parties a chance to provide their views on
the most appropriate county for trial.320
The Tort Reform Act, H.B. 393 appears to abrogate Rule 51.03 for all tort
cases by adding a new section 508.011 to the existing venue statutes. That
section provides:
Change of venue, state statute prevails if in conflict with supreme court
rules.
508.011. To the extent that rule 51.03 of the Missouri rules of civil
procedure contradicts any provision of this chapter, the provisions of
this chapter shall prevail regarding any tort claim.
Section 508.011 does not purport to create a conflict itself. Unlike a number of
other provisions of Missouri venue law,321 it does not provide that “no change of
venue under Rule 51.03 shall be allowed” in any tort case. Instead, it merely
provides a trumping rule to be applied if such a contradiction exists elsewhere in
Chapter 508’s tort venue statutes. As a result, it becomes crucial to determine

318

State ex rel. Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Mo. 2006).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.04(f). Under the rule, parties are divided into no more than five classes: “(1)
plaintiffs, (2) defendants, (3) third-party plaintiffs (where a separate trial has been ordered); (4)
third-party defendants, and (5) intervenors.” If any one member of a class applies for any form of
change of venue, that application exhausts the right of all class members to a change.
320
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03(c); Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232, 237 (Mo. 2006).
321
See statutes cited infra, note 334.
319
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whether Rule 51.03 contradicts either the provisions of the newly enacted Tort
Reform Act such as sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5,322 or any remaining
remnants of pre-tort-reform Chapter 508.323 If such a contradiction does exist, it
will then be necessary to determine whether section 508.011 is constitutional.324
Parts 1 and 2 below argue that there is no such contradiction. Parts 3 and 4
demonstrate that, if such a contradiction did exist, section 508.011 would be
unconstitutional under Article V, section 5 (the “Limited to the Purpose” clause)
and under Article III, section 21 (the “Original Purpose” clause).
1. Rule 51.03, Section 508.011, and the Post-Tort Reform Additions to
Chapter 508
The existence of a contradiction between Rule 51.03 and the post-tort
reform venue provisions is not self-evident. The new tort-case provisions each
state that “venue shall be in [designated counties]”325 but say nothing about
whether that venue can be changed. In a quite similar situation,326 the Supreme
Court recently concluded that there was not a conflict between Rule 51.03 and
the special venue statute for suits against municipalities.327 While the special
venue statute provided that such suits could be commenced only in the county in
which the municipal corporation was located, the Court held that this did not
prevent change of venue under Rule 51.03.328
The Court based this conclusion on a number of arguments that are as
applicable to the new tort venue statutes as they were to the special municipality
venue statute. The Court pointed out that section 508.250329 specifically provides
that a court to which a case is transferred will have jurisdiction to hear the case
even if the case “would not otherwise [have been] cognizable in that court.”330

322

See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
324
See infra Parts IV.A.3 and IV.A.4.
325
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4 (2005) (emphasis added); § 508.010.5(1) (emphasis added);
§ 508.010.5(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
323

326

State ex rel. Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2006).
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.050 (2005) provides, “Suits against municipal corporations as defendant
or codefendant shall be commenced only in the county in which the municipal corporation is
situated, or if the municipal corporation is situated in more than one county, then suits against the
municipal corporation shall be commenced only in that county wherein the seat of government of
the municipal corporation is situated; except that suits may be brought against a city containing
more than four hundred thousand inhabitants in any county in which any part of the city is
situated.”
327

328

Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d 232, 234-37 (Mo. 2006).
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.250 (2005) provides, “The court to which any cause shall be transferred
by change of venue shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall proceed to
final judgment and execution therein; although such cause would not otherwise be cognizable in
such court.”
329

330

Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 235 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 508.250 (2005)). See also MO. SUP. CT.
R. 51.14(b) (“The court to which any civil actions shall be transferred by change of venue shall
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As a result, a transferee court has authority “to hear and determine the [case], and
[to] proceed to final judgment and execution therein”331 despite the fact that
venue would not otherwise have been proper under the special municipality
venue statute; and it would have equal authority to do so despite the new tort
venue statutes.
The Court also emphasized that the statutes establishing venue as an initial
matter and the rules and statutes permitting change of venue serve interrelated
but distinct functions. The former are intended “‘to provide a convenient, logical
and orderly forum for litigation.’”332 The latter, on the other hand, are intended
to deal with a separate problem: how to handle situations in which “the selected
venue becomes inappropriate for trial due to the small number of persons in the
county, due to prejudice of the inhabitants against one of the parties as a result of,
for example, undue publicity, or for other reasons.”333 This difference in function
is as pertinent to the new tort venue provisions as it is to the municipality venue
statute.
Finally, the court pointed out that, in situations in which the legislature
intended to eliminate the right to change venue, it had done so through explicit
and unequivocal language. In three different sections Missouri statutes forbid
changes of venue in language that could not be clearer: “No change of venue
shall be allowed in any of the proceedings under [certain statutory
provisions].”334 The legislature’s failure to use such language in the municipality
venue statute—like its similar failure in the tort venue statutes—suggests that it
did not intend the grant of initial venue to be treated as inconsistent with the
longstanding right to change venue under Rule 51.03. If the legislature had
wanted to forbid transfers of venue in tort cases, it could have provided simply,
“No change of venue under Rule 51.03 shall be allowed in any tort case.”
However, the Lebanon School District court also relied on one textual
aspect of the municipality venue statute that is not shared by the tort venue
provisions. The municipality venue statute, like most pre-tort reform venue
provisions, limits venue options by defining the county where suits against
municipalities “shall be commenced.”335 The new tort venue provisions, on the
other hand, limit venue options by defining the counties where “venue shall

have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and shall proceed to final judgment and execution
therein, although such civil action would not otherwise be cognizable in such court.”).
331

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.250 (2005).
Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 237 (quoting State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194,
196 (Mo. 1991)).

332

333

Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 237.
MO. REV. STAT. § 88.067 (2005) (applicable to certain condemnation proceedings involving
certain counties), § 242.650 (applicable to certain drainage district proceedings); § 245.255
(applicable to certain levee district proceedings). Each of the sections permits changes of judge
(but not venue) for cause. There is at least one additional section with the same language.
§ 257.030 (applicable to certain river basin conservancy districts). For the applicability of the civil
rules to condemnation proceedings, see State ex rel. Wash. Univ. Med. Ctr. Redevelopment Corp.
v. Gaertner, 626 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. 1982).
334

335

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 508.050 (2005).
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be.”336 The Lebanon School District court rejected the district’s argument that
“Missouri statutes contemplate (indeed require) that all lawsuits must be tried in
a county in which suit initially could be commenced,”337 a rejection that depends
in part on the “shall be commenced” language.
After tort reform, the argument will focus on different language.
Defendants will argue that the new tort venue statutes, by specifying where
venue “shall be,” explicitly identify the location for trial and implicitly forbid
changing that location. Venue is ordinarily defined as “the place where a case is
to be tried.”338 It will be argued that, by providing that “venue shall be” in a
particular county, the General Assembly intentionally abandoned the practice of
specifying where a suit should be brought339—a location that would be only the
presumptive place of trial, subject to subsequent developments including
applications to change venue—and decided instead to specify venue itself, thus
fixing an immutable trial location. And that is an argument that the Lebanon
School District court did not face.
While this is a plausible interpretation of the new language, it is not a
necessary one and it faces substantial obstacles. As a matter of ordinary
language, it is not unusual to direct that something “shall” occur or shall be done
in a particular manner, yet also to direct that, in certain events, it shall not occur
or shall not be done in that manner.340 For example, a will may provide that the
testator’s parents “shall be” the trustees of a testamentary trust, yet also provide
that, in certain circumstances, someone else shall serve as trustee.341 Similarly, a

336

§ 508.010.4; § 508.010.5(1)-(2).
Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 235.
338
Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co., 646 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo. 1983) (“Venue means the place
where a case is to be tried.”) overruled on other grounds State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994); 92A C.J.S. Venue § 2 (database updated May 2006) (“The
prevailing meaning of ‘venue’ is the place of trial of action, the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought to trial.). See also State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d
57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (“Venue refers to the situs in which a court of competent jurisdiction may
adjudicate an action.”); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991)
(“Venue is a designation of the location or geographical situs where the court has jurisdiction to act
in a particular lawsuit. The origin of venue dates back to the development of the English judicial
system when venue was the locality from which the court summoned jurors.”).
337

339

Oddly, this interpretation would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the legislature has said
nothing at all about where the suit should be filed, permitting plaintiff to file suit in any county and
leaving it to the defendant to move to transfer if dissatisfied with plaintiff’s choice.
340

To take an example from the venue statutes themselves, section 508.140.1 provides that, if an
affidavit for change of venue is filed and is sufficient on its face, the change of venue “shall be
awarded” as a matter of course and without a hearing; but section 508.140.2 qualifies that by
providing that, if the county has more than 65,000 inhabitants and the opposing party files a
counter-affidavit, “the court shall hear evidence on the issue and determine the same on the merits
of the evidence.”
341
6A Eric Ziegenhorn, Missouri Practice: Legal Forms §20:24 Article V.B. at 442 (3d Ed. 2003).
See also id. §20.28 Article IX.B at 491; id. §20.30 Article IX.B. at 501. It is, of course, also
common for a trust to provide that a trustee “shall distribute” funds to specified beneficiaries, but
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will may provide that a particular person “shall serve” as trustee and at the same
time permit the removal and replacement of that trustee.342 Rule 55.25 provides
that a “defendant shall file an answer within thirty days after the service of the
summons and petition,” yet that time is not immutable and can be changed by the
filing of a Rule 55.27 pre-answer motion or by the granting of a motion to
enlarge time.343 In the same way, there is nothing contradictory about providing
that venue “shall be” in a particular county, yet also providing that venue can be
changed as the result of the filing of an application under Rule 51.03 or the
granting of an application under 51.04.
In addition, it is not clear that the legislature intended to use the phrase
“venue shall be determined” to have any different meaning than the more
common phrase “suit may be brought.” The 93rd General Assembly itself used
the two phrases as synonyms. In section 508.010.2, the legislature stated that, in
non-tort cases, “venue shall be determined as follows: . . . (2) When there are
several defendants, and they reside in different counties, the suit may be brought
in any such county.”344 Thus, the legislature answered the question of how venue
should be determined by specifying where such suit could be brought. In doing
so, the 93rd General Assembly was not alone. There are at least three other
situations in which Missouri statutes appear to treat direct specifications of venue
as equivalent to specifications of where a judicial proceeding should be
initiated.345

also to provide that, upon the happening of certain contingencies, the trustee “shall distribute” the
funds to other beneficiaries. See, e.g., id. §20.197.
342

Compare id. §20.25, Part 1.04 (Option 2) at 450 with id. §20.25, Part 5.03 (alternative) at p.
469; and compare id. §20.30 Article IX.B. at 501 (“trustee (the “Trustee”) of the Trust shall be [a
particular person]” with id. §20.30 Article IX.B.(4) (providing for removal and replacement of the
trustee).
343

Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.25(a) with MO. SUP. CT. R. 44.01(b) and with MO. SUP. CT. R.
55.25(c).

344
See also MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2(3) (2005) (identical “suit may be brought” language as to
cases where some defendants are non-residents); § 508.010.2(4) (identical “suit may be brought”
language as to cases in which all defendants are non-residents).
345
See, e.g., § 536.328 (“Judicial review shall be commenced in the circuit court of the county in
which the small business has its primary place of business, or in Cole County. If the small business
does not have a primary place of business in the state, proper venue shall be in Cole County.”)
(emphasis added); § 210.152.5 (aggrieved alleged child abuse perpetrator “may seek de novo
judicial review” in certain circuits, but, if he or she is a non-resident “venue shall be in Cole
County”) (emphasis added). Compare § 84.015 (in actions involving St. Louis Board of Police
Commissioners, “venue . . . shall be appropriate in” the circuit court of the city of St.
Louis)(emphasis added) with § 84.095 (actions against the “commissioners in their official capacity
shall be commenced” in the same circuit.) (emphasis added) and compare § 536.110.1
(“Proceedings for review may be instituted by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county of
proper venue”) (emphasis added) with § 536.110.3 (“venue of such cases shall, at the option of the
plaintiff, be in” certain counties) and compare § 213.085.2 (persons aggrieved “may obtain judicial
review by filing a petition in the circuit court of the county of proper venue”)(emphasis added) with
§ 213.085.3 (“venue of such cases shall, at the option of the appealing party, be in” certain
counties).
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Similarly, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended sections 508.010.4
and 508.010.5 to dictate an immutable location for trial. If the sections did so,
they would necessarily bar not only small county changes of venue under Rule
51.03 but also changes of venue for cause under Rule 51.04.346 It is highly
unlikely that the legislature would make such a drastic revision of existing law
without doing so explicitly,347 particularly in light of the serious constitutional
issues that would be raised by requiring trial in a county where prejudice has
been established. Yet the text of the sections makes no distinction between the
two types of applications for change of venue, and if that text contradicts one
rule, it necessarily contradicts the other.348
In addition, if the place of trial is immutable whenever a statute states that
“venue shall be” in a particular county, venue changes are forbidden in a number
of surprising situations. The new tort venue provisions are not the only Missouri
statutes that define venue by using that language. While many of those statutes
appear to deal only with judge-tried cases in which changes of venue (as opposed
to a change of judge)349 would not be available in any event,350 there are others

346
This is true as a matter of logic—nothing in the legislature’s use of “venue shall be” would
explain why one sort of change would be permitted and the other forbidden—but also because both
forms of change of venue serve the same function. Both are intended to avoid the risk of prejudice
resulting from factors such as publicity or the parties’ likely relationships with members of the jury
pool. State ex rel. Lebanon Sch. Dist. R-III v. Winfrey, 183 S.W.3d at 237. Rule 51.03, makes
small county changes of venue automatic, not because they serve a different function, but because
experience demonstrated that the likelihood of such factors was sufficiently great and the number
of applications for such changes was so large that the costs of individualized determinations of
prejudice were not justified. Id. at 237.
One could argue that the interpretation would also forbid changes of venue by written agreement
of all parties under section 508.010.14. However, consent-based changes of venue might be
justified on the basis of waiver.
347

See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (Court will not lightly assume that
Congress abrogated longstanding legal doctrine that is “well grounded in history and reason.”).

348

Rule 51.03 cannot itself provide the distinction, since it merely provides a trumping rule.
See, e.g., Wolff v. Ward, 16 S.W. 161 (Mo. 1891) (no change of venue from inhabitants in
equitable cases).
349

350
Some of these statutes specify the venue for suits seeking review of administrative decisions.
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 252.315.2 (2005) (“venue shall be in Cole County” in suits brought
under section 536.150 to challenge certain administrative decisions under the Missouri Economic
Diversification Act); § 252.318.2 (same); § 536.110 (“venue shall, at the option of plaintiff, be” in
certain counties for petitions for review in contested cases); § 536.328 (“venue shall be in Cole
County” for petitions by non-resident small businesses seeking review of certain regulations); §
213.085.3 (in cases seeking review of MCHR findings, “venue of such cases shall, at the option of
the appealing party, be” in particular counties). Others define venue for enforcement of certain
orders, subpoenas, or statutorily mandated agreements. See, e.g., § 276.646 (“venue shall be” in
particular counties for certain petitions to enforce subpoenas); § 393.016 (“venue shall be” in
specific court for suits to enforce certain agreements between water and sewer districts); §
392.470.2 (in suits to enforce certain orders relating to telecommunications, “[t]he venue of such an
action shall lie in [particular counties]”); § 407.822.2 (in cases seeking enforcement of orders under
Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act, “[v]enue for such proceedings shall be” in certain
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that apply to jury tried cases where such changes could be sought; and it is hard
to imagine that the legislature silently selected to abolish the right to change
venue for this odd collection of statutes. For example, it seems unlikely that the
legislature intended to forbid changes of venue in actions whenever service was
effectuated through the nonresident watercraft statute, but not in actions when
service was effectuated through the nonresident motorist statute.351 It seems
similarly unlikely that the legislature decided to pick actions for damage to
survey markers from among all the various forms of damage to real property, and
make it the sole such cause of action in which changes of venue are not
permitted.352 It is hard to imagine that the legislature decided to forbid changes
of venue in suits “involving the [St. Louis] board of police commissioners” while
permitting such changes in suits “against the members of the St. Louis board of
police commissioners in their official capacity.”353 And it would certainly come
as a surprise to lawyers practicing in Jackson County to learn that the legislature,
when it divided Jackson County into eastern and western portions, also
eliminated the previously existing right to file a motion to change venue from
that county for cause.354
counties). Still others specify the venue for a miscellaneous collection of apparently judge tried
matters. See., e.g., § 452.403 (“venue shall be” in particular county when grandparent seeks
mediation of visitation issue); § 393.145 (in suits to appoint receivers of certain sewer or water
districts, “venue of such cases shall, at the option of the commission, be” in particular counties); §
536.050 (in certain suits for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of rules, “venue of such
suits against agencies shall, at the option of the plaintiff, be” in certain counties).
351

Compare § 506.330 (in actions against non-residents for injuries caused by watercraft, “[t]he
venue of such an action shall be the county in which the damage occurred.”) (emphasis added) with
§ 506.290 (actions under the non-resident motorist statute “shall be filed in” certain counties)
(emphasis added).
352
Compare, § 60.355 (“Venue for such cause of action shall be in the county in which the
violation occurs”) with, e.g., Flowers v. Roberts, 979 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(change of venue granted in common law trespass to land action) and § 537.340 (providing
statutory treble damage for various forms of trespass on realty including destruction or taking of
trees, crops, or minerals; governed by the general tort venue statute).
353

Compare, § 84.015 (“Venue for any civil action involving the board of police commissioners,
established pursuant to section 84.020, shall be appropriate in the twenty-second judicial circuit.”)
(emphasis added) with § 84.095. (“All causes of action against the members of the St. Louis board
of police commissioners in their official capacity shall be commenced in the circuit court of the city
of St. Louis.”) (emphasis added).
354

See, § 478.461 (“venue shall be in either the western portion or the eastern portion of the
[sixteenth judicial] circuit”; “venue shall be in that portion of the circuit” in which the facts giving
rise to venue occurred) (emphasis added).
Since Jackson County has more than 75,000 inhabitants, Rule 51.03 changes are not available.
Changes for cause under Rule 51.04, although rare, have been sought. See, e.g., McManemin v.
McMillin, 157 S.W.3d 304, 305 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that case was now in Greene
County after a “change of venue from Jackson County, Missouri”); State ex rel. Amoco Oil Co. v.
Ely, 992 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding trial court’s Rule 51.04 denial of motion to
change venue for cause based solely on movants failure to provide proper notice and not suggesting
that section 478.461 was a ground for that denial). It does not appear that the section 478.461 issue
was raised in either case.
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Thus, it is difficult to argue that the language of the new tort venue
provisions dictates that venue should be immutable and equally difficult to argue
that Rule 51.03 “contradicts” those provisions. If the General Assembly had
intended to forbid small county changes of venue, the language of those
provisions seems an extremely oblique method to accomplish that goal,
particularly given the availability of an established, more direct method:
explicitly providing that “no change of venue under Rule 51.03 shall be allowed
in any tort case.”355
2. Rule 51.03, Section 508.011, and the Remnants of Pre-Tort Reform
Chapter 508
There is an alternative, more obscure, argument that Rule 51.03 conflicts
with provisions of Chapter 508. That argument focuses not on the newly enacted
provisions of the chapter, but instead on two much older provisions that have lain
dormant for years, sections 508.130356 and 508.140.357 To understand the
argument, some history will be helpful.
The state of Missouri has always permitted parties to apply for a change of
venue due to prejudice of the inhabitants of the county in which a civil case was
set for trial.358 By 1879, although such a change continued to require a nominal

355

See authorities cited supra note 334.
For the text of section 508.130, see infra, note 372.
357
For the text of section 508.140, see infra, note 373. One might also argue that Rule 51.03
contradicts section 508.090.2, which provides in relevant part, “A change of venue may be awarded
in any civil suit to any court of record for any of the following causes: (1) That the inhabitants of
the county are prejudiced against the applicant; (2) That the opposite party has an undue influence
over inhabitants of the county.” However, by its own terms section 508.090.2 does not purport to
set forth the exclusive situations in which changes of venue can be granted; and there are a number
of provisions providing other bases for change of venue. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.13
(2005) (providing for change of venue based on consent); § 508.080 (same); § 508.310 (providing
for changes of venue in Cape Girardeau County); §§ 508.320-.330 (providing for changes of venue
in Marion County); § 478.347 (providing for changes of venue in Lewis County); § 478.461.2(4)
(providing for changes of venue in Jackson County). See also, Bray v. Marshall, 66 Mo. 122
(1877) (even if based on consent, change of venue requires an order of the court). In addition, even
if section 508.090.2 were seen as listing the only situations in which venue could be changed for
cause, it would not contradict Rule 51.03 which provides a change of venue as of right for which
the applicant “need not allege or prove any cause.” See infra text accompanying notes 393-98.
356

358

An Act to Amend Certain Acts Respecting the Proceedings in Chancery and Suits at Law §4,
1804-24 Mo. Laws 769, 770 (June 27, 1821). Even before statehood, the Territory of Missouri had
enacted a statute giving a party a right to a jury selected from an adjoining county if the applicant
stated under oath that he believed that he could not receive a fair trial by a jury selected from the
forum county. An Act Establishing Courts of Common Pleas, and for Other Purposes §18, 1804-24
Mo. Laws 276-78 (August 20, 1813).
By 1835, the grounds for change of venue were expressed in terms strikingly similar to those set
forth in the current statutes. See An Act for the Change of Venue in Civil Cases § 1, MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 1834-35 (March 14, 1835) (change of venue authorized if “the inhabitants of the county
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finding of prejudice, that finding had become automatic if a proper application
and affidavit were filed.359 Under the then existing procedure, the applicant filed
a petition and affidavit stating that the affiant had “just cause to believe that he
cannot have a fair trial on account of the cause alleged.”360 Once an application
was filed, there was no provision for the opposing party to file a counter-affidavit
or for the court to hear evidence on the question.361 If the application and
[were] prejudiced against the applicant” or if the “opposite party [had] undue influence over the
inhabitants of the county.”).
359

At least by 1879, the applicant’s allegations of prejudice were deemed conclusive. See infra,
authorities cited at notes 361-64.
Prior to that date, the status of such allegations fluctuated over time. Until 1835, with two short
exceptions (1821-22 and 1831-33), the statutes appeared to require the court to grant the change
based on the applicant’s sworn statement or affidavit alone. See An Act Establishing Courts of
Common Pleas, and for Other Purposes §18, 1804-24 Mo. Laws 272, 276-78 (August 20, 1813)(if
applicant swears that he cannot obtain a fair trial “the court shall order a special jury to be
summoned from an adjoining county”); An Act to Amend Certain Acts Respecting the Proceedings
in Chancery and Suits at Law §4, 1804-24 Mo. Laws 769, 770 (June 27, 1871)(upon application
and affidavit “it shall and may be lawful for the said court . . . to award a change of venue”); An
Act to Regulate Proceedings at Law §33, 1804-24 Mo. Laws 841, 848-49 (January 11, 1822) (upon
petition and affidavit “the court shall award a change of venue”); An Act to Provide for Changing
the Venue in Civil and Criminal Cases §1, 1825 Mo. Laws 786, 786-87 (February 16, 1825) (“such
court or judge, reasonable notice of the application having been given to the other party, or his
attorney, shall award a change of venue”); An Act to Provide for changing the Venue in Causes
Cognizable in the Circuit Courts §1, 2 1824-36 Mo. Laws 246, 246-47 (January 15, 1831) (upon
application and five days notice to the other side, “such court being first satisfied of the truth of the
statements made in the petition, shall award a change of venue”) (emphasis added); An Act
Providing for Change of Venue in Criminal Cases §10, 2 1824-36 Mo. Laws 388, 391 (February
12, 1833)(repealing the 1831 provision and reviving Act of February 16, 1825 as to civil cases, thus
reinstating the “shall award” standard).
From 1835 until 1879, the statutes provided that, upon application and affidavit, “the court shall
hear the case, and award a change of venue.” An Act for the Change of Venue in Civil Cases §3,
1835 R.S. Mo. 614, 615 (March 14, 1835); An Act Providing for the Change of Venue in Civil
Cases § 3, 1845 Mo. Laws 1072, 1072 (March 8, 1845) (same); An Act Providing for the Change
of Venue in Civil Cases § 4, 1855 Mo. Laws 1558, 1559 (November 19, 1855) (same); 1866 G.S.
Ch. 158, §4 (same). In light of the fact that the statutes in effect from 1835 to 1879 did not provide
any mechanism for the adverse party to file counter-affidavits, it is unclear whether the “shall hear
the case, and award a change of venue” language required the court to decide the merits of the
application or simply determine its facial sufficiency. See, e.g., Byrne v. St. Louis Public Sch., 12
Mo. 402, 403 (1849); Corpenny v. City of Sedalia, 57 Mo. 88, (Mo. 1874) (dealing with a change
of judge under the same statute).
360
MO. REV. STAT. § 3732 (1879). Applicants were also required to state when they obtained the
“information and knowledge” on which he based his belief.
361

§ 3733 (“If reasonable notice shall have been given to the adverse party or his attorney of
record, the court or judge, as the case may be, shall consider the application, and if it be sufficient,
a change of venue shall be awarded.”) (emphasis added). The lack of provision for a hearing is
particularly significant since it replaced language that at least seemed to contemplate some form of
hearing. See, e.g., 1866 G.S. Ch. 158, §4 (upon the filing of an application and affidavit “the court
shall hear the case, and award a change of venue”). It is also significant that the 1879 statute did
not contain language similar to the short-lived 1831 version that permitted a change of venue only
if the court was “satisfied of the truth of the statements made in the petition.” An Act to Provide
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affidavit were in proper form and proper notice had been given, the trial court
had no authority to deny the requested change.362
The only question to be determined by the court under that section, is the
sufficiency of the application. The section does not require that the judge
shall be satisfied of the truth of the allegations. If the petition is sufficient in
form and substance, then the statute is peremptory, and the change of venue
shall be awarded.363

The trial judge could not consider his own opinions and could not take
evidence on the issue since “[t]he application, duly verified, furnishes evidence
which is conclusive upon the court as to the existence of the causes in that
county.”364
Thus, by 1879, parties who filed a timely, sworn application were entitled
to the change and the adverse party had no right to challenge the allegations in
for Changing the Venue in Causes Cognizable in the Circuit Courts §1, 2 1824-36 Mo. Laws 246,
246-47 (January 15, 1831) repealed by An Act Providing for Change of Venue in Criminal Cases
§10, 2 1824-36 Mo. Laws 388, 391 (February 12, 1833).
362
Douglas v. White, 34 S.W. 867, 867-68 (Mo. 1896) (granting the motion is imperative and a
matter of right rather than favor or discretion); Dowling v. Gerard B. Allen & Co., 88 Mo. 293
(1885) (statute is peremptory and the change must be granted); Gee v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 41 S.W.
796, 797 (Mo. 1897) (decided under pre-1895 law) (same).
There were two later Court of Appeals decisions that stated in dictum that the court could inquire
as to whether the application was made in bad faith. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Big Three Mining
Co., 123 S.W. 70, 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909); Padberg v. Padberg, 78 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App.
1935) (designated as “Not to be Published in State Reports”). Even those opinions did not permit
taking evidence on the issue or deciding it based on the trial court’s view of the truth or falsity of
the application’s allegations. They stated that the determination of good or bad faith had to be
made based on the files and records of the case. Both decisions dealt with applications based on
allegations that the judge (rather than the inhabitants) was prejudiced and both held that the change
should have been granted. In addition, they were decided under statutes under which counteraffidavits and hearings were permitted in all applications based on prejudice of the inhabitants.
(Big Three Mining was decided before 1921. Padberg was filed after 1921 but in a county of more
than 75,000 inhabitants.) See infra, text accompanying notes 365-67.
As the Dowling court noted, the requirement of notice was superfluous. “If the application is
sufficient, it being the duty of the court at once to award the change, it is difficult to perceive a
reason for requiring any notice whatever of the application. It is only necessary because the statute
requires it.” Dowling, 88 Mo. 293.
363

Dowling, 88 Mo. 293 (The sufficiency of the application was judged on a purely formal basis. It
was enough if the application simply parroted the words of the statute. State v. Yager, 157 S.W.
557, 558, 560 (Mo. 1913) (approving the following as a sufficient statement of prejudice of
inhabitants: “Because the inhabitants of Pike county, Mo., are prejudiced against this applicant, the
defendant in this cause.”)). The court explicitly denied the adverse party’s claim that he should
have been permitted to offer testimony on the issue.
364
Gee, 41 S.W. at 797 (emphasis added). See also Douglas, 34 S.W. at 868 (“Nor are the rights of
the applicant made to depend upon the finding of the court upon the questions of facts stated in the
application, or upon the private knowledge or information of the court of the existence or
nonexistence of the facts therein stated, but must be determined by what is judicially presented in
due course of law, and this the office of the application can alone perform.”).
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the application or to present evidence. However, in 1895, the legislature
amended the code of civil procedure to give the adverse party the right to file a
counter-affidavit denying the allegations of prejudice, and to require the court (on
the filing of such a counter-affidavit) to hear evidence on the application and
decide it on the merits.365 As originally enacted, this right to an evidence-based
decision on the merits applied to all cases regardless of the size of the county in
which the case was filed,366 but the legislature eliminated that right in 1921 for
cases in all counties except those having more than 75,000 inhabitants.367 In
1967, the population cut-off was changed to 65,000 inhabitants,368 but the
pertinent statutory provisions have otherwise remained essentially the same since
1921.369 As a result, since 1921, the statutes have effectively provided a twotrack system for inhabitant-based changes of venue: In small counties, since no
counter-affidavit or hearing is permitted and since the application is treated as
conclusive, applications for change of venue are granted as a matter of right.370
In large counties, the adverse party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and
changes of venue are granted only if the trial court finds that the alleged
prejudice exists and justifies the change.371 This statutory framework is now
codified in sections 508.130372 and 508.140373 which are set forth in the margin.

365

Act of Apr. 1, 1895, § 2, 1895 Mo. Laws 92-93. The 1895 amendment added the following
proviso:
Provided, that if the removal is asked on the ground of objections to the inhabitants of
the county, and the adverse party shall have filed a counter-affidavit controverting the
objections to the inhabitants of the county, the court shall hear evidence on the issue
and determine the same on the merits of such evidence.
This was the first time that Missouri change of venue statutes gave adverse parties the right to file a
counter-affidavit in civil cases. See authorities cited supra note 362.
366
1 HALE HOUTS, MISSOURI PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED § 256 at 456 (1936).
367
Act of Apr. 11, 1921 § 1, 1921 Mo. Laws 203, 204. Based on the 1920 census, this eliminated
all but five Missouri counties, Buchanan County, Jackson County, Jasper County, St. Louis
County, and the city of St. Louis.
368
Act of July 25, 1967 §1, 1967 Mo. Laws 652, 653. It would be interesting, but beyond the scope
of this article, to try to determine the motivation for this change. In the 1960 census, only Jefferson
County had between 65,000 and 75,000 inhabitants but it had grown to 105,248 by 1970. Boone
County grew from 55,202 to 80,911 and St. Charles County grew from 52,970 to 92,954 in the
same time period.
369
In 1957, the crucial section, 508.140, was divided into the three current subparts and slightly
reworded in ways that are not pertinent to this article. Act of June 13, 1957 §1, 1957 Mo. Laws
294, 297.
370
See authorities cited supra note 359; 1 HALE HOUTS, MISSOURI PLEADING AND PRACTICE
ANNOTATED §256 at 457 (1936).
371
State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Waltner, 169 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1943).
372
Section 508.130 is entitled “Application for disqualification of judge or change of venue—
contents” and provides:
Any party, his agent or attorney, may present to the court, or judge thereof in
vacation, a petition setting forth the cause of his application for disqualification of the
judge or for a change of venue, and when he obtained his information and knowledge
of the existence thereof; and he shall annex thereto an affidavit, made by himself, his
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However, under Missouri law, the statutory framework is not the only set of
rules defining the right to change venue in Missouri. In 1959, the Supreme Court
enacted the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure;374 and, pursuant to Article V,
section 5 of the Missouri Constitution, those rules “have the force and effect of
law.”375 In the initially enacted version of those rules, effective April 1, 1960,
Rules 51.06 and 51.07 effectively mirrored the then existing statutory

agent or attorney, to the truth of the petition, and that affiant has just cause to believe
that he cannot have a fair trial on account of the cause alleged. If the removal is asked
because of objections to the inhabitants of the county, the application shall not include
therein any other county than the one from which the change of venue is asked.
373
Section 508.140 is entitled “After notice given, duty of court.“ and provides:
1. If reasonable notice has been given to the adverse party or his attorney of record,
the court or judge, as the case may be, shall consider the application, and if it is
sufficient, the judge shall be disqualified or a change of venue shall be awarded to
some county in the same, adjoining or next adjoining circuit, convenient to the parties
for the trial of the case and where the causes complained of do not exist. One or more
of several parties plaintiff or defendant may ask for the change of venue, and if the
change is awarded the entire cause shall be removed, and there shall be no further
change of venue awarded on the same side of the suit.
2. In all cases in counties in this state which have a population of more than sixty-five
thousand inhabitants and wherein the removal is asked on the ground of objections to
or prejudice of the inhabitants of the county and the adverse party has filed counteraffidavit controverting the objection to or the prejudice of the inhabitants of the
county, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and determine the same on the
merits of the evidence, and if the issue is determined in favor of the applicant for the
change of venue, the change shall be awarded as herein provided.
3. This section does not apply to causes wherein a special venire has been issued, and
in such case the party not applying for the special venire shall be granted a change of
venue as of course, upon proper affidavit.
374
For the orders of the Supreme Court adopting the rules, see MO. SUP. CT. R. 41-82 xv-xvii (West
1960) (superseded). For a history of the enactment of the rules, see id. at iii-v (Introduction by
Chief Justice Hollingsworth).
375
Mo. Const. art. V, § 5 provides, “The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice,
procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the force and
effect of law. The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral
examination of witnesses, juries, the right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The court shall
publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall take effect before six
months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by a law
limited to the purpose.”
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requirements,376 and those two rules remained essentially unchanged until
1973.377 As a result, the statutory two-track system remained in effect.378
However, in 1975, the Supreme Court repealed the existing Rule 51, and
enacted a new Rule 51 in its place.379 Former Rules 51.06 and 51.07 were
eliminated and functionally replaced by current Rules 51.03 and 51.04.380 The
new rules created a new form of two-track system. In any size county, parties
could apply for a “Change of Venue from Inhabitants for Cause,” claiming
prejudice or undue influence; and, if the opposing party opposed the motion, the
court would hear evidence and decide the issue.381 The procedure was somewhat
simplified,382 but otherwise quite similar to the procedure for large counties under
the statute and previous rules. In small counties, the Rule 51.03 replaced the
previous, nominally cause-based procedure with one that explicitly authorized
“Change[s] of Venue from Inhabitants as a Matter of Right in Counties of
Seventy-Five Thousand or Less Inhabitants.”383 The previous requirement of an
application and an affidavit alleging prejudice384 was replaced by a simple,
unsworn application that could be as terse as “Plaintiff requests a change of
venue.”385 The previous case law treating the application’s allegations as

376

MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.06-51.07 (1960) (superseded). According to the Committee Notes, Rule
51.06 was identical to section 508.130 except for its title, while Rule 51.07 was identical to section
508.140 except for the deletion of some obsolete references. MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.06 at 77 (1960)
(superseded) (Committee Note to Rule 51.06); MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.07 at 78 (1960) (superseded)
(Committee Note to Rule 51.07). However, the Committee Notes compared the two rules to the
version of the statutes contained in MO. REV. STAT. (1949), i.e., prior to the 1957 amendments. As
previously discussed, those amendments divided section 508.140 into three subsections, but made
no pertinent substantive changes. See Act of June 13, 1957 §1, 1957 Mo. Laws 294, 297.
377
Rule 51.06 was amended in 1963 to make some stylistic changes, to require that applications be
filed within 5 days of learning of the grounds justifying change of venue, and to require that the
application include a statement that the application “is made in good faith and not to delay the trial
or to vex or harass the adverse party.” Order (Rules of Civil Procedure), 367-68 S.W.2d (Missouri
Cases) xviii, xix-xx (July 9, 1963). At the same time, Rule 51.07 was amended to conform to the
changes in Rule 51.06. Order (Rules of Civil Procedure), 367-68 S.W.2d (Missouri Cases) xviii,
xx-xxi (July 9, 1963). In 1966, there were minor, primarily stylistic or clarifying changes to the
two rules. Order (Supreme Court of Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure), 399-400 S.W.2d
(Missouri Cases) xx, xx-xxii (Mar. 21, 1966). Neither set of changes is significant for purposes of
this article.
378

Oddly, despite the 1967 statutory redefinition of small counties, Act of July 25, 1967 §1, 1967
Mo. Laws 652, 653, the rules never reduced the population cutoff to 65,000.
379

Order (Supreme Court of Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure), 514-15 S.W.2d (Missouri Cases)
xxii, xlii-xlv (Sept. 1, 1975).
380
While there have been subsequent minor amendments to the two rules, those amendments are
not significant for purposes of this article; and Rules 51.03 and 51.04, as adopted in 1973, are
essentially identical to the current version of the two rules.
381

MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.04.
For example, the requirement of affidavits was eliminated. Id.
383
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03.
384
See supra text accompanying notes 358-61.
385
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03 (Committee Note—1973).
382
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conclusive386 was replaced by the explicit statement that “[t]he applicant need not
allege or prove any cause for such change.”387
Despite the similarities between the statutory and rule-base frameworks, it
might be argued Rule 51.03 contradicts sections 508.130 and 508.140 in some
respects, and therefore that the statutory framework should govern to the extent
of that contradiction. First, section 508.140 gives small county treatment only to
counties with less than 65,000 inhabitants while Rule 51.03 applies to counties
with less than 75,000. Second and more significantly, section 508.130 requires
that applicants allege, under penalties of perjury, that they have “just cause to
believe that [they] cannot have a fair trial for the cause alleged,”388 i.e., that “the
inhabitants of the county are prejudiced against the applicant [or t]hat the
opposite party has an undue influence over the inhabitants of the county.”389
While there will be many cases in which a party could honestly make such an
allegation (and there may be others in which a party might make one
dishonestly), the requirement of such a sworn statement will be a real constraint
for many.390 (Even this constraint would be eliminated if the required allegations
come to be seen as a recognized and permissible legal fiction like English law’s
traditional fictional allegation that the island of Minorca is actually located in
London.)391 The practical result of interpreting 51.03 as contradicting the
statutory small county rules would be modest: It would eliminate two or three
counties from Rule 51.03’s coverage392 and would return to a more formalistic,
cumbersome and less straightforward, nominally cause-based procedure.
Nonetheless, this argument does suggest that some contradiction exists between
Rule 51.03 and sections 508.130 and 508.140.

386

See supra text accompanying notes 364.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03.
388
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.140 (2005).
389
§ 508.090.
390
There are two cases suggesting that the application must allege prejudice was against the
applicant as an individual rather than against the applicant’s “side of the issue.” Charlotte v.
Chouteau, 33 Mo. 194 (1862); Bent v. Lewis, 15 Mo. App. 40, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1884). The
authority of these cases is somewhat unclear. The first was a suit for emancipation of a slave
during the Civil War and was decided over a powerful dissent. Charlotte, 33 Mo. At 194 (Dryden,
J., dissenting) (“What matters it to the defendant whether it be against him or his cause? The result
to him is the same in the one case as in the other; in either case he fails to get what every litigant is
entitled to—a fair and impartial trial.”). The second involved a claim that a judge should be
disqualified because he had heard similar cases in the past. Bent, 15 Mo. App. at 44. If these cases
are not treated as good law, the constraint would be significantly reduced (if not eliminated) since
most change of venue applicants believe that the inhabitants of the forum county are unfavorably
disposed toward (i.e., prejudiced against) their side of the case.
387

391
See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 18, 21 (1967); Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1202, 1209-10 (1990). For the classic discussion of the uses and evolution of legal fictions, see
FULLER, supra.
392

According to the 2000 census, only three counties have populations between 65,000 and 75,000;
and one of these (Platte County with a 2000 census population of 73, 781) had almost surely passed
the 75,000 threshold before section 508.011 was enacted.

2007]

VENUE IN MISSOURI AFTER TORT REFORM

659

However, it is not at all clear that this argument is correct or that there
really is a contradiction between that rule and those statutes. For both large and
small counties, the statutory sections prescribe a procedure for obtaining a
change of venue that is, at least formally, a change of venue for cause. Section
508.130 explicitly requires that the petition and affidavit set forth a basis for the
change of venue and a sworn statement that the affiant “has just cause to believe
that he cannot have a fair trial on account of the cause alleged.”393 Section
508.140 does not dispense with the requirement of good cause for any size
county. Instead, it provides two different procedures for proving cause: For
small counties, an affidavit in proper form is considered sufficient and conclusive
proof that cause for the change of venue exists.394 In counties with more than
65,000 inhabitants, the judge must hold an evidentiary hearing and must
independently decide whether cause exists.395 But regardless of which procedure
is required, any change under either section is a change of venue for cause.
Viewed in this way, Rule 51.03 cannot contradict the two statutory
sections, because Rule 51.03—unlike Rule 51.04—does not even deal with
“Changes of Venue from Inhabitants for Cause.”396 Instead of contradicting the
statutorily created right to a cause-based change, Rule 51.03 supplements that
right by providing an additional and different type of change of venue, “Changes
of Venue from Inhabitants as a Matter of Right.”397 The Missouri Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly differentiate between the two types of change, regulating
cause-based changes through Rule 51.04 while regulating matter-of-right
changes through Rule 51.03. In the former, the applicant must “set forth the
causes for the change of venue” and, if the adverse party files a denial, must
prove the causes alleged. In the latter, the applicant “need not allege or prove
any cause.”398 Under this interpretation, Rule 51.04 may contradict the two
statutory sections; but Rule 51.03 does not.
3. Section 508.011 and Article V Section 5 (the “Law Limited to the
Purpose” Rule)
The previous two sections demonstrate that there are persuasive arguments
that there is no contradiction between Rule 51.03 and Chapter 508 and thus that
newly enacted section 508.011 has no effect.399 However, if those arguments are

393

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.130 (2005).
§ 508.140.1. See authorities cited supra note 364.
395
§ 508.140.2. If no counter-affidavit is filed, the petitioner’s application is sufficient.
396
Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03 with MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.04.
397
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03.
398
Id.
399
Such a conclusion may seem troublesome both because of the rule against surplusage, see supra
text accompanying note 254, and because of the natural suspicion that the section would not have
been adopted unless at least some members of the General Assembly believed there was a
contradiction. These concerns may be somewhat alleviated by section 508.011’s introductory
phrase, “To the extent that rule 51.03 of the Missouri rules of civil procedure contradicts any
provision of this chapter.” MO. REV. STAT. § 508.011 (2005) (emphasis added). That phrase may
394
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rejected, the Court should invalidate section 508.011 since it violates the
“Limited to the Purpose” clause of Article V, section 5 of the Missouri
Constitution. This conclusion is supported by the text of the Constitution itself,
by existing case law interpreting Article V, section 5, and by the history of the
enactment of that constitutional provision.
a. The Textual Argument
Article V, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution of 1945, as amended,
provides:
The supreme court may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and
pleading for all courts and administrative tribunals, which shall have the
force and effect of law. The rules shall not change substantive rights, or the
law relating to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the right of
trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The court shall publish the rules and fix
the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall take effect before six
months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole
or in part by a law limited to the purpose.400

It would seem self-evident that H.B. 393, the 2005 Tort Reform Act,401 was
not “limited to the purpose” of annulling or amending Rule 51.03. The Tort
Reform Act accomplishes—and presumably was intended to accomplish—a
wide variety of changes in Missouri law.402 To mention just a few, it set new
caps on punitive damages403 and medical malpractice awards,404 repealed the
suggest that legislators were uncertain as to whether there was a contradiction or that there was a
disagreement among various legislators on the issue. However, uncertainty about the existence of a
contradiction could have been more clearly expressed by replacing “To the extent that” with “To
the extent, if any, that” or simply with “If.”
It is possible that the phrase was intended to permit Rule 51.03 transfers to any county that
would have been a proper venue under the new tort venue rules, for example, a transfer from the
plaintiff’s principal place of residence to the individual defendant’s principal place of residence.
See § 508.010.5(2). Ironically, this interpretation raises quite similar concerns. First, just as there
was a simpler way to have expressed uncertainty, there was a simpler way to have expressed this
intent. For example the legislature could have simply said, “In any tort case, Rule 51.03 shall not
be deemed to permit change of venue to any county in which venue would not otherwise be proper
under this Chapter.” Second, the interpretation would itself lead to perverse incentives: A plaintiff
wanting to try a case in his own principal place of residence would need to file in the defendant’s
principal place of residence and immediately move to transfer as of right.
400
Mo. Const. 1945 art. V, § 5 (as amended 1976) (emphasis added). The current amended version
is somewhat stronger than the version adopted in 1945. The amendment expanded the rule making
power to cover administrative tribunals and added the phrase “which shall have the force and effect
of law.” There has been no change in the crucial last sentence.
401

2005 Mo. Laws 641, 641-57.
For a summary of some of the changes, see the official Bill Summary for H.B. 393 (Truly
Agreed) at http://www.house.mo.gov/bills051/bilsum/truly/sHB393T.htm.
402
403
404

2005 Mo. Laws 641, 647.
Id. at 651-52.

2007]

VENUE IN MISSOURI AFTER TORT REFORM

661

joint and several liability doctrine,405 created new presumptions regarding the
pecuniary value of the lives of minors and full-time homemakers,406 changed the
interest rate charged on judgments,407 and made changes to discovery
procedure.408 While this disparate set of objectives may satisfy the single subject
requirement of Article III, section 23409—a question on which this article
expresses no opinion—the Tort Reform Act is clearly not, in any ordinary sense,
a “law limited to the purpose” of annulling or modifying Rule 51.03. Given the
Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that words in the constitution should be
given their ordinary meaning,410 this properly ends the matter.
It could be argued that section 508.011, viewed in isolation, is “limited to
the purpose” of modifying Rule 51.03. However, section 508.011 is not itself a
law; it is a section of a law. The Constitution states that a “law” is a bill that has
been duly enacted by both houses of the General Assembly and either signed by
the Governor or passed over his or her veto.411 H.B. 393 was a single bill that
was enacted as a whole by each house,412 signed as a whole by the presiding
405

Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 650-51.
407
Id. at 643-44.
408
Id. at 646.
This change itself raises Article V, Section 5 concerns since it is arguably inconsistent with
Rule 56.01(d). Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 510.263.8 (2005) (“Discovery as to a defendant's assets
shall be allowed only after a finding by the trial court that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff
will be able to present a submissible case to the trier of fact on the plaintiff's claim of punitive
damages.”) with MO. SUP. CT. R. 56.01(d) (“Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be
used in any sequence”). See also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (state statute
restricting court’s discretion inconsistent with federal rule granting court discretion).
406

409

Mo. Const. art. III, § 23 (“No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly
expressed in its title.”).

410
See, e.g., Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002); State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on
Legislative Research, 956 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. 1997) (citing numerous cases).
411

See, e.g., Mo. Const. art. III, §31 (“Every bill which shall have passed the house of
representatives and the senate shall be presented to and considered by the governor, and, within
fifteen days after presentment, he shall return such bill to the house in which it originated endorsed
with his approval or accompanied by his objections. If the bill be approved by the governor it shall
become a law.”) (emphasis added); Mo. Const. art. III, § 32 (If the veto of a bill is overridden, the
presiding officer of each house shall certify that fact and “[t]he bill thus certified shall be deposited
in the office of the secretary of state as an authentic act and shall become a law.”) (emphasis
added). Mo. Const. art. III, § 30 (“No bill shall become a law until it is signed by the presiding
officer of each house in open session, who first shall suspend all other business, declare that the bill
shall now be read and that if no objection be made he will sign the same.”) (emphasis added); Mo.
Const. Art. III, § 21 (“The style of the laws of this state shall be: ‘Be it enacted by the General
Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows.’ No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill
shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose. Bills may
originate in either house and may be amended or rejected by the other. Every bill shall be read by
title on three different days in each house.”) (emphasis added).
412
Journal of the House, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 674 (Mar. 16, 2005);
Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 477-79 (Mar. 16, 2005).
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officer of each house,413 and then approved as a whole by the Governor.414 When
so approved, it became “a law”415—not a group of laws.
b. Case Law Interpreting Article V, Section 5
The Supreme Court has gone out of its way to warn the legislature that
multiple section laws like H.B. 393 that are not “limited to the singular objective
of annulling [or modifying] one of [the Court’s] rules” are constitutionally
dubious.416 In State v. Pizzella,417 the Court was faced with a provision that
referred to a specific Supreme Court Rule and was clearly intended to annul or
modify that rule.418 That provision, like section 508.011, was codified as a
separate section in the Revised Statutes.419 However, also like section 508.011,
the provision was only one of many subparts of the law as enacted.420 Because
the defendant in Pizella lacked standing to challenge the provision, the Court did
not need to discuss the issue of whether the provision violated Article V,
section 5.421 Nonetheless, the Court took the extraordinary step of warning the
legislature to review its practice of purporting to amend Supreme Court rules in
this fashion, unanimously stating:
Section 545.880.1 was a subpart of one of nine discrete provisions in
section 1 of Senate Bill 602. A multi-faceted law such as Senate Bill 602
which is not limited to the singular objective of annulling one of our rules
may very well, under a logical extension of our decision in State ex rel. K.C.
v. Gant, 661 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. banc 1983), run afoul of the "limited to the
purpose" mandate of Article V, section 5.422

The Supreme Court then cited Miller v. Russell423 with approval, as a case
holding that a “statute which provided for revisions in court structure [The Court
Reform and Revision Act of 1978] as well as annulling a Rule [was] violative of

413

Journal of the House, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 690 (Mar. 17, 2005);
Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 493-94 (Mar. 17, 2005).
414

Journal of the House, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 736-37 (Mar. 29, 2005).
Mo. Const. art. III, §31 (“If the bill be approved by the governor it shall become a law.”)
(emphasis added).
415

416

State v. Pizzella, 723 S.W.2d 384, 387 n.3 (Mo. 1987).
723 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1987).
418
Pizzella, 723 S.W.2d at 385-86.
419
The provision was codified as MO. REV. STAT. § 545.880.1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
420
Pizella, 723 S.W.2d at 386, 387 n.3. Eventually codified as MO. REV. STAT. § 545.880.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1984), the provision was originally one of several parts of House Committee Substitute for
Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 602 which was enacted as Act of June 7, 1984.
1984 Mo. Laws 746, 747-48.
417

421

Pizella, 723 S.W.2d at 387 n.3.
Id.
423
593 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
422
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art. V, section 5.”424 Under that holding, a statute which provides for wide
ranging revisions in Missouri tort law (such as the Tort Reform Act of 2005) as
well as annulling Rule 51.03 would be equally violative of that constitutional
provision.
More recently, in State v. Reese,425 the Court rejected another “multifaceted” law that contained a section that would have modified a Supreme Court
Rule. Since 1972, substitution of parties has been comprehensively governed by
Rule 52.13.426 That rule—which defines the procedures to be used, inter alia,
when an individual party died or became incompetent—differed from and
superseded former section 507.100 of 1969,427 the previously enacted statutory
provision covering the same subjects.428 However, in 1983, the legislature
enacted a bill significantly revising the previous statutes relating to trusts, estates,
and persons under disability;429 and one section of that law essentially reenacted
the previously existing statutory provision, section 507.100.430 That section of
the bill was limited to a single topic, substitution of parties, and had no effect
other than to change the then existing procedures prescribed by Rule 52.13.431
Although all parties argued that the subsequently enacted 1983 law should be
deemed controlling, the Court rejected that argument.432 Despite the fact that the
relevant section of that law was limited to the same topic as Rule 52.13, the
Court unanimously held that the rule should govern stating that “[t]he General
Assembly [had] not passed a law limited to the purpose of annulling or amending
Rule 52.13. See 1983 Mo. Laws 895-896.”433
Pizella and Reese are not aberrations. The Supreme Court has invariably
held that previously enacted Supreme Court Rules prevailed over subsequently
enacted, multi-faceted laws in which a single section conflicted with those
rules.434 The courts of appeals have reached the same result in numerous
424

Pizella, 723 S.W.2d at 387 n.3 (describing the holding of Miller). In Miller, a father had argued
that a Supreme Court Rule had been abrogated by the re-enactment of section 211.241 of the
Missouri statutes. Miller v. Russell, 593 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
425

920 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1996).
From 1960 to Dec. of 1972, substitution had been covered in Rule 52.12 which had been
substantially tracked MO. REV. STAT. § 507.100 (1959). State v. Reese, 920 S.W.2d, 94, 95 (Mo.
1996).
426

427

MO. REV. STAT. § 507.100 (1969).
Mo. Const. art. V, § 5.
429
Act of July 14, 1983, 1983 Mo. Laws 804.
430
Id. at 895-96. It differed from the previous version in one respect; it substituted the phrase
“mentally incapacitated” for the word “incompetent.”
428

431

Compare id. with MO. REV. STAT. § 507.100 (1959) and with MO. SUP. CT. R. 52.13.
State v. Reese, 920 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Mo. 1996).
433
Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
434
See, e.g., State ex rel. K.C. v. Gant, 661 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1983) (Rule 127.05 prevails over
section 211.029 which was one eight sections of Senate Bill 512, Act of June 17, 1980, 1980 Mo.
Laws 331, 332); State ex rel. Pressner v. Scott, 387 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1965) (Then existing Rule
54.06(c)(2) prevails over section 351.630.2 which was one of five subsections of one of two
sections of Act of July 18, 1961, 1961 Laws 257, 257-58). See also Schleeper v. State, 982 S.W.2d
252 (Mo. 1998) (finding no conflict between Rule 29.15 and section 547.360 but suggesting that
432
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cases.435 For example, in State ex rel. Kaufman v. Hodge,436 the Eastern District
dealt with an act that had a section limited to the purpose of modifying an
explicitly identified Supreme Court rule,437 and nonetheless found that the
statutory section could not modify the rule since the entire law was not limited
to that purpose.438

rule would prevail over the statute which was enacted as sections 12 and 14 of Act of July 7, 1997,
1997 Mo. Laws 1270, 1278-82); Breeden v. State, 987 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that Rule 24.035 prevailed over the same act because the act was not “limited to the purpose of
amending or annulling” the Supreme Court Rule).
435
In addition to the case discussed in the text, cases from the Eastern District Court of Appeals
reaching a similar result include State ex rel. McCulloch v. Lasky, 867 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (then existing Rule 29.14(h) prevails over subsequently enacted section 491.230(2) which
was one section of the forty-two-page Act of July 10, 1990, 1990 Mo. Laws 749, 771); Redifer v.
Redifer, 650 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (then existing Rule 51.05 prevails over subsequently
enacted section 478.255 which was one of two sections of the Act of July 30, 1979, Mo. Laws 1979
625, 625-26); State v. Tate, 658 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (then existing Rule 24.06(b)
prevails over subsequently enacted section 545.885.2 which was a sub-sub-section the six-page Act
of May 20, 1980, Section A, §545.885.2, 1980 Mo. Laws 494, 495).
The Southern District does not seem to have decided any cases in which a rule was challenged
based on a subsequently enacted, multi-section law. But see State ex rel. Helms v. Moore, 694
S.W.2d 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (then existing Rule 32.08(c)(3) prevails over subsequently
enacted section 478.255.3 which was part of the Act of June 10, 1982, 1982 Mo. Laws 670, 671,
which would have modified multiple Supreme Court Rules; basis for ruling unclear).
Cases from the Western District upholding rules against challenges based on subsequently
enacted multi-faceted statutes include Breeden v. State, 987 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(Rule24.035 prevails over subsequently enacted section 547.360 which was originally sections 12
and 14 of the Act of July 7, 1997 §§ 12, 14, 1997 Mo. Laws 1270, 1278-82); Knight v. State, 985
S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (same); Miller v. Russell, 593 S.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (Rule 110.05a(15) prevails over subsequently enacted section 211.021, which was one
section of H.B. 1634, the Court Reform and Revision Act of 1978, 1978 Mo. Laws 696). But see
State v. Kenney, 973 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes
443-54).
436
908 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
437
The sole effect of section 452.311 was to effectively modify Rule 53.01 (which provided that an
action was commenced on filing regardless of when summons was issued, see Ostermueller v.
Potter, 868 S.W.2d 110, 110-11 (Mo. 1993)) so that, in certain domestic cases, the action would
not be deemed commenced until a summons was issued. In those cases, it would have had the
effect of substantially repealing the 1972 amendments to Rule 53.01 and returning to the previous
version that provided that an action was ordinarily deemed instituted only by both filing the petition
“and suing out theron a writ of summons.” Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 53.01 (1960) with MO. SUP.
CT. R. 53.01 (1972). See Ostermueller, 868 S.W.2d at 110-11.
Section 452.311, as then existing, specifically referred to Rule 53.01, providing that “[a] petition
is not filed within the meaning of supreme court rule 53.01 in any cause of action authorized by the
provisions of chapter 452, unless a summons is issued forthwith as required by supreme court rule
54.01.”
438

State ex rel. Kaufman v. Hodge, 908 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
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When enacted, what became § 452.311 is the seventh section of a bill
relating to the Department of Social Services.[439]
If it is argued that this provision amended Rule 53.01 or 54.01, such an
argument would be suspect. To amend a supreme court rule, the constitution
requires the General Assembly to do so "by a law limited to the purpose."
Mo. Const. 1945, art. V, § 5. The 1989 amendment was not in a bill limited
to the purpose of amending or annulling a rule. 440

The court went on to recognize that the legislature had amended and
reenacted section 452.311 in 1991.441 Unlike the 1989 version, the 1991 version
contains only one section and that section seems limited to the purpose of
modifying Rule 53.01.442
There is a single apparent exception to this uniform line of decisions. In
State v. Kenney,443 the Western District held that the special Cole County
criminal change of venue statute444 preempted previously enacted Supreme Court
Rule 32.03 regarding change of venue.445 The court stated that the Cole County
statute complied Article V, section 5 since “[t]he ‘Notwithstanding Missouri
supreme court rule 32.03’ language of section 545.473 [the special Cole County
statute] reveals the General Assembly's intent to pass a law limited to the purpose
of annulling or amending Rule 32.03.”446 However, section 545.473 was not
itself a law but simply one small section of a comprehensive bill dealing with
various aspects of criminal law and procedure447—exactly the sort of “multifaceted law” that the Supreme Court warned against in Pizella.448

439

Section 452.311 was originally enacted as section 7 of Act of July 27, 1989 §7, 1989 Mo. Laws
1164, 1171.
440

Kaufman, 908 S.W.2d at 139 n.2.
Id.
442
See Act of June 27, 1991, 1991 Mo. Laws 1030. But see Kaufman, 908 S.W.2d at 139 n.2
(declining to express opinion on whether the new version complies with Article V, Section 5).
441

443

973 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
MO. REV. STAT. § 545.473 (2005).
445
State v. Kenney, 973 S.W.2d, 536, 540-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The court also held that the
Cole County statute prevailed over the general criminal “for cause” change of venue statute, MO.
REV. STAT. § 545.490 (2005).
444

446

Kenney, 973 S.W.2d at 541. The Supreme Court has stated that a law cannot be “limited to the
purpose” of amending or annulling a rule unless it specifically mentions the rule. See, e.g., State ex
rel. K.C. v. Gant, 661 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Mo. 1983) (“A law, to qualify as one ‘limited to the
purpose’ of amending or annuling a rule, must refer expressly to the rule.”) (quoting State ex rel.
Pressner & Co. v. Scott, 387 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1965)). However, the Court has never suggested
that the fact that a law refers to a rule is enough, by itself, to establish that the law is limited to that
purpose. The fact that something may be a necessary condition does not mean that it is a sufficient
condition. The fact that only members of the student body can be on a school’s basketball team
does not mean that every member of the student body is on the team.
447

Section 545.473 (first codified as section 508.355) was originally enacted as section 2 of senate
bill 450. Act of Mar. 17, 1986, 1986 Mo. Laws 1091, 1105. It constituted one of twenty-two
sections and occupied roughly half a page of the twenty-four page bill. In 1995, it was re-enacted
(and given its current designation) as a part of an even more multi-faceted bill, as house bill 424,
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Kenney is more of an apparent exception than a real one. Neither the
parties in their briefs449 nor the court in its opinion450 recognized that section
545.473 was merely a part of a larger, multi-faceted law. Similarly, neither the
parties nor the court cited Pizella.451 Instead, the appellant affirmatively argued
that section 545.473 was limited to the purpose of amending Rule 32.03 and
therefore could not have any effect on a different rule, Rule 32.04.452
Respondent, in turn, agreed that section 545.473 validly amended Rule 32.03453
and that Rule 32.04 was the applicable rule. As a result, the court was faced with
a situation in which both parties took the position that Rule 32.03 had been
validly amended by section 545.473, both parties treated that section as if it were
a stand-alone law, neither party pointed out that it was just a part of a multifaceted law, and both parties treated the meaning of Rule 32.04 as the relevant
question to be decided. Given that situation, the court had no reason to
independently research the enactment history of section 545.473 and was
apparently unaware that it was just one part of part of a larger, multi-section
law.454
In any event, Kenney is the only case providing even apparent support for
the validity of 508.011. It stands alone against the otherwise uniform body of
case law to the contrary and—more significantly—against the plain language of
Article V, section 5 itself.

which comprehensively revised the laws relating to penal institutions. Act of July 5, 1995, 1995
Mo. Laws 570, 598.
448

State v. Pizzella, 723 S.W.2d 384, 387 n.3 (Mo. 1987).
Brief for Appellant at 28-31, State v. Kenney, 973 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (No. 5587);
Respondent’s Statement, Brief and Argument at 23-34, State v. Kenney, 973 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998) (No. 55587) (copies on file with the author; originals available at the Missouri Public
Archives).
449

450

Kenney, 973 S.W.2d at 540-41.
See id.
452
Brief for Appellant, supra note 450 at 28-29 (“The purpose and valid effect given to section
545.473 RSMo is constitutionally limited to amending or annulling Rule 32.03.”). See also
Appellant’s first Point Relied On, id. at 21 (Article V, Section 5 “limits the valid purpose and effect
of section 545.473 RSMo to annulling or amending Rule 32.03”). Appellant then argued that Rule
32.04 implicitly incorporated a procedure provided by a different statutory section, section 545.490.
Id. at 29-31.
451

453
Brief for Respondent, supra note 540 at 31. Respondent then agreed with Appellant that Rule
32.04 was the applicable rule, but argued that the rule abrogated (rather than—as Appellant
argued—incorporated) the procedures of section 545.490. Respondent also argued that the
Appellant had not properly preserved the issue. Id. at 27-29.
454

Such independent research for authorities not cited by the parties, particularly on an issue not
presented by them, could be considered improper since the appellate court would run the risk of
being seen as an advocate for one of the parties. See, e.g., Henson v. Henson, 195 S.W.3d 479, 482
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Shaw v. Raymond, 196 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); City of
Plattsburg v. Davison, 176 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
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c. The Enactment History of Article V, Section 5
The meaning of the “law limited to the purpose” language of Article V,
section 5 is sufficiently clear that there is little reason to look to the history of its
enactment to determine its meaning. Nonetheless, since it is likely that
enactment history arguments will be made—and since the primary source
materials for such arguments are not easily available—a review of that history
may be useful.
Such a review reinforces the understanding of section 5 suggested by the
case law and by the ordinary meaning of the section’s language. The prevailing
majority in the Constitutional Convention intended to shift control over
procedural rules away from the General Assembly—which had been vested with
such control under the then recently enacted statutory Civil Code—and transfer it
to the Supreme Court.455 Reading the “law limited to the purpose” language of
section 5 as creating only a narrowly defined legislative override is consistent
with that intent. This is particularly true in light of the Convention’s choice of
that language instead of the language of either of two provisions of the Civil
Code, each of which would have given the legislature broader override power.456
Finally, the debates on the Convention floor, while not independently conclusive,
are entirely consistent with the view that section 5 was intended to permit the
legislature to override Supreme Court rules only after separately considering the
issue and only by passing a law that was limited to that purpose.457
Article V, section 5 was originally adopted as part of the 1945 Missouri
Constitution,458 but it was not enacted in a vacuum. Less than two months before
the opening of the 1943-44 Constitutional Convention, the Missouri legislature
passed and the governor signed a comprehensive new General Code of Civil
Procedure.459 Under the Civil Code, principal authority over procedural rules
was vested, not in the courts, but in the General Assembly. The Supreme Court
was forbidden to enact rules changing any existing practice or procedure in
criminal cases,460 and such changes were to be made only “by a legislative act

455

See infra text accompanying notes 466-04
See infra text accompanying notes 458-65.
457
See infra text accompanying notes 505-12.
458
For the full current text of Article V, Section 5, see supra text accompanying note 401. It was
amended in 1976, by a vote of the people, but there was no change in the crucial “law limited to the
purpose” language.
456

459

General Code for Civil Procedure, 1943 Mo. Laws 353 (Aug. 6, 1943) [hereinafter Civil Code].
The Convention convened on Sept. 21, 1943. 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
MISSOURI 1943-1944, at 1 (1st Day, Sept. 21, 1943) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION].
While the Code of Civil Procedure was not to take effect until Jan. 1, 1945, Civil Code § 3 at 357,
the delegates to the convention were well aware of its provisions.
460

As was noted on the floor of the Convention, a bill to grant such power was rejected by the same
General Assembly that enacted the Civil Code. 13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1945 at 7341 (statement of Mr. Tee); id. at 3862 (statement of Mr. Williams). All
references to the constitutional convention debates refer to the debates as contained in the transcript
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passed for that specific purpose.”461 Moreover, while the Civil Code gave the
Supreme Court power to promulgate civil rules,462 that power was tightly
circumscribed since the Court could not promulgate any rules that conflicted with
existing law including the Civil Code itself.463 While the Court was authorized to
promulgate rules to harmonize any conflicts between various procedural statutory
provisions,464 even such harmonizing rules were subject to an unrestricted
legislative override since they were only to “be effective until superseded by
legislative enactment.”465 There was no requirement that the superseding statute
be a law “limited to the purpose” of amending or repealing the rule.
Almost as soon as the Convention convened, it became apparent that a
significant group of delegates wanted to drastically shift the power to regulate
procedure from the legislature to the judiciary. On the tenth day of the
Convention, five delegates466 submitted Proposal 21, a comprehensive revision of
the previously existing judicial article that had been prepared by a committee of
the Missouri Bar Association working in conjunction with a committee appointed
by the Missouri Judicial Conference.467 Proposal 21 created an “administrative
council” consisting of fifteen judges468 and gave the council the power to propose
stored in the Missouri Supreme Court Library. The author is informed that the Missouri State
Archives’ copy of the transcript of the debates has different pagination.
461

Civil Code, supra note 460, at § 145 at 397. There was one exception that proved the rule. If
any provision of the Civil Code was found to have inadvertently changed criminal practice in any
respect, the Supreme Court was directed to immediately promulgate a rule restoring the preexisting practice. Id.
462

Id. §10 at 359.
Id. § 10(a) at 359 (“No such forms or rules shall . . . be contrary to or inconsistent with the laws
in force for the time being.”).
463

464
Id. § 10(b) at 359-60 (authorizing promulgation of rules to harmonize conflicts between
provisions of the Civil Code or between the Civil Code and other statutes).
465

Id. § 10(b) at 360.
The delegates who introduced Proposal 21 included Richard Righter (Chair of the Convention’s
Committee on the Judicial Department) and former Missouri Governor Guy Park. See 1 JOURNAL
OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460.
466

467
Id. at 2 (10th Day, Oct. 12, 1943); PROPOSALS, THE 1943-44 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
MISSOURI, No. 21 [hereinafter PROPOSALS]. For a discussion of the genesis of Proposal 21 and the
work of the Missouri Bar Association Committee, see Samuel H. Lieberman, A Preliminary Report
of the Special Committee to Consider Articles of the New Constitution Relating to the Judiciary, 14
MO. BAR J. 156, 156, 193 (1943); Report of Committee to Cooperate with Judiciary Committee of
the Supreme Court in Doing Research and Making Recommendations to Coming Constitution [sic]
Convention Concerning Organization, Jurisdiction and Powers of the Judiciary, 14 MO. BAR. J.
217, 217-20 (1943); Proposal No. 21 in the 1943 Constitutional Convention of Missouri, 14 MO.
BAR. J. 284, 284-88 (1943); Laurance Hyde et al., Suggestions of Joint Committee in Support of
Proposal 12, 14 MO. BAR. J. 289, 289-90 (1943); Symposium on the New Constitution, 15 MO.
BAR. J. 190, 196-99 (1944) (statement of Mr. Righter); JACK PELTASON, THE MISSOURI P LAN FOR
THE SELECTION OF JUDGES 91 (1945). Proposal 21 contained numerous provisions unrelated to this
article and was seen as one of the principal proposals backed by those who wanted to retain the
Missouri non-partisan plan for selection of judges.
468
PROPOSALS, supra note 468, at No. 21 § 23 at 8. The council was to be composed of three
judges from the Supreme Court, three from the Courts of Appeals, six from the Circuit Courts, and
three from the Probate Courts. Id.
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“rules of practice, procedure and evidence for all the courts, to be effective when
approved by the Supreme Court.”469 Unlike the Civil Code, section 25 of
Proposal 21 explicitly contemplated that these judge-made rules would trump
pre-existing statutorily created procedures including the Civil Code itself. “All
laws in force at the time of the adoption of this constitution which pertain to
practice, procedure or evidence shall have the force and effect of general rules
until rescinded or changed by the council with the approval of the Supreme
Court.”470 Section 25 did provide for legislative override of judge-made rules,
but that provision was much more restrictive than the one contained in the Civil
Code.
Instead of permitting override by any subsequent “legislative
enactment,”471 it provided that rules could only “be repealed, or amended, by the
general assembly by a special law limited to that purpose.”472 Proposal 21 was
referred to the Convention’s Committee on the Judicial Department473 as were
three subsequent proposals containing essentially identical restrictive legislative
override provisions.474

469

Id. No. 21 § 25 at 9.
Id. (emphasis added).
471
Civil Code, supra note 460, at § 10(b) at 360.
472
PROPOSALS, supra note 468, at No. 21 § 25 at 9 (emphasis added).
473
1 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 2 (10th Day, Oct. 12, 1943); PROPOSALS,
supra note 468, at No. 21 at 1.
The Convention had previously delegated initial drafting of the judicial article to that committee
whose members were appointed on Sept. 28, 1943. 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note
460, at 3-4 (3rd Day, Sept. 28, 1943).
The Committee held weekly public hearings until Dec. 16, 1943 at which various proposals were
presented by their proponents and discussed. Id. at 8 (12th Day, Oct. 14, 1943) (scheduling the
Committee’s meetings for Thursdays at 2:00); Id. at 2 (45th Day, Dec. 7, 1943) (reporting that the
Committee would hold its last public hearing on Dec. 16, 1943); Richard S. Righter, The Judicial
Section of the Proposed Missouri Constitution, 13 U.K.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1944). All proposals were
referred to sub-committees which evaluated them and reported back to the Committee as a whole.
Id. at 1 (referring to 35 proposals); but see FILES, THE 1943-1944 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
MISSOURI, FILE 15: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY No. 5 at 1 (listing 36 proposals)
[hereinafter FILES, FILE 15]. After the public hearings concluded, the Committee held meetings
(also open to the public) at which it considered and voted on the reports of the various subcommittees. Righter, supra note 474, at 1-2. It eventually prepared and voted on three drafts of the
proposed judicial article. Id.
470

474
Two proposals contained exactly the same legislative override language as Proposal 21. See
PROPOSALS, supra note 468, at No. 274 § 13 at 6-7 (identical language) (introduced and referred to
the committee on Nov. 17, 1943. 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 12-13 (33rd
Day, Nov. 17, 1943)); PROPOSALS, supra note 468, at No. 351 § 20 at 6-7 (identical language)
(introduced and referred to the committee on Dec. 2, 1943. 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra
note 460, at 10 (42nd Day, Dec. 2, 1943)).
One additional proposal contained almost identical language. PROPOSALS, supra note 468, at No.
219 § 21 at 10 (rules proposed by the council and adopted by the court “may be repealed or
amended, and any new rule may be enacted, by the general assembly by a special law limited to
that purpose”) (introduced and referred to the committee on Nov. 17, 1943. 1 JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 5 (33rd Day, Nov. 17, 1943)).
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The Committee voted three times on provisions that were based on section
25 of Proposal 21 granting rule-making authority to the Supreme Court.475 The
version on which the Committee cast its final vote gave the rule-making authority
directly to the Supreme Court and did not provide for an “administrative
council.”476 It contained a restrictive legislative override provision essentially
identical to the one contained in Proposal 21, providing that the rules could only
be “be repealed or amended by a special law limited to that purpose.”477
However, the debate in the Committee focused not on the override provision, but
instead on the fact that the proposal might be interpreted to permit the Court to
enact rules relating to evidence, the right to jury trial, or the right to appeal.478
There were only two other proposals that explicitly authorized the Supreme Court (or the
administrative counsel with the Court’s approval) to promulgate rules. See PROPOSALS, supra note
468, at No. 142 Article 5, § 9 at 10-11 (introduced and referred to the committee on Nov. 3, 1943, 1
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 9 (26th Day, Nov. 3, 1943)); PROPOSALS, supra
note 468, at No. 175 § 3 at 2 (introduced and referred to the committee on Nov. 9, 1943. 1
JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 3 (28th Day, Nov. 5, 1943)). Neither proposal
contained any provision for legislative override of such rules and neither forbade enactment of rules
that were inconsistent with existing statutes.
None of the remaining twenty-nine proposal considered by the committee contained any
provision authorizing the promulgation of rules.
475
13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 7354-55 (statement of Mr.
Tee) (describing initial Committee rejection of, subsequent Committee reconsideration and
approval of, and final Committee rejection of the provision); Id. at 3853-54 (statement of Mr. Marr)
(describing his idiosyncratic recollection of earlier versions of provision before Committee).
It is unclear whether the language of the provision was revised between the Committee’s first
vote on the issue and its final rejection of the proposal. Compare id. at 7354-55 (statement of Mr.
Tee) (suggesting that the language remained the same) with id. at 3853-54 (statement of Mr. Marr)
(suggesting that earlier versions had not authorized the Supreme Court to make rules for the trial
courts). However, there is no evidence that there was any change in the language authorizing a
narrow legislative override.
476

The final version before the Committee provided, “The Supreme Court shall exercise
superintending control over all courts with power to establish rules of practice and procedure for all
courts which shall not abridge any substantive right or remedy given by law. Any such rule may be
repealed or amended by a special law limited to that purpose. Rules shall be published.” Id. at
3836 (statement of Mr. Tee) (quoting from a draft in his notes). See also id. at 3877 (statement of
Mr. Park) (identical language but with several apparent typographical or transcription errors). It is
unclear whether the concept of the administrative council was rejected in a subcommittee or by the
Committee itself.
477

Id. at 3836 (statement of Mr. Tee). The only difference between the two override provision in
Proposal 21 and the one on which the Committee voted is that the latter omitted the redundant
phrase “by the general assembly.” Compare text accompanying this note with PROPOSALS, supra
note 468, at No. 21 § 25 at 9 (stating that rules may only “be repealed, or amended, by the general
assembly by a special law limited to that purpose.”).
478
13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3841-42 (statement of Mr.
Philips) (committee members objected because the phrase “practice and procedure” might be
deemed to give the Court the right to change the rules of evidence); id. at 3877 (statement of
Governor Park) (agreeing with Mr. Phillips that the principal objection of opponents in the
committee was that it might authorize rules relating to evidence); id. at 3835 (statement of Mr.
Righter) (committee members objected to the lack of the safeguards that were subsequently added
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Because of these objections, on February 24, 1944, the Committee rejected the
proposal by a vote of 11-10.479
As a result, on March 10, 1944, when the Committee submitted its final
report to the Convention, that report contained no provision authorizing the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules.480 If the Constitution had been adopted
without such a provision, the Supreme Court would have had only the limited
rule-making authority provided by the Civil Code, and the General Assembly
would have had the unrestricted power to repeal or amend such rules by any
“legislative enactment,”481—even one not “limited to the purpose.”
However, the struggle for judicial control over procedural rule making was
not over; it had simply shifted to the floor of the Convention itself. Debate on
the Committee’s report and the proposed judicial article began on May 24,
1944.482 The Convention initially dealt with a large number of minor
amendments and then, on June 5 and June 6, debated and resolved the most
contentious issue, retention of the Missouri Plan for judicial selection.483 Just
before adjournment on June 6, almost immediately after the vote on the Missouri
Plan, former Governor Guy Park484 submitted an amendment inserting a section
giving the Court broad rule-making authority.485 Governor’s Park’s proposed
by Governor Park, (i.e., safeguards forbidding rules relating to evidence, right to jury etc.)); id. at
3835 (statement of Governor Park) (same). There is one colloquy in the convention debates that
suggests that the legislative override provision was inserted to ameliorate some members’ concerns
that giving the rule making authority to the Court would be exclusive and would eliminate the
legislature’s power to make rules. Id. at 3850 (statement of Mr. Righter). However, the narrow
override provision, in essentially its final form, was included in the proposal at all stages of the
debate, i.e., in Proposal 21, in the version debated by the Committee, and in the version
subsequently submitted to and approved by the Convention itself. Therefore, if the draftspersons
added the provisions to deal with those concerns, they must have done so at the beginning rather
than in the Committee.
479
Id. at 3834 (statement of Mr. Righter); id. at 3877 (statement of Mr. Park). Governor Park
stated that three members of the Committee had left before the vote. Id. at 3877.
480
1 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460 at 20-34 (99th Day, Mar. 10, 1944). See also
FILES, FILE, supra note 474, at 15 at 1. The Committee’s report was unusual in that it contained
two alternative proposals for judicial selection, one proposing to continue the recently enacted
Missouri Plan and the other proposing a return to elected judges. Compare id. at 8-13 with id. at
13-18. The Committee had split precisely equally on these two proposals. Id. at 8.
481
Civil Code, supra note 460, at § 10(b) at 360.
482
2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 6 (148th Day, May 24, 1944).
483
Id. at 2-6 (154th Day, June 5, 1944); Id. at 1-6 (155th Day, June 6, 1944); MARTIN L. FAUST,
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MISSOURI: THE CONVENTION OF 1943-1944 105-06 (1971).
484
Park had served as Governor of Missouri from 1933 to 1937 and before that had been a circuit
judge. See OFFICIAL MANUAL STATE OF MISSOURI 61 (Kristen S. Meyer Ed.) (2005-2006).
485
2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 6 (155th Day, June 6, 1944). 12 DEBATES OF
THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3800 (statement of Mr. Park). The full text
of the proposed amendment was as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to establish rules of practice and procedure
for all Courts. Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any party. Said rules shall not affect the rules of evidence, or the law relating
to jurymen or juries or the right of trial by jury as now existing or the mode of giving
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amendment was designed to alleviate the concerns that had led to defeat in the
Committee.486 For example, it forbade the Court from enacting rules of evidence,
rules that would affect the right to trial by jury, or rules that would restrict the
right to appeal.487 At the same time, Governor Park’s amendment accomplished
the principal goals of those who favored judicial authority over procedural rules:
It gave the Supreme Court explicit authority “to establish rules of practice and
procedure for all Courts”; and—most significantly for purposes of this article—it
restricted the General Assembly’s authority by providing that such rules could be
overridden only “by a special law limited to that purpose.”488
The following day, before any motion to adopt the amendment was made,
this override proviso was modified in one minor respect. At the suggestion of
Mr. Mayer, Governor Park agreed to delete the word “special” so that the final
phrase would read “annulled or amended by a law [rather than a “special law”]
limited to that purpose.”489 However, this deletion was intended solely to avoid
possible linguistic inconsistency between the proviso and the proposed legislative
article which was said to contain a definition of “special laws” and restrictions on
the circumstances in which such laws could be passed.490 (As used in the
legislative article, the phrase “local or special laws” referred to laws that applied
only to particular persons or localities,491 not to a law—like one repealing a
Supreme Court Rule—that is generally applicable but is limited to a particular
purpose.) Both Park and Mayer agreed that the change was not intended to have

evidence by the oral examination of witnesses. The right of appeal shall continue in
all cases in which appeals are now or may hereafter be authorized by law. The
Supreme Court shall cause such rules to be made public and may fix the dates when
any rule or rules shall take effect, provided that no rule shall become effective prior to
six months after its public promulgation, and provided further that any rule may be
annulled or amended by a special law limited to that purpose.
486
13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3841-42 (statement of Mr.
Philips) (Park’s proposal contains provisions intended to deal with concerns of the opponents ); id.
at 3835 (statement of Governor Park) (stating that he had “rearranged” the previous proposal to
deal with those concerns); id. at 3835 (statement of Mr. Righter) (Park’s proposal contains new
provisions intended to alleviate concerns of former opponents).
487

See supra note 486. A number of delegates indicated that they had voted against the rulemaking proposal in committee but now supported it because of these new limitations. See, e.g., Id.
at 3845 (statement of Mr. Ford); id. at 3875 (statement of Mr. Garten); id. at 7353 (statement of Mr.
Marr) (stating that he made the motion to strike the provision in committee but now favors it).
488

2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460 at 6 (155th Day, June 6, 1944);
THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3800 (statement of Mr. Park).

12 DEBATES OF

489

13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3825-26.
Id. (colloquy between Mr. Mayer and Mr. Park). For the current version of this restriction, see
Mo. Const. art. III, §§ 40-42. For the version then being considered by the Convention, see FILES,
FILE, supra note 474, at 17 §§ 51-52 at 18-20. The Constitution itself does not, in fact, define
“local or special laws,” but case law has done so. See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 491.
490

491

See, e.g., Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1991) (defining “special
laws” as ones that apply to some but not all similarly situated persons); Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d
833 (Mo. 2006) (same).
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any effect on the meaning of the proviso, the word “special” having been inserted
simply for emphasis.492
The Park amendment presented the Convention with a choice between two
starkly different rule-making regimes: If the Park amendment was adopted, broad
rule-making authority would be vested in the Supreme Court; and the General
Assembly would have only a narrowly controlled legislative override. If it was
defeated, the Civil Code would continue to control, the Court would have quite
limited rule-making power, and even that power could be easily overridden by
any “legislative enactment.”
Park amendment opponents recognized that the amendment would
drastically curtail legislative authority493 and quickly tried to restore the General
Assembly’s broad power over civil rules. Omar Brown, one of the principal
opponents, moved to amend the Park amendment so that it would have read
simply “The Supreme Court shall have the power to establish rules of practice
and procedure within all courts. Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor
modify the general code of civil procedure provided by law.”494 If adopted, Mr.
Brown’s language would have reinstated the rule-making regime created by the
Civil Code effectively forbidding promulgation of any rules inconsistent with
existing statutory law and again permitting the General Assembly to override
Supreme Court rules by any “legislative enactment” including ones not limited to
the purpose of modifying or annulling those rules. However, the Convention
overwhelmingly rejected Mr. Brown’s proposal, defeating it by a vote of fiftyone to fourteen.495 After additional debate, the Convention approved the Park
amendment itself by a vote of thirty-six to twenty-six.496
On September 19, 1944, when the Judicial Article as a whole came to the
floor for final consideration, the proponents of legislative control over rulemaking made one last effort to defeat the Park Amendment.497 At their request, it
was considered separately and again debated.498 After this final debate, the

492

13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3826 (statement of Mr.
Park) (acknowledging that he would be just “as well off” if the word were deleted since it had been
simply inserted for emphasis). Even after the change, at least one member continued to describe
the Park amendment as permitting legislative override only by a “special law.” Id. at 7345
(statement of Mr. Storckman).
493

See, e.g., Id. at 3840 (statement of Mr. Brown of Christian County); id. at 3854-55 (statement of
Mr. Phillips of Jackson County); id. at 3859-62 (statement of Mr. Williams); id. at 3870-75
(statement of Mr. Tee).
494

Id. at 3839.
Id. at 3868; 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 4 (156th Day, June 7, 1944)
(reporting vote as 14 yeas, 51 nays, 10 absent, and 8 absent with leave).
495

496

13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3878.
Id. at 7339-56.
498
Mr. Tee (with the concurrence of eleven other members) requested separate consideration of
section 5. Id. at 7339. Mr. Righter then moved that section 5 be adopted and that brought the
matter to the floor for separate debate. Id.
Prior to the Sept. 19 debates, the Committee on Phraseology, Arrangement, and Engrossment
had redesignated the Park amendment as section 5 of the judicial article and had rephrased it. The
497
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Convention again approved the Park amendment, this time by a vote of fifty-four
to thirteen.499 Thus, in three separate votes (one rejecting the Brown proposal,
one adopting the Park Amendment, and one reaffirming that adoption), the
Convention rejected the Civil Code regime in favor of language that permitted
the General Assembly to override Supreme Court rules only “by a law limited to
that purpose.”
The choice of this language is particularly significant when compared to the
language that it replaced. Delegates repeatedly discussed the Civil Code and
acknowledged that the Park amendment would supersede its provisions.500 As
the Convention was aware, the Civil Code contained its own override
provision—one that permitted the General Assembly to repeal judge-made rules
by any “legislative enactment.”501 In light of the Convention’s decision to adopt
the more restrictive, “law limited to the purpose,” language, it is reasonable to
infer that the Convention intended to enact exactly what that language seems to
convey: that rules may not be modified or repealed by a “legislative enactment”
unless that enactment is “a law limited to the purpose” of annulling or amending
the rule. If the Convention had intended to permit rules to be repealed by “multifaceted” multi-purpose laws, it would have retained the Civil Code’s language
permitting such repeal by any “legislative enactment.”502
Similarly, the Convention was aware that, in section 145 of the Civil
Code,503 the General Assembly had provided that existing criminal practices and
final proviso was made a separate sentence and rephrased to read “Any rule may be annulled or
amended by a law limited to the purpose” (rather than “that purpose”). As rephrased, the entire
Park amendment read as follows:
The supreme court may establish rules of practice and procedure for all courts. The
rules shall not change substantive rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral
examination of witnesses, juries, the right to trial by jury, or the right of appeal. The
court shall publish the rules and fix the day on which they take effect, but no rule shall
take effect before six months after its publication. Any rule may be annulled or
amended by a law limited to the purpose.
Report No. 1 of Committee on Phraseology, Arrangement and Engrossment. Article VI: Judicial
Department at 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 460 at 14, 17-18 (168th Day, June 28,
1944)(report submitted); Id. at 4 (197th Day, Aug. 23, 1944) (report adopted and rephrased file
engrossed).
499

13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 7356; 2 JOURNAL OF THE
CONVENTION, supra note 460, at 25-26 (210th Day, Sept. 19, 1944) (reporting the vote on the Park
amendment, designated section 5, as 54 yeas, 13 nays, 8 absent, and 8 absent with leave).
500

See, e.g., Id. at 3836-38 (statement of Mr. Julian); id at 3840-41 (statement of Mr. Phillips of St.
Louis); id. at 3861-62 (statement of Mr. Williams); id. at 3867-68 (statement of Mr. Brown of
Christian County); id. at 7346-47 (statement of Mr. Park)
501
See, e.g., id. at 7345 (statement of Mr. Storckman) (referring to Civil Code Section 10’s override
provision). It is reasonable to infer that the distinguished lawyers and judges who made up the
Missouri Bar-Missouri Judicial Conference Joint Committee that drafted and approved Proposal 21
as well as the members of the Convention’s Committee on the Judicial Department were also
familiar with the Civil Code’s override provision and consciously decided to use different
language.
502
503

Civil Code, supra note 460, at § 10(b) at 360.
Id. at § 145; 1943 Mo. Laws 353, 397.
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procedures could “not be changed except by a legislative act passed for that
specific purpose.”504
That language—particularly the phrase “specific
purpose”—could be construed as permitting procedural changes to be made only
by laws having such a change as their sole purpose; but the Convention chose
even stronger language that made that restriction explicit—permitting rule
changes only “by a law limited to the purpose.” Once again, the decision to use
new, clearer language strengthens the conclusion that Article V, section 5’s
override provision means what it says.
The statements of various delegates on the floor during the Park amendment
debates suggest the same conclusion. While the debates focused primarily on the
wisdom of the Park amendment as a whole, they did contain a limited amount of
discussion of the legislative override provision in particular. Some opponents of
the Park amendment argued that the existence of any legislative override
somehow demonstrated the Court should have no rule-making authority at all505
or that it might lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Court and the General
Assembly.506 On the other hand, some Park amendment supporters described the
override provisions as a sensible allocation of authority that recognized the
greater expertise of the Court while giving ultimate veto power to the
majoritarian branch.507 Others, including some of the strongest supporters of
judicial rule-making, argued for complete elimination of the legislative override
proviso508 and unsuccessfully moved to eliminate it.509
However, the debates contain little that illuminates—and nothing that
conclusively establishes—the meaning of the Park amendment’s “law limited to
that purpose” proviso. The proviso was quoted sufficiently frequently that the
Convention members were certainly aware of its language.510 Mr. Storckman

504

Civil Code, supra note 460, at § 145; 13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1945 at 3862 (statement of Mr. Williams) (quoting § 145 on the floor of the
Convention).
505

See, e.g., 13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3839 (Statement
of Mr. Brown); id. at 7342-43 (Statement of Mr. Williams); id. at 7350-53 (Statement of Mr.
Parker); id. at 7353-54 (Statement of Mr. Tee).
506

See, e.g., id. at 3840 (Statement of Mr. Brown); id. at 7343-44 (Statement of Mr. Williams); id.
at 7354 (Statement of Mr. Tee).

507
See, e.g., id. at 3825 (Statement of Mr. Park); id. at 3830 (Statement of Mr. Storckman); id. at
3842 (Statement of Mr. Phillips of St. Louis City); id. at 7348 (Statement of Mr. Arnold).
508
Id. at 3836-37 (Statement of Julian) (opposing proviso); id. at 3842 (Statement of Mr. Phillips of
St. Louis City) (opposing proviso but willing to compromise); id. at 3845 (Statement of Mr. Ford)
(same); id. at 3868-69 (statement of Mr. Julian and motion); id. at 3869 (second by Mr. Potter); id.
at 3869-70 (expressing support for Mr. Julian’s substitute but willingness to vote for the Park
amendment if the substitute fails).
509

Id. at 3868-69 (Motion by Mr. Julian to substitute the following for the Park amendment: “The
Supreme Court shall have the power to establish rules of practice and procedure for all Courts.”);
id. at 3876 (Mr. Julian’s substitute defeated by a voice vote). The Julian substitute would also
have eliminated the Park amendment’s other restrictions on rule making, for example, the ban on
rules affecting the right to a jury and the requirement that rules be published.
510

See, e.g., id. at 3825 (statement of Mr. Park) (first speech regarding the amendment); id at 3860
(statement of Mr. Williams); id. at 7343 (statement of Mr. Williams); id. at 7346 (statement of Mr.
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explained a rationale for the “limited to the purpose” requirement, indicating that
it would force the legislature to focus on the wisdom of changing the rule by
requiring that it give the question separate consideration. If the Court adopted an
unwise rule, Storckman stated, “the Legislature still has the reigns [sic] in its
hand. It can pass a special law giving special consideration to that situation and
bring back the old system or any system that we want.”511 Governor Park
indicated that, to revoke a Supreme Court Rule, the General Assembly would
need to pass a free-standing act having that purpose. When asked whether he
thought it was a good idea to give the Court the power to change provisions of
the Civil Code, he responded, “Yes, sir, with the right of the Legislature, if they
think the court is wrong, to veto it [the court’s rule] by repassing [the previous
provision], by simply passing an act to do away with it [the rule].”512
Nonetheless, while these statements are suggestive, they cannot be seen as
definitive.
However, the question is not whether the debates definitively confirm the
ordinary meaning of the Constitutional text, but rather whether those debates
definitively contradict that meaning;513 and no member of the Convention even
suggested that the language meant anything other than what it appears to say. No
member argued that the Park amendment’s proviso could be satisfied by anything
other than a law that had modification or annulment of Supreme Court rules as its
exclusive purpose.514 No member suggested that it could be satisfied by a
multiple section bill in which one section was limited to that purpose.
Park). At the very beginning of the discussion, the Convention’s attention was particularly directed
to the language of the proviso by Mr. Mayer’s suggestion that the word “special” be deleted and by
Governor Park’s acceptance of that suggestion. Id. at 3825-26 (colloquy between Mr. Mayer and
Mr. Park). On the other hand, as one would expect in extended oral debate, the language was
sometimes misquoted. See, e.g., id. at 3838 (statement of Mr. Julian) (omitting “limited to the
purpose” language).
511
Id. at 7345 (Statement of Mr. Storckman) (emphasis added). The requirement that override
legislation be considered seperately on its own merits may have been part of a general reformist
trend to avoid logrolling by forbidding legislation that combined unrelated proposals into a single
bill which would have to be voted up or down as a whole. The same convention adopted of Article
III, Section 21’s single subject requirement as well as Article III, Section 21’s “original purpose”
requirement—both of are intended to reduce logrolling. Missouri Ass'n of Club Executives v.
State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 8__(Mo. 2006)quoting Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26
(Mo.1997).
512
Id. at 3827 (Statement of Mr. Park) (emphasis added).
513
See authorities cited supra note 410.
514
The only statement that could be stretched to support the view that the Park amendment
contained an unqualified legislative override is an exchange between Mr. Julian (who opposed any
override) and Mr. Righter:
MR. JULIAN: In [sic] that new constitutional law, giving the Legislature a veto of the
Supreme Court, did you ever hear of that before?
MR. RIGHTER: No, I say it’s, here’s the point. The Legislature has heretofore
exercised this power of making codes and passing rules of procedure. Now, some of
the members thought that if we give it to the court, we’re taking it away from the
Legislature. Now, to make clear that we’re not taking away any power that the
Legislature now has, we put that in there.
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Viewed as a whole, the enactment history reinforces the interpretation of
section 5 supported by the case law and the ordinary meaning of section 5’s text.
That interpretation is the one that best serves the goal of the prevailing faction in
the convention—drastically shifting rule-making authority from the legislature to
the Court. That interpretation is the only one that explains the Convention’s
decision to use new language rather than the language of the Civil Code’s
override provision. That interpretation is the one most consistent with the floor
debates.
4. Section 508.011 and Article III Section 21 (the “Original Purpose” Rule)
As discussed in the previous section, the text, case law, and enactment
history of Article V, section 5 of the Missouri Constitution all suggest that
section 508.011 violates that constitutional provision since the Tort Reform Act
is not “a law limited to the purpose” of annulling or amending Rule 51.03.
However, if one were to reach the opposite conclusion—if one were to conclude
that, as ultimately enacted, the Act had that limited purpose—it would face
another constitutional obstacle: it would violate Article III, section 21’s “original
purpose” requirement.
Article III, section 21 provides that “No law shall be passed except by bill,
and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change
its original purpose.”515 The Supreme Court has recognized that this original
purpose requirement ordinarily presents the sponsor of a bill with a choice:
[A] bill's sponsor is faced with a double-edged strategic choice. A title that
is broadly worded as to purpose will accommodate many amendments that
may garner sufficient support for the bill's passage. Alternatively, a title that
is more limited as to purpose may protect the bill from undesired
amendments, but may lessen the ability of the bill to garner sufficient support
for passage.516

However, that choice is illusory if the bill is one that must (under Article V,
section 5) be “limited to the purpose” of amending or annulling a Supreme Court
rule. By definition, such a “limited purpose” bill cannot have a broad purpose
“that will accommodate many amendments.” As a result, if the Tort Reform Act
as passed was a “law limited to the purpose” of amending Rule 51.03, it violates

13 DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1945 at 3850.
It is possible to argue that, since the legislature had an unrestricted override right under previous
law, Mr. Righter’s statement suggests that they would still have one under the Park amendment.
However, in context it seems more likely that Mr. Righter was referring only to the fact that the
Park amendment preserved the General Assembly’s power to enact or veto rules rather than stating
that the procedure for exercising that power would not be changed.
In any event, Mr. Righter’s ambiguous remark is hardly enough to justify ignoring the clear
language passed by the Convention and ratified by the people of Missouri.
515
516

Mo. Const. art. III, §21 (emphasis added).
Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Mo. 1997).
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Article III, section 21 unless the original purpose of H.B. 393 (the bill that
became the Tort Reform Act) as introduced was similarly limited.517
Yet the “original purpose” of H.B. 393 could not possibly have been to
annul or modify Rule 51.03 since the bill, as originally introduced on January 31,
2005, said nothing at all about that rule and did nothing to modify it.518 The first
version of the bill that mentioned or modified Rule 51.03 was the House
Committee Substitute which was reported out of the Judiciary Committee on
February 10, 2005.519 If the original purpose of the bill was not limited to
annulling or modifying Rule 51.03, and if the bill’s purpose cannot
constitutionally be changed, then the final purpose of the bill could not be so
limited.520
The bill as originally introduced may have had the much broader purpose
stated in its original title (revising the laws “relating to claims for damages and
the payment thereof”) which might be construed as including the subsequent
amendment modifying Rule 51.03.521 Under that interpretation, the broad
original purpose would not have been changed by the amendment, and thus the
bill as a whole would not violate the “original purpose” requirement.522
However, since that broad original purpose could not have been one that was

517

For purposes of Article III, Section 21, the original purpose of a bill is determined as of the time
it was introduced. Stroh Brewery, 954 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Mo. 1997); McEuen ex rel. McEuen v.
Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 120 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Mo. 2003).
518

Compare H.R. 393, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 185-86 (Mo. 2005) (Introduced and Read First
Time, Journal of the House, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 185-86 (Jan. 1, 2005)),
available at http://www.house.mo.gov/bills051/biltxt/intro/HB0393I.htm (containing no mention of
Rule 51.03 and no section 508.011) with Conference Committee Substitute For Senate Substitute
For Senate Committee Substitute For House Committee Substitute For House Bill No. 393 (Truly
Agreed and Finally Passed, Journal of the House, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly
674 (Mar. 16, 2005); Journal of the Senate, First Regular Session, 93rd General Assembly 477-79
(Mar. 16, 2005)) available at http://www.house.mo.gov/bills051/biltxt/truly/ HB0393T.HTM
(containing current section 508.011).
519

House Committee Substitute for H.R. 393 (Reported, Journal of the House, First Regular
Session, 93d Gen. Assem. 285 (Mo. 2005)).
520

Moreover, any argument that the original purpose was limited to modifying or amending Rule
51.03 would run the risk of invalidating the entire Tort Reform Act since, if that were the original
purpose, it would be impossible to argue that the bill had a sufficiently broad single purpose to
comply with Article III, section 21.
521

This article expresses no opinion on whether this is the correct interpretation of the original
purpose of the bill. See, e.g., Mo. State Med. Ass'n v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 39 S.W.3d 837, 839
(Mo. 2001) (the original purpose does not need to be stated in the bills title or anywhere in the bill);
McEuen, 120 S.W.3d at 210 (same). Similarly, this article takes no position on whether the act as a
whole violates either the original purpose, single subject, or clear title provisions of the
Constitution.
522
See, e.g., Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Mo. 1982) (the purpose of a bill with
a general purpose is not impermissibly amended if the amendment is germane to that general
purpose); Stroh Brewery, 954 S.W.2d at 326 (Mo. 1997) (amendments do not change the original
purpose of a bill if they are germane to the original purpose).
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limited to the purpose of amending Rule 51.03 (particularly since the original bill
did nothing to accomplish that purpose), it would violate Article V, section 5.
B. Deletion and Addition of Parties or Claims After Tort Reform
1. The Pre-Tort Reform Rules
Prior to the enactment of H.B. 393, venue in most cases—tort or contract—
was party-dependent. Under former section 508.010, venue usually depended on
the residence of the defendants and sometimes on the residence of the plaintiff.523
Under section 508.040, venue depended on the location of defendants’ offices or
agents for transacting their usual and customary business.524 Under section
355.176.4, venue often depended on the location of the non-profit corporation
defendants’ principal places of business or registered offices.525 As a result, the
courts needed to determine what nominal parties should be treated as real parties
for venue purposes and what nominal parties should be disregarded. They also
needed to determine how venue determinations would be affected by post-filing
addition or removal of parties.
In a series of cases, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted a set of principles
to resolve those issues. First, venue was tentatively determined based on the
parties named in the original petition.526 Second, a party named in the original
petition would be disregarded for venue purposes if the court concluded that the
party had been pretensively joined.527 Third, unless a party had been pretensively
joined, the fact that a party was subsequently removed from the case (either by
plaintiff’s voluntary decision to dismiss the party or by the court’s action on a
party’s motion) did not affect venue.528 Fourth, if a plaintiff amended his petition
to add a party, the court was required to redetermine venue as if the case had just
been filed.529 Fifth, defendant’s decision to file a third party petition had no
effect on venue and venue of the third party petition was proper so long as venue
over the plaintiff’s petition was proper.530
While these principles were not universally praised, they were reasonably
clearly understood.

523

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
525
See supra Part II.C.
526
State ex rel. Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Mo. 2004).
527
See, e.g., id. at 502 (Mo. 2004).
528
Id.
529
Id.
530
State ex rel. Garrison Wagner Co. v. Schaaf, 528 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Mo. banc 1975) ("[I]n thirdparty practice it need not be shown that venue requirements have been independently complied
with but that such may rest on venue properly shown in the original case."); State ex rel. Linthicum
v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001) (same).
524
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2. The Post-Tort Reform Rules
a. The Continued Importance of Parties for Venue Determination After
Tort Reform
Enactment of H.B. 393 has, of course, diminished the extent to which venue
is party-dependent since, in many cases, venue will depend on the place of first
injury. Nonetheless, even under the post-tort reform regime, it will often still be
crucial to determine who should be considered parties for venue purposes. For
example, in non-tort actions, plaintiffs will still be able to bring actions in the
county in which any defendant resides.531 In tort actions in which the first injury
occurs outside the state of Missouri, plaintiffs will now be able to bring suit in
the county where any defendant’s registered agent is located or where any
individual defendant’s principal place of residence is located.532 In such actions,
it will also be proper to bring the action in the county where any individual
plaintiff’s principal place of residence is located.533 In all of these cases, since
venue explicitly depends on facts about the parties, the decision to consider or
disregard a nominal party can be decisive.
Even in tort cases in which the first injury occurs in Missouri, it will
sometimes be important to determine who will be treated as parties for purposes
of venue. For example, in medical malpractice suits, plaintiffs are considered to
be injured only “in the county where the plaintiff first received treatment by a
defendant for a medical condition at issue in the case.”534 If a plaintiff has been
treated in several counties by several health care providers, the county of first
injury will depend on which of those providers are treated as defendants and
which will be disregarded.
b. The Text and Modest Effect of 508.012
Section 3 of H.B. 393535 (now codified as Mo. Rev. Stat. § 508.012) cast
serious doubt on a number of the pre-tort reform principles. It provides:
Transfer of case based on addition or removal of a plaintiff or defendant prior
to commencement of trial.
508.012. At any time prior to the commencement of a trial, if a plaintiff or
defendant, including a third-party plaintiff or defendant, is either added or
removed from a petition filed in any court in the state of Missouri which
would have, if originally added or removed to the initial petition, altered the
determination of venue under section 508.010, then the judge shall upon

531

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005). Similarly, section 508.010.2(1) sometimes makes the
residence of the plaintiff crucial, i.e., when the plaintiff seeks to bring the action in the county of
residence on the basis that the defendants can be found (i.e., served) there.
532
§ 508.010.5. For a discussion of multiple-defendant cases, see supra Parts III.C.1-2.
533
For a discussion of multiple-plaintiff cases, see supra Part III.C.3.
534
§ 538.232 (2005) (emphasis added).
535
2005 Mo. Laws 641, 649-55.
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application of any party transfer the case to a proper forum under section
476.410, RSMo.536

Contrary to the belief of many lawyers, section 508.012 makes relatively
minor changes in the pre-tort reform principles and will not have the drastic
effect some have feared. It will not mean that every dismissal of a defendant will
require redetermination of venue. It will not mean that defendants can
manipulate venue by filing a third party petition. It will not eliminate the need
for the doctrine of pretensive joinder. Instead, section 508.012 leaves the pre-tort
reform venue rules for considering or disregarding parties substantially intact and
represents a modest reform rather than a radical one. The limited effect of
section 3 is best understood in the context of a series of concrete situations in
which parties are added to or removed from a case or in which claims against
parties are ruled upon.
c. Removal of Defendants from the Petition
i. Removal of a Defendants Versus Judgment Dismissing All Claims Against
a Defendant
To illustrate the first situation, suppose a plaintiff files a malpractice suit in
Jackson County against two doctors alleging that the first doctor treated him in
Jackson County and that the second doctor later treated him in Clay County.
Under section 538.232,537 venue would be proper only in Jackson County since
that is the county in which plaintiff “first received treatment by a defendant for a
medical condition at issue in the case.” However, if the plaintiff elects to amend
his petition to drop all claims against the first (Jackson County) doctor, it is clear
that the court must redetermine venue. In the words of the statute, the Jackson
County doctor has been “removed from [the] petition”; and, if he had not been
named in “the initial petition,” venue would not have been proper in Jackson
County.538
On the other hand, suppose that the plaintiff pursues his claims against both
doctors; however, after further discovery, the Jackson County doctor successfully
moves for summary judgment on all the claims against him. Must the court
transfer venue on the basis that the Jackson County doctor has been removed
from the case and that, if he had not been included in the original petition, venue

536

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.012 (2005).
§ 538.232, which was added by 2005 Mo. Laws 641, 655, provides: “In any action against a
health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the
failure to render health care services, for purposes of determining venue under section 508.010,
RSMo, the plaintiff shall be considered injured by the health care provider only in the county where
the plaintiff first received treatment by a defendant for a medical condition at issue in the case.”
537

538

§ 508.012. If plaintiff had only sued the Clay County doctor, the first treatment “by a defendant
for a medical condition at issue in the case”—and thus the first injury—would have occurred in
Clay County. § 538.232 (emphasis added).
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would only have been proper in Clay County? 539 The text of the statute strongly
indicates that such a transfer should not be granted.
Section 508.012 does not require that venue be redetermined unless a party
has been “added [to] or removed from a petition filed in any court in the state of
Missouri.”540 A “petition” is, of course, a written document filed by the plaintiff
to commence the action.541 Parties are only added to or removed from that
document by filing an amended petition. The summary judgment dismissing all
claims against the Jackson County doctor does not remove that doctor from the
petition. He remains a named defendant unless the plaintiff elects to amend.542
And this is not a new distinction nor is it a merely technical one.543 Absent a
certification under Rule 74.01(b), the summary judgment ruling is an
interlocutory one that the trial court may revise, reconsider or set aside at any
time until entry of a final judgment disposing of all issues and all remaining
parties.544 Moreover, the plaintiff can challenge the dismissal of that defendant
by appealing once the entire case is resolved and a final judgment is entered.545
The Jackson County doctor has not been removed from the case; he has—subject
to reversal on appeal—won. He has not stopped being a defendant; he has
simply become a prevailing defendant. The legislature could have provided that
venue must be redetermined whenever all claims against a defendant were
resolved in that defendant’s favor. It did not do so, instead choosing to require
such redetermination only if a defendant is removed “from the petition.”

539

The determination of venue would change because, if the Jackson County doctor is not
considered a defendant, plaintiff would have “first received treatment by a defendant” in Clay
County. § 538.232 (emphasis added).
540

§ 508.012 (emphasis added).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.01.
542
An amendment dropping a named defendant can be a dangerous decision for a plaintiff since
such an amendment may be deemed to have abandoned plaintiff’s claims against the defendant.
State ex rel. Bugg v. Roper, 179 S.W.3d 893 (Mo. 2005). But see Beckmann v. Miceli Homes,
Inc., 45 S.W.3d 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (identifying a narrow exception to abandonment where an
amended pleading follows a decision dismissing a particular defendant on a ground that is not
correctible by amendment).
541

543
In fact, the distinction has been recognized in Missouri law since at least 1886. In Chouteau v.
Rowse, 2 S.W. 209, 210 (1886), the court explicitly distinguished between a voluntary non-suit by
which a plaintiff “abandons his suit, and it is ended,” and an involuntary non-suit which manifests
plaintiff’s intention “not to abandon the prosecution of the suit, but to further prosecute it by
appeal.”
544

MO. SUP. CT. R. 74.01(b); Bolin v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 549 S.W.2d 886, 889-90
(Mo. 1977) (summary judgment on all claims against one of two defendants was not final and
could be set aside at any time prior to final judgment on all claims as to the other defendant)
overruled on other grounds Magee v. Blue Ridge Prof’l Bldg., 821 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Mo. 1991);
Horne v. Ebert, 108 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).

545
MO. SUP. CT. R. 74.01(b). Of course, if the trial court certifies the summary judgment decision
as an appealable interlocutory judgment by making an “express determination that there is no just
reason for delay,” the plaintiff could appeal immediately. Id.
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This textual argument is sufficient standing alone, but it is reinforced by the
policy behind section 508.012.546 That section appears to have been inspired by a
desire to reduce plaintiffs’ ability to finesse venue restrictions by the temporary
addition of essentially nominal parties. As to frivolous claims, that ability was
already limited by the doctrine of pretensive joinder (a doctrine which, as
discussed below, has continued viability and increased scope in the post-tort
reform era).547 Section 508.012 tightened those limitations by requiring trial
courts to disregard even non-frivolous claims against defendants if the plaintiff
does not pursue those claims at trial.548 This anti-manipulation policy is not
implicated when plaintiffs unflaggingly pursue non-frivolous claims against a
defendant—even if those claims are ultimately rejected by the trial court.
A line of federal cases creates a similar distinction between the voluntary
decision to amend the petition to remove a defendant and the involuntary
dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against that defendant. Suits filed in state court
cannot be removed to federal court based on diversity if even one defendant is
not diverse, i.e., is a citizen of the same state as any plaintiff.549 But does such a
case become removable if the non-diverse defendants are subsequently dismissed
from the case? In answering that question, the federal courts have made the same
voluntary-involuntary distinction dictated by section 508.012.550 If the plaintiff
voluntarily discontinues his claims against the non-diverse defendant, the suit
becomes removable since the non-diverse defendant has been taken wholly out of
the case.551 On the other hand, if the claims against the non-diverse defendant are
dismissed by the court without the acquiescence of the plaintiff, the suit does not
become removable since the dismissed defendant is still a party to the case for
purposes of appeal.552

546

As discussed infra, notes 549-52, it is also supported by a striking analogy to cases under federal
law.
547

See supra IV.B.2.e-f.
For example, it eliminates the incentive for a plaintiff to join uncollectible employees of an
employer-defendant, fully intending from the beginning to drop them before trial in order avoid the
risk that the jury might award a smaller verdict out of sympathy for the employees or, even worse
from the plaintiff’s standpoint, might award a verdict only against the uncollectible employees.
548

549

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that removal is only proper if the federal courts would have had
jurisdiction if the case had originally been filed in federal court. Under the rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806), complete diversity is required. There are, of course, additional
requirements; for example, there must be a sufficient amount in controversy and no defendant can
be a citizen of the forum state.
550
See generally, Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967); Johnson v.
Snapper Division of Fuqua Industries, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
551
Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 316 (1915) (case removable due to
dismissal of non-diverse defendants only if “the discontinuance as to such defendants was
voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, and that such action has taken the [non-diverse] defendants
out of the case, so as to leave a controversy wholly between the plaintiff and the [diverse]
defendant”).
552

Am. Car & Foundry, 236 U.S. at 317 (grant of demurrers to the evidence as to all claims against
non-diverse defendants does not make case removable by remaining diverse defendants);
Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 638 (1901) (directed verdict in favor of non-diverse
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ii. Removal of a Defendant Versus Voluntary Non-Suits Under Rule 67.02
A plaintiff who does not wish to pursue a particular defendant at trial can,
under Rule 67.02(a)(1), file a voluntary non-suit against that defendant prior to
the swearing of the jury for voir dire.553 Doing so is the effective equivalent of
an amendment deleting all claims against the defendant: it fully removes the
defendant from the case since the court has no authority to reconsider or set aside
such a dismissal554 and the plaintiff cannot appeal since he or she is not aggrieved
by any action of the trial court.555 However, unless the plaintiff elects to amend
the petition, one could argue that the voluntary non-suit would not, in a literal
sense, remove the defendant from the petition, and thus should not lead to
redetermination of venue.
However, this argument should be rejected. The cardinal rule of statutory
interpretation is not to read the statute literally but rather “to ascertain the intent
of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible,
and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.”556 Reading the
statute to ignore voluntary non-suits would permit precisely the sort of
manipulation that section 508.012 was intended to forbid. It would frustrate,
rather than effectuate, the manifest intent of the General Assembly, and would
represent the sort of “hyper-technical” interpretation that the Supreme Court has
cautioned courts to avoid.557 It is neither logical nor reasonable558 to infer that
the General Assembly intended to permit plaintiffs to accomplish through
voluntary non-suits exactly what it forbade them to accomplish through
amendments.
Instead, the court should construe the phrase “removed from the petition” to
include any voluntary action by the plaintiff that effectively and fully removes
the defendant from the case. Such an interpretation effectuates the purpose of
section 508.012 (to reduce venue manipulation) and avoids turning a significant
defendants does not make case removable by remaining diverse defendants); S. Ry. Co. v. Lloyd,
239 U.S. 496, 501 (order granting involuntary non-suit at the close of plaintiffs’ case as to nondiverse defendant does not make case removable) (alternative holding).
553

MO. SUP. CT. R. 67.02(a)(1).
In re Klaas, 8 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (Once a voluntary non-suit is filed, the
“trial court may take no further action as to the dismissed action and any step attempted is a
nullity”).
554

555

State ex rel. Moore v. Sharp, 151 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); P.R. v. R.S., 950
S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Chouteau v. Rowse, 2 S.W. 209 (Mo. 1886).
556

In re Boland, 155 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. 2005) (emphasis added); Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties,
Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240 (Mo. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection,
121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003). See also Chouteau, 2 S.W. 209 (pointing out that the maxim ita lex
scripta est is subordinate to the maxim qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice).
557

Landman, 107 S.W.3d at 251 (“construction of statutes is not to be hyper-technical”).
Id. (statutes should be interpreted in a manner that is “reasonable and logical”); Laclede Gas
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 253 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1953) ( “The law favors constructions which
harmonize with reason, and which tend to avoid unjust, absurd, unreasonable or confiscatory
results.”); Md. Cas. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. 1967) ( “The law favors a
construction of a statute which avoids unjust or unreasonable results”).
558
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part of the section into an effective nullity.559 It is also supported by the equitable
maxim that “equity regards that as done which should have been done.”560 By
voluntarily dismissing all claims against a particular defendant, plaintiffs
transform the litigation’s structure to one that is identical to what would exist if
they had amended to delete those claims. They should, in good conscience,
amend their pleadings to conform to their actual claims.561 If they fail to do so,
courts may use their equitable powers to treat amendments that “should have
been [filed]” as if they had been filed.562
If the court declines to interpret section 3 itself as automatically requiring
venue redetermination as the result of voluntary non-suits, trial courts have ample
authority to take steps that carry out the intent of section 508.012. Under Rule
55.27(e), the trial court has authority, at any time on its own motion, “to order
stricken from any pleading any . . . redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.”563 Once plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed all claims against
a person, portions of the petition that designate that person as a defendant and
pray for relief against him are both immaterial and impertinent as those terms are
used in the rule: they “do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in
question.” 564 To accomplish the General Assembly's intended result, trial courts
should exercise their Rule 55.27(e) authority to strike the claims against such
voluntarily dismissed former defendants.565

559

See cases cited supra note 144.
This interpretation is also suggested by section 3’s requirement that venue be redetermined only
if the removal of the defendant is “before the commencement of trial.” While the cutoff point is
not stated with precision, it roughly corresponds to the deadline for filing a voluntary non-suit as a
matter of right under Rule 67.02(a). (Voluntary non-suits may be filed as of right “(1) Prior to the
swearing of the jury panel for voir dire examination, or (2) In cases tried without a jury, prior to the
introduction of evidence.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 67.02(a)).

560

St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Fitch, 190 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. 1945); Capitol Life Ins. Co. v.
Porter, 719 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
561

Compare MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03(b) (forbidding “maintaining a claim . . . in a pleading” if that
claim is no longer warranted) (emphasis added).

562
See Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1976) (treating complaint as amended without
requiring actual amendment since such a requirement would be merely a formality).
563

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(e).
5C CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1382 (3d ed.
2004) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the federal analog to Rule 55.27(e)) [next to note 52].
This does not mean that all allegations regarding the dismissed defendant’s conduct must be
stricken. Those allegations (e.g., allegations that an employee—even if now dropped as a
defendant—committed certain negligent acts) may remain material. However, the reference to that
individual as a defendant and the assertion of claims against him become immaterial and
impertinent as soon as the claims against him have been voluntarily dismissed.
564

565
The same result could be reached under Rule 62.01, which gives trial courts the authority to
hold pre-trial conferences to consider, among other things, the “necessity or desirability of
amendments to the pleadings.” However, it is not entirely clear that Rule 62.01, standing alone,
gives the trial court the authority to order a plaintiff to amend the petition to delete claims against
voluntarily dismissed defendants.
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Alternatively, the Supreme Court could exercise its rule making authority to
explicitly resolve the voluntary non-suit anomaly.566 This could be accomplished
by adding something similar to the following subsection to Rule 67.02:
(e) If, under Rule 67.02(a) or (b), a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses all claims
against one or more (but not all) defendants, the plaintiff shall amend the
petition to remove the dismissed defendants from the petition. If the plaintiff
fails to do so within __ days, the court shall strike from the petition all claims
against the dismissed defendants. If, under Rule 67.02(a) or (b), a plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses all claims against all defendants, any remaining
plaintiffs shall amend the petition to remove the dismissed plaintiff from the
petition. If the remaining plaintiffs fail to do so within __ days, the court
shall strike from the petition all claims by the dismissed plaintiff.

d. Adding Parties, Strategically Delayed Joinder, and the Problem of Third
Party Defendants
i. Addition of Defendants Under Rules 52.04 or 52.05
Section 508.012 requires redetermination of venue not only when a party is
removed from the petition but also when one is added to it. In doing so, it simply
codifies existing case law on strategically delayed joinder. Under State ex rel.
Linthicum v. Calvin,567 the Missouri Supreme Court had already held that,
whenever plaintiff amended to add an additional defendant, the case would be
deemed to be “brought” anew against that defendant and venue would need to be
reevaluated.568 Section 508.012’s new “added [to] a petition” language explicitly
codifies the requirement that venue be redetermined in the typical situation in
which a plaintiff voluntarily amends to join an additional defendant under Rule
52.05. Similarly, it should apply when a plaintiff or defendant is joined after a
compulsory joinder motion under Rule 52.04. When an absent party is found to
be indispensable and joinder is feasible, the petition is amended to add the
indispensable party.569 Thus, such a party is, in the language of section 508.012,
“added [to the] petition” and that addition triggers the need for venue
redetermination.
This conclusion is fully consistent with the purpose of the statute since it
destroys the incentive for strategically delayed joinder. If joinder under Rule
52.05 did not trigger redetermination, a plaintiff could obtain a preferred venue

566

MO. CONST. art. V § 5
57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001).
568
State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 857-58 (Mo. 2001).
569
Crumbaker v. Zadow, 151 S.W.3d 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (abuse of discretion to refuse
plaintiff leave to amend to add a party after court determines that the party is indispensable under
Rule 52.04); Schmitz v. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ( “If [an
outsider] is indispensable, then leave should be granted to amend the petition and add [the outsider]
as a party.”).
567
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by simply filing suit without naming a particular defendant and then joining that
defendant by filing an amendment as a matter of right under Rule 55.33(a). If
subsequent joinder of indispensable parties did not trigger redetermination,
plaintiffs would have an incentive to fail to join such parties, expecting that the
named defendants (or the court on its own motion) would require their
subsequent joinder.570
ii. Addition of Third Party Defendants Under Rule 52.11
The effect of a defendant’s impleading of a third-party defendant is more
complicated. While pre-tort reform case law disregarded third-party defendants
when determining venue,571 Section 508.012 explicitly mentions third-party
defendants and clearly contemplates that, in some situations, the existence of a
third-party defendant will have an effect on venue. However, both the text of the
rule and its purpose show that defendant’s decision to implead a third-party
defendant does not, by itself, require such a re-evaluation. Instead, it is only if a
plaintiff subsequently amends the petition to assert a claim by the plaintiff against
the third-party defendant that a venue redetermination is required.
To see why this is the case, it is first necessary to review the language of
section 508.012 carefully. That section requires redetermination if, prior to trial,
“a plaintiff or defendant, including a third-party plaintiff or defendant, is either
added [to] or removed from a petition . . . which would have, if originally added
[to] or removed [from] the initial petition altered the determination of venue.” 572
But defendant’s decision to file a third-party petition against a third-party
defendant does not add anyone to the petition. In Missouri, a petition and a thirdparty petition are distinct and different pleadings.573 A petition is the pleading

570

This alternative would not be without risk since failure to join an indispensable party is a
jurisdictional issue that can be raised even on appeal and thus could lead an appellate court to
vacate a favorable verdict. However, that risk is minimal since, plaintiffs could always amend to
add the indispensable party if no defendant moved to require them to do so.
571

Linthicum, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001) ("[I]n third-party practice it need not be shown that
venue requirements have been independently complied with but that such may rest on venue
properly shown in the original case.") (quoting State ex rel. Garrison Wagner Co. v. Schaaf, 528
S.W.2d 438, 442 (Mo. 1975)); Schaaf, 528 S.W.2d at 442 (Mo. 1975) (same).
572

Section 3’s discussion of addition or removal of third-party plaintiffs is baffling. Since thirdparty plaintiffs are necessarily already defending parties in the case, the author is unaware of any
situation in which third-party plaintiffs could be added to the petition: they are already in it.
Similarly, since a third-party plaintiff is already a defendant, removing a third-party plaintiff
necessarily removes a defendant which would, by itself, require redetermination of venue. It
appears that the mention of third-party plaintiffs must have been inserted in error or in an
abundance of caution. Despite the rule against surplusage, not every legislative word can be given
meaning.
573

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.01. The rules and official forms ordinarily use the phrase “third-party
petition.”—See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.01, 52.11(a) (second paragraph), 85, Official Form. —
There is, however, a single reference to a third-party petition as a petition simpliciter (MO. SUP. CT.
R. 52.11(a) (first paragraph).
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filed by the plaintiff to commence a civil action,574 while a third-party petition is
a pleading filed by a defending party in an existing case to assert a derivative
claim575 against someone not already a party in that case.576 The filing of a thirdparty petition does not add the third-party defendant to the petition; it asserts a
related but independent claim by the defendant/third-party plaintiff against the
third party defendant. It does so in a separate document. The petition remains
unchanged and no amendment of the petition is required.
In addition, section 508.012 requires redetermination of venue only if the
new party is one who “would have, if originally added . . . to the initial petition
altered determination of venue.”
This language makes it clear that
redetermination is not required if the new party is one who could not have been
joined as a defendant in the initial petition. However, the plaintiff could not have
added the third-party defendant as a defendant in the initial petition unless
plaintiff asserts “a claim upon which relief [could] be granted” against the thirdparty defendant.577 If plaintiff asserts no claim at all against a particular party,
plaintiff necessarily is not asserting a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Moreover, even if the plaintiff had named the third-party defendant as a
defendant in the initial petition, doing so would not have “altered the
determination of venue.” Under the doctrine of pretensive joinder, the trial court
must disregard the naming of a defendant unless the plaintiff makes a nonfrivolous argument that the allegations against that defendant state a cause of
action.578 If plaintiff is making no claim against the third-party defendant,
joinder of him or her in the petition would be pretensive and would not “alter[]
the determination of venue.”
Thus, the mere filing of a third-party petition does not, by itself, add a
defendant to the petition. This interpretation would be troublesome if it rendered
the phrase “including a third-party . . . defendant” meaningless, but it does not do
so. There is an important situation in which a third-party defendant is added to
the petition and in which that addition would have altered the determination of
venue: whenever the original plaintiff amends the initial petition to assert
plaintiff’s own claims against the third-party defendant.579
This interpretation of section 3 is dictated by the text of the section: when a
plaintiff amends to add a claim against a third-party defendant, that party is
literally “added [to the] petition.” It also implements the section’s goal of
reducing plaintiffs’ ability to manipulate venue rules. A plaintiff is not
manipulating venue when he sues the only defendant against whom he has a
claim. However, the anti-manipulation purpose would be defeated if a plaintiff
574

MO. SUP. CT. R. 53.01.
A derivative claim is a claim that the third-party defendant “is or may be liable to the defending
party for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defending party.”
575

576

MO. SUP. CT. R. 52.11(a).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.27(a)(6).
578
State ex rel. Malone v. Mummert, 889 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. 1994).
579
Such claims are authorized by Rule 52.11(a) which provides “[t]he plaintiff may assert any
claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff [i.e., the original defendant].”
577
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could circumvent venue restrictions simply by suing selected defendants, waiting
for those defendants to implead parties whose initial joinder would have defeated
venue, and then amending to assert claim against the impleaded parties.580
The United States Supreme Court has reached a strikingly parallel set of
conclusions in dealing with diversity jurisdiction.581 Federal courts have
diversity jurisdiction only if no defendant is a citizen of the same state as any
plaintiff.582 At the same time, a defendant’s decision to implead a non-diverse
third-party defendant is not deemed to destroy diversity.583 However, in Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,584 the Supreme Court rejected a tactic for
manipulation of diversity jurisdiction that bears a striking resemblance to the
type of party manipulation against which 508.012 is directed. Ms. Kroger sued a
diverse defendant and that defendant impleaded Owen Equipment, a corporation
that— like Ms. Kroger—was a citizen of Iowa.585 Ms. Kroger then amended her
complaint to assert a claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant, Owen
Equipment.586 The Court held that there was no jurisdiction over the original
plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant stating that a
plaintiff should not be permitted to “defeat the statutory requirement of complete
diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of
diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.”587
Thus, in determining the existence of diversity, the federal courts have adopted
the exact position that the language of 508.012 dictates for determining the
existence of venue: they ignore defendant’s mere impleading of a third-party
defendant but give full weight to a plaintiff’s subsequent amendment asserting a
claim against that third-party defendant.

580

Compare Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (holding that
plaintiffs could not circumvent the complete diversity rule by initially suing only diverse
defendants and then amending to assert claims against non-diverse third-party defendants).
581

These conclusions have now been codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute. 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (2004).
582

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2004); Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). There are, of course, several
narrow statutory exceptions to this complete diversity rule. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act,
H.R. 525, 109th Cong. (2005).
583

See, e.g., H. L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir., 1967); Dery v. Wyer,
265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). This result is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2004).
584

437 U.S. 365 (1978).
Owen Equipment, 437 U.S. at 367-69. Owen Equipment’s Iowa citizenship did not become
apparent until trial.
585

586

Id. at 368.
Id. at 374. This result has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) which forbids exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by a plaintiff against a non-diverse third party defendant.

587
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e. Pretensive Joinder and Strategically Delayed Joinder of Parties After
Tort Reform.
i. Pretensive Joinder of Parties After Tort Reform
In the pre-tort reform regime, there was a well developed body of law
dealing with pretensive joinder and strategically delayed joinder of parties.
Under the pretensive joinder doctrine, a trial court determined venue without
considering any defendants who it found to have been “pretensively joined.” A
defendant was treated as pretensively joined in two situations: First, joinder of a
defendant was considered pretensive if the allegations of the petition failed to
“state a claim under existing law or under a non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or under a non-frivolous
argument for the establishment of new law” against that defendant.588 Second,
even if the allegations stated a cause of action, joinder was considered pretensive
if the record demonstrated that, based on information available to the plaintiff at
the time the petition was filed, plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that
the allegations could be proved.589 “Both tests are objective, requiring that the
plaintiff have a realistic belief under the law and evidence that a valid claim
exists.”590
The adoption of 508.012 has reduced, but not eliminated, the usefulness of
the pretensive joinder doctrine. Whenever a plaintiff amends a petition to
remove a party, the court no longer needs to ask whether joinder of that party was
pretensive. However, as previously discussed,591 section 508.012 does not
require venue redetermination, even if all claims against a defendant are
dismissed, unless the plaintiff amends to remove that defendant from the petition.
As a result, pretensive joinder doctrine could continue to perform an important
function: distinguishing between claims that were merely unsuccessful and those
that were so frivolous that they should be disregarded for venue purposes.592
When a defendant prevails on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment, the court on motion to transfer by the remaining defendants, would

588
State ex rel. Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Mo. 2004). As the court
emphasized in State ex rel. Malone v. Mummert, 889 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1994), the court does
not need to “determine whether the duty the plaintiffs seek to impose against the joined defendants
actually exists as a matter of substantive law. It is enough for purposes of venue discussion that
they have a reasonable belief that under existing law, non-frivolous arguments for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, or non-frivolous arguments for the establishment of new
law, that such a duty exists or should exist.”
589

Doe Run, 128 S.W.3d at 505-06.
Id. at 504.
591
See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
592
As the court in Doe Run explicitly recognized, the standard for determining whether a petition
states a claim for venue purposes “is less stringent than [the standard] for granting a motion for
summary judgment or sustaining a motion to dismiss on the merits.” 128 S.W.3d at 505. See also
id. at 505-06 (the fact that a defendant may prevail on summary judgment does not mean that the
joinder of that defendant was pretensive).
590
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need to determine whether the claims against the dismissed defendants were, at
the time of filing, so lacking in merit that the plaintiff could not have had a
“realistic belief under the law and evidence that a valid claim exist[ed].”593
There is, however, a plausible argument that the doctrine of pretensive
joinder has not survived the enactment of the 2005 Tort Reform Act. That act
was a comprehensive revision of the Missouri venue statutes. As part of that
revision, section 508.012 specifically identified the situations in which the trial
court should redetermine venue594 yet omitted any provision authorizing them to
do so based upon a finding of pretensive joinder. Under the long recognized
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,595 (“the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another”596) this omission strongly suggests that 508.012 was
intended to supersede and replace the pretensive joinder doctrine.597
Although this argument is plausible, it should not be accepted, expressio
unius is merely one of many maxims used to accomplish the overriding goal of
determining the legislature’s intent.598 It must be applied with caution599 and “‘is
sometimes followed and sometimes held inapplicable, depending on the
facts.’”600 It is an argument from silence and such arguments only begin the
inquiry into the legislature’s intent rather than ending it.601
Viewing the Tort Reform Act as a whole in light of its history, it is apparent
that the General Assembly intended to make it harder—not easier—for plaintiffs
to manipulate venue. The new venue provisions repeatedly and consistently
restrict the options available to plaintiffs.602 Not only does the Act make it easier

593

Id. at 504.
See supra Part IV.B.2.c.i.
595
The Missouri Supreme Court recognized expressiou unius as far back as 1841. Wimer v.
Brotherton, 7 Mo. 264 (1841).
594

596

State v. Campbell, 26 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
The failure to codify the pretensive joinder doctrine may seem particularly persuasive in light of
the General Assembly’s evident (and presumed) awareness of that doctrine. Greenbriar Hills
Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Mo. 2001) (expressio unius canon is
particularly strong where the legislature is aware of the pre-existing law).
597

598
Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. R-8 of Lafayette County v. Robertson, 262 S.W.2d 847, 850-51
(Mo. 1953).
599

Id.; State ex rel. Birk v. City of Jackson, 907 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Pippins v.
City of St. Louis, 823 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
600

Robertson, 262 S.W.2d at 850 (quoting State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 210 S.W.2d 31, 33-34
(Mo. 1948).
601

State ex rel. Rowland Group v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo. 1992).
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.1 (2005) (defining new term “principle place of residence”
as limited to single location to replace the multiple residences existing under pre-existing law); §
508.010(4) (restricting tort plaintiffs suffering in-state injuries to a single venue rather than the
multiple venues often available under pre-existing law); § 508.010(5) (restricting tort plaintiffs
suffering out-state injuries to two venues rather than the multiple venues often available under preexisting law); § 508.010(4)-(5) (providing that restrictive tort venue rules would prevail over often
more liberal provisions of other laws); § 508.010(10) providing that motions to transfer would be
deemed granted if not denied within 90 days).. See also 2005 Mo. Laws 641, 642, 656 (repealing
former section 508.040 that provided multiple venue options for suits in which at least one
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for defendants to challenge plaintiffs’ venue choices, it also makes it more likely
that they will prevail on those challenges.603 In light of these provisions and the
well-known history of the Tort Reform Act’s enactment, it is simply
inconceivable that the General Assembly intended to eliminate the well
established doctrine that precluded the most egregious form of venue
manipulation—the filing of objectively frivolous claims against defendants who
are not even arguably liable.604 To conclude that the expressio unius compels
such a result would be to ignore the Missouri Supreme Court’s almost onehundred-year old warning that the maxim must be used solely as a tool to
determine the legislature’s intent and never as “a Procrustean standard to which
all statutory language must be made to conform.”605
A more difficult question is whether the Supreme Court should modify the
pretensive joinder doctrine to permit trial courts to consider post-filing
developments. To illustrate the question, consider two situations in which the
initial joinder of a party is not pretensive under current doctrine. In the first,
plaintiff joins a defendant based on a legal theory that is a non-frivolous
argument for extension of existing law. However, before the case goes to trial,
the Missouri Supreme Court issues an opinion in a separate case that
conclusively rejects plaintiff’s legal argument.606 In the second situation,
plaintiff joins a defendant based on factual allegations that the plaintiff
reasonably expects, in light of the information then available, will be supported
by the testimony of a particular witness. However, before the case goes to trial, it
becomes quite clear that neither the witness nor any other evidence will support
the crucial allegations.
In both situations, the joined defendant could successfully move for
summary judgment. Moreover, given the presumed clarity of the changed
situation, plaintiffs’ lawyers could not, without violating Rule 55.03(b), sign a
brief in opposition to such a motion.607 However, under the current pretensive
joinder doctrine, venue would not be reevaluated in either case since pretensive
defendant was a corporation); 2005 Mo. Laws 641, 642, 656 (repealing former section 508.070 that
provided multiple venues for suits against regulated motor carriers).
603

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010(10) (2005) (providing that motions to transfer would be deemed
granted if not denied within 90 days).
604
See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (Court will not lightly assume that Congress
abrogated longstanding legal doctrine that is “well grounded in history and reason.”).
605
State ex rel. O'Bannon v. Cole, 119 S.W. 424, 429 (Mo. 1909) (quoting HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK,. HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 146 (1896)). See
also Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 179 S.W.3d 266, 273 n.4 (Mo. 2005) (maxim
to be used solely as guide to legislative intent); Springfield City Water Co. v. City of Springfield,
182 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Mo. 1944) (maxim merely an aid to determining lawmakers’ intent and
should not be permitted to thwart that intent). Procrustes was a mythical Greek giant who would
adjust travelers’ height to fit his guest bed by stretching them on the rack or by cutting off their
legs.
606

A parallel, less common but more striking situation is one in which plaintiff’s claim is fully
supported by an existing Missouri Supreme Court case; but, before trial, the Missouri Supreme
Court overrules that case.
607

As discussed below, on service of a proper motion under Rule 55.03, plaintiffs’ lawyers could
be sanctioned for failing to withdraw or otherwise correct the allegations.
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joinder would be determined based on the legal and factual information
reasonably available to the plaintiff at the time of filing.608 Even though neither
plaintiff could continue to have a “realistic belief under the law and evidence that
a valid claim exists,”609 each did have such a belief at the time of filing. As a
result, the existing pretensive joinder doctrine would not require venue
redetermination; and, unless plaintiff amended to remove the defendant, neither
would section 508.012.
This result made logical sense so long as the applicable law dictated that
venue was to be determined based on the parties at the time the suit was
“commenced.” But section 508.012 now suggests that determination of venue
should not be so limited. The same policy reasons that caused the courts to
refuse to permit plaintiffs “to engage in the pretense of joining defendants for the
sole purpose of obtaining venue,”610 should also prevent them from engaging in
the pretense of continuing to maintain an action against defendants for that
purpose.
This is particularly true in light of the 1993 amendments to Rule 55.03.611
Under Rule 55.03, attorneys are deemed to make representations to the court that
closely parallel the two parts of the pretensive joinder test: that factual allegations
“have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery”612 and that claims and other legal contentions “are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.”613 Under the 1993
amendments to Rule 55.03, attorneys are no longer deemed to make these
representations only when they sign a pleading; they are also deemed to make
them when they “present or maintain” the pleading.614 The addition of the word
608

The first plaintiff has performed “a reasonable legal inquiry under the circumstances” which led
to the conclusion that his theory was supported by “existing law or a non-frivolous argument for
extension . . . of existing law.” State ex rel. Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 506
(Mo. 2004) (emphasis added). The second plaintiff had a reasonable belief that the allegations
would be proved based on “the information available at the time the petition was filed.” Id. at 506
(emphasis added).
609

Id.
State ex rel. Malone v. Mummert, 889 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. 1994).
611
The two tests for pretensive joinder closely parallel the requirements of that rule. See id. at 825
(Mo. 1994) (citing MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03(b) as parallel to the first branch of the pretensive joinder
test).
610

612
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03(b)(3). Compare Doe Run, 128 S.W.3d at 506 (pleading pretensive if “the
information available at the time the petition was filed would not support a reasonable legal opinion
that a case could be made against the [joined] defendant”).
613

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03(b)(2). See Malone, 889 S.W.2d at 825 (explicitly recognizing the parallel
between Rule 55.03(b) and the pretensive joinder test).
The attorneys are also deemed to have certified that they have conducted “a reasonable inquiry
under the circumstances,” Rule 55.03(b)—a requirement that closely parallels the pretensive
joinder’s requirement of “reasonable legal inquiry under the circumstances.” Doe Run, 128 S.W.3d
at 504.
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“maintain” was intended to make it clear that parties have an ongoing
responsibility to re-evaluate the viability of their pleadings based on post-filing
developments and “an obligation to withdraw from positions when they are no
longer tenable.”615 This obligation is given teeth by the 1993 amendments to
Rule 55.03(c)(1)(A) which provide that, within thirty days after service of a
motion identifying the lack of legal or factual support for the claims against a
particular defendant, the plaintiff must “withdraw[] or otherwise appropriately
correct[]” those claims or else be liable for sanctions.616
Thus, Rule 55.03 requires “withdrawal or correction of claims” against a
defendant if those claims, although not pretensive when filed, no longer have
sufficient legal or factual basis to create a “realistic belief under the law and
evidence that a valid claim exists.”617 If the plaintiff complies with the rule by
amending the petition to remove the defendant, section 508.012 will require
venue redetermination without reference to the pretensive joinder doctrine.
However, if the plaintiff fails to do so,618 the courts should not reward that failure
by giving plaintiff access to an otherwise unavailable venue. This could be done
through an expansion of the pretensive joinder doctrine to require consideration
of post-filing developments, or through construing Rule 55.03(c)(2) as
authorizing the trial court either to strike the claims against the defendant or to
order the plaintiff to amend the petition to remove those claims from the petition.
ii. Tactically Delayed Joinder of Parties
As previously discussed, the Missouri Supreme Court had essentially
resolved the treatment of tactically delayed joinder of parties even prior to tort
reform. Whenever a plaintiff amended his petition to add a new defendant, the
case was deemed to have been “brought” anew and venue was redetermined.619
Section 3 has codified that ruling and there appears to be no need for any
judicially crafted additional doctrine.

615

15 MICHAEL MURRAY, MISSOURI PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES PRACTICE 334 (3d ed. 2005).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03(c)(1)(A).
617
Doe Run, 128 S.W.3d at 504.
618
Failure to amend the petition may not always be a sign of bad faith or intransigence. While
amending the petition to remove the defendant is the most obvious method of “withdrawing or
correcting” a claim, it may not be the only method. For example, an attorney who believes
(contrary to the trial court’s view) that claims against a particular defendant are warranted by a nonfrivolous argument for change of existing law, might pledge not to assert the claim further at the
trial level yet decline to amend the petition in order to preserve his client’s right to appeal.
616

619

State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Mo. 2001).
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f. The New Frontier: Pretensive Joinder of Claims and Strategically
Delayed Joinder of Claims after Tort Reform
i. Pretensive Joinder of Claims
Prior to tort reform, venue was almost entirely party dependent. While
there were rare situations in which venue could be affected by the nature of the
claims asserted by plaintiff, the broad range of options available to plaintiffs
prevented those situations from posing significant problems.620 As a result,
Missouri courts have not had any need to determine whether to adopt principles
to deal with pretensive joinder of claims or with the related problem of
strategically delayed joinder of claims.
All this will change under the post-tort reform venue rules. For example,
venue over a pure contract case against a corporation is now proper only in the
county containing the corporation’s registered agent621—presumably a location
selected at least in part because the corporation’s legal department considered it
to be friendly venue. A plaintiff who suffered injury from the breach of contract
in what he perceives to be a more plaintiff-friendly county will have an incentive
to develop and plead a legitimate tort count to obtain the advantage of the more
favorable venue.622 A few plaintiffs may be tempted to plead frivolous tort
counts; and, even if they do not do so, a few defendants may be tempted to argue
that legitimate tort counts are frivolous. Similarly, a plaintiff injured by a tort in
what he perceives as an unfavorable venue will have an incentive to add
allegations of earlier wrongful acts that injured him in a more favorable
county.623 The questions raised by this type of pleading—which might be called
questions of pretensive joinder of claims624—are simply not resolved by section

620

Under pre-tort reform law, if venue was proper for one count against a defendant, it would be
treated as equally proper for any other properly joined claim against that defendant. See State ex
rel. Riordan v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1997); State ex rel. McClain v. Heckemeyer, 741
S.W.2d 734, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). This will no longer be a tenable position in tort cases, since
the new tort venue provisions apply if “any count” alleges a tort. As a result, the fact that a venue
would be proper for a contract count will be irrelevant if a tort count is also alleged.
621

Under section 508.010.2, non-tort actions can only be brought in the county where a defendant
resides. Corporations are deemed to reside in the county where their registered office is located.
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375.2 (2005).
622
Under sections 508.010.4 and 508.010.5, if even a single count alleges a tort, the tort venue
rules apply. In the case of an in-state first injury, this would permit plaintiff to file suit in the
county of first injury.
623
Under section 508.010.4, venue is proper in the county in which plaintiff “was first injured by
the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action.”
624

Denominating the issue “pretensive joinder of claims” has the advantage of reminding the reader
of the issue’s close relationship to—while still distinguishing it from— the existing case on
pretensive joinder of parties. However, like any short hand expression, it is imprecise and can be
misleading. A separate tort count alleging the same injury as a contract count would not ordinarily
be considered a separate “claim” for purposes of, for example, claim preclusion or appealability
under Rule 74.01(b).
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508.012 which provides for redetermination of venue when parties are removed
from a petition, but says nothing about what the court should do when claims are
dropped or dismissed. Section 508.012 is designed to protect against a type of
pretensive pleading—pretensive joinder of parties—that has become less
important in an era when the nature of the claims, rather than the residence of the
parties, has become crucial. Like the Maginot Line, it is a defense against the
last war’s strategy, great for trench warfare but useless in an era of tanks and dive
bombers.
However, while section 508.012 does not itself deal with pretensive joinder
of claims, it does not forbid the courts from doing so themselves as a matter of
procedural common law. While there is a plausible expressio unius est exclusio
alterius argument, that argument is even weaker here than the case of pretensive
joinder of parties and should be rejected.625 Section 508.012 explicitly identifies
situations in which the naming of a party in the initial petition should be
subsequently disregarded for venue purposes and might arguably be seen as an
effort to fully catalog all such situations.626 It is much harder to argue that
section 508.012 should be seen as an effort to catalog all situations in which any
aspect of the pleadings should be disregarded for purposes of venue. Moreover,
since there was no existing body of Missouri case law dealing with pretensive
joinder of claims, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the legislators never
thought about the problem rather than to conclude that they intended to forbid the
courts from dealing with it.
The courts should adopt a pretensive joinder of claims doctrine to deal with
the situation. One of the great merits of common law decision making is its
ability to apply unchanging fundamental principles to an ever changing legal
landscape.627 The fundamental principles underlying current pretensive joinder
doctrine are equally applicable when it is a claim, rather than a party, that is
pretensively joined. There is no more reason to “permit plaintiffs to engage in
the pretense of joining [a claim] for the sole purpose of obtaining venue”628 than
there is to permit them to engage in the pretense of joining a defendant for that
purpose. More than sixty years ago, in one of the seminal pretensive joinder
cases, the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated:
It would be a very dangerous doctrine, indeed, and one utterly destructive of
the valuable rights conferred upon [defendants by the venue statutes] if this
court should countenance a practice whereby a plaintiff could [obtain a
preferred venue] by stating a paper case against [a particular] defendant . . .

625

See supra text accompanying notes 594-605.
As previously discussed, this article rejects that interpretation of section 3.
627
Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R. R., 67 Mass. 263, 267-68 (1854).
628
State ex rel. Malone v. Mummert, 889 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. 1994). See also State ex rel. Doe
Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. 2004).
626
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when in truth and in fact the plaintiff had no cause of action against [that]
defendant.629

It is just as dangerous and just as destructive to permit plaintiffs to obtain
the same result by stating a paper case asserting a particular claim “when in truth
and fact” no such claim exists. A plaintiff’s attorney who files a pleading
asserting objectively frivolous claims violates Rule 55.03(b) whether those
claims are asserted against existing parties or against additional parties.630 In
both situations, the reason for disregarding the frivolous claim is the same: a
plaintiff should not be permitted to undermine statutorily created venue
restrictions by asserting a claim without a “realistic belief under the law and
evidence that a valid claim exists.”631
The existing two-part pretensive joinder test set forth in Malone and Doe
Run Resources could easily be adapted to cover pretensive joinder of claims. For
purposes of venue, the court would disregard allegations if they failed to “state a
claim under existing law or under a non-frivolous argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law, or under a non-frivolous argument for
the establishment of new law.”632 Even if the allegations of the claim stated a
cause of action, the court would disregard them if, based on information available
to the plaintiff at the time the petition was filed, plaintiff could not have
reasonably believed that the allegations could be proved.633 These standards
would be applied in any situation in which the allegations would affect venue.
Thus, for example, the court would utilize the two-part test to determine whether
to disregard allegations of earlier wrongdoing arguably added to change the
county of first injury, as well as to decide whether to ignore a tort count arguably
added to take advantage of section 508.010.4. The standard would apply
regardless of whether the challenged allegations added a defendant to the case.634
ii. Strategically Delayed Joinder of Claims
Just as the post-tort reform venue provisions have created temptations for
pretensive joinder of frivolous claims, they have also created incentives for
strategic delay in the joinder of perfectly legitimate claims. For example, a
plaintiff who has a legitimate basis for asserting both contract and tort counts

629
Diehr v. Carey, 191 S.W.2d 296, 300-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945). This passage was quoted with
approval by the Missouri Supreme Court in Lichterman v. Crockett, 331 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Mo.
1960), and cited with approval in Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo.
1965). See also Sledge v. Town & Country Tire Ctrs., Inc., 654 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983).
630

See supra note 607-16 and accompanying text.
Doe Run, 128 S.W.3d at 504.
632
Id. at 505.
633
Id. at 506.
634
Alternatively, the Missouri Supreme Court could substantially simplify the pretensive joinder
doctrine and coordinate it with an increasingly important body of case law by even more explicitly
linking the doctrine to Rule 55.03(b)(2)-(3).
631
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against an unregistered foreign corporation may elect to initially allege only the
contract count since, by doing so, plaintiff has the choice of suing in any county
rather than being restricted to the county of first injury.635 Similarly, a different
plaintiff injured by a series of tortious acts (e.g., conduct intended to interfere
with different aspects of plaintiff’s business) may elect to initially allege only
those acts causing injury in a particular county in order to avoid being forced to
sue in a county in which plaintiff suffered earlier injuries.636 Emulating the
plaintiff’s lawyers in State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin,637 the first plaintiff may
then amend to add his tort counts or the second plaintiff may amend to allege the
additional tortious acts, each hoping that this strategically delayed joinder of
claims will provide the benefit of their preferred venue without forcing them to
surrender any of their potential claims.638
Neither section 508.012 nor pretensive joinder doctrine are suited to deal
with strategically delayed joinder of claims. Similarly, the text of post-tort
reform section 508.010 provides little if any support for a requirement that courts
redetermine venue after strategically delayed claims are added. If that
requirement is to be imposed, the most promising basis for doing so will be
found in Rule 51.045.
Section 508.012 is strictly limited to situations in which a party has been
added to, or removed from, the petition and says nothing about situations in
which counts or other allegations are added without any change in parties. The
judicially created pretensive joinder doctrine rests on a foundation that is simply
absent in the delayed joinder situation: misconduct by the plaintiff or plaintiff’s
attorney. The underlying principle that justifies disregarding pretensive joinder
is that plaintiffs should not be permitted to benefit from filing frivolous claims—
claims that they knew (or should have known) were groundless—claims that
they are forbidden to file by current Rule 55.03. In the simplest terms, a plaintiff
who files a petition containing a pretensively joined claim is lying to the court: he
or she is falsely representing that a valid, provable claim exists despite
knowledge (or at least presumptive knowledge) that one does not. The
pretensive joinder doctrine rests on the principle that plaintiff should not receive
any advantage from misconduct that violates the attorney’s duty of competence
and candor to the court and the requirements of Rule 55.03.639

635

Under section 508.010.2(4), if no count alleges a tort and all defendants are nonresidents,
plaintiff can sue in any county. In the situation described in the text, the sole defendant is a nonresident since an unregistered foreign corporation is deemed to have no Missouri residence. State
ex rel. England v. Koehr, 849 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). On the other hand, under section
508.010.4, a plaintiff who asserts even one tort count is limited to the county of first injury.
636

Under section 508.010.4, venue would be limited to “the county where the plaintiff was first
injured by the wrongful acts or negligence alleged in the action.” MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.4
(2005).
637

57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001).
These amendments could be made as a matter of right if filed before plaintiff serves an answer.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.33(a).

638

639

This is why the joining of claims against an insolvent defendant with no intention of attempting
to collect from such a defendant is not considered pretensive. State ex rel. Malone v. Mummert,
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But a plaintiff who decides to delay filing some of his or her legitimate
claims against a defendant violates neither the duty of candor nor Rule 55.03.
Such a plaintiff has not engaged in the “pretense of joining [a claim]”640 by
stating a mere “paper case.”641 The lack of principled congruence between
pretensive joinder doctrine and strategically delayed joinder may well be among
the reasons that the majority in State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin,642 declined to
rest its conclusion on any theory of “pretensive non-joinder, “643 instead basing
its decision on its reading of the text of the venue statutes.644 As a result, if the
courts are to redetermine venue when a strategically delayed count is added, their
decision to do so must rest on something other than 508.012 or the pretensive
joinder doctrine.
One source for such a decision would be the statutory text, and there are
two plausible arguments that focus on H.B. 393’s use of new language to frame
the venue determination. Pre-tort reform venue statutes often defined venue by
language that specified where a suit could be “brought”645 or where it could be
“commenced.”646 Since the civil actions are “brought” or “commenced” by filing
a petition,647 this suggests that allegations of the petition presumptively determine
venue. However, several sections of H.B. 393 use quite different language to
describe the venue determination, stating that, “[i]n all actions in which there is
any [or no] count alleging a tort, venue shall be determined as follows: [setting
forth the venue rule].”648
It might be argued that the choice of the phrase “venue shall be
determined”—rather than the phrase “the suit may be brought”—suggests that
venue should be determined at the time of trial or perhaps redetermined
whenever venue facts change before trial. Since “venue” is often defined as the
889 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Mo. 1994). Since the plaintiff, in such a situation, is making a claim that
is neither legally nor factually groundless, the fact that the defendant’s insolvency “may cool the
plaintiff’s ardor as a practical matter” does not make the claim pretensive.
640

Id. at 824. See also State ex rel. Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. 2004).
Diehr v. Carey, 191 S.W.2d 296, 300-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
642
57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001).
643
State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d at 855, 865 (Stith, dissenting) (noting the court’s
avoidance of the phrase “pretensive non-joinder”).
641

644

Id.
See, e.g., former MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (“suits instituted by summons shall . . . be brought .
. .”); former § 508.010(6) (“In all tort actions, suit may be brought . . .”); § 508.020 (suits by
attachment and suits in replevin “shall be brought . . .”).
645

646

See, e.g., former § 508.010(5) (suits “in which any county shall be a plaintiff, may be
commenced and prosecuted to final judgment”; § 508.050 (suits against cities “shall be commenced
. . .”).

647
If a new defendant is added in an amended petition, the action is deemed to have been
commenced by filing the amended petition. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001). Amendments that
do not add new parties (e.g., amendments that drop a party) do not have the effect of changing the
date that the action was commenced. Id.
648
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005) (emphasis added) (any count alleging a tort); § 508.010.5
(emphasis added) (no count alleging a tort). See also § 508.010.4 (“[I]n all actions in which there
is any count alleging a tort . . . venue shall be in the county where the plaintiff was first injured by
the wrongful acts or negligent conduct alleged in the action.” (emphasis added)).
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location where a suit should be tried649 (rather than where it should be filed), it
might seem logical that the place of trial should be determined based on the best
information available up to the time of trial.
Alternatively, one could argue that the General Assembly’s choice of the
phrase “In all actions in which there is any [or no] count alleging a tort”650—
instead of the phrase “all actions in which the petition contains any count
alleging a tort”—provides a basis for redetermining venue whenever a petition is
amended to add or remove a count. It could be argued that, by this choice of
language, the legislature redirected attention away from whether the a tort count
was included in the petition at time of filing and toward whether such a count
“is” included in the “action” as a whole, presumably including counts added in
amended petitions.651
However, these arguments are seriously flawed. First, while it is true that
the legislature did not say that the tort rules apply to “all actions in which the
petition contains any count alleging a tort,” it is equally true that the legislature
did not say that they applied to “all actions in which the petition or any
subsequent amended petition contains any count alleging a tort.” If the
legislators had chosen the first phraseology, it would be clear that venue should
not be redetermined. If they had chosen the second, it would be clear that venue
should be redetermined. Since they chose neither, their intent is simply unclear.
Given that lack of clarity, the ordinary presumptions about legislative intent
suggest that the General Assembly should not be deemed to have changed the
pre-existing legal doctrine on the issue.652
This is particularly true since, when the General Assembly wanted to
change pre-existing doctrine to require venue redetermination, it did so explicitly
and unequivocally; and it did so in the Tort Reform Act itself. In section
508.012, the legislature provided that venue should be re-evaluated whenever “a

649
Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co., 646 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo. 1983) (“Venue means the place
where a case is to be tried.”) overruled on other grounds State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994); 92A C.J.S. Venue § 2 (database updated May 2006) (“The
prevailing meaning of "venue" is the place of trial of action, the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought to trial.). See also State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d
57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (“Venue refers to the situs in which a court of competent jurisdiction may
adjudicate an action.”); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991)
(“Venue is a designation of the location or geographical situs where the court has jurisdiction to act
in a particular lawsuit. The origin of venue dates back to the development of the English judicial
system when venue was the locality from which the court summoned jurors.”).
650

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005).
Both of these text-based arguments would go beyond dealing with strategically delayed joinder
of counts and would require redetermination whenever a new count was added. Thus, they would
apply even if the facts justifying the addition of the new count were not known at the time of the
initial filing. In addition, they arguably would require redetermination if a counterclaim or crossclaim contained a tort count even if plaintiff never asserted such a count.
651

652

See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (Court will not lightly assume that Congress
abrogated longstanding legal doctrine); Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983); United States
v. Tex., 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
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plaintiff or defendant, including a third-party plaintiff or defendant, is added [to]
or removed from the petition.” If the General Assembly had intended to require
venue re-evaluation whenever a new count was added, it would have used similar
explicit language,653 for example, by providing that venue should be re-evaluated
whenever “a count is added to or removed from the petition.”
Second, the fact that venue rules decide the proper county for trial (rather
than the proper county for filing) does not determine when, or on the basis of
what facts, that decision should be made. After all, each of the Missouri cases
that defined “venue” as the determination of the place of trial654 was decided in
an era when that determination was made shortly after filing655 and was based on
the facts alleged in the pleading that commenced the case.656
Third, H.B. 393 actually treats the phrases “venue shall be determined” and
“the suit may be brought” as synonymous. For example, section 508.010.2
provides:
In all actions in which there is no count alleging a tort, venue shall be
determined as follows: . . .
(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties,
the suit may be brought in any such county
(3) When there are several defendants, some residents and others
nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state in
which any defendant resides;
(4) When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought
in any county in this state.657

Thus, H.B. 393 itself answers the question of how “venue shall be
determined” by explaining where “suit may be brought.”
Fourth, the suggested interpretations would violate the rule against
surplusage, i.e., the rule that one should avoid interpretations that make statutory
provisions superfluous.658 If the language of section 508.010 already required
constant redetermination of venue based on all post-filing developments, there
would be no need to have added a section 508.012 requiring such a
redetermination when parties are added to or dropped from the petition.
Fifth, section 508.010.9 explicitly provides “In all actions, venue shall be
determined as of the date the plaintiff was first injured.”659 As previously

653
State ex rel. Golden v. Crawford, 165 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Mo. 2005) (recognizing the express
language of a statute that demonstrated the intent of the legislature).
654

See supra note 649.
Until January 1, 2001, challenges to venue were waived unless asserted in a pre-answer motion
or the answer. See infra notes 688-90 and accompanying text. Since that time, the deadline for
filing such a challenge has been extended to 60 days.
655

656

State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. 2001).
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.2 (2005) (emphasis added).
658
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
659
MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.9 (2005) (emphasis added).
657
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discussed,660 the application of section 508.010.9 is not entirely clear. However,
it would certainly be difficult to argue that the General Assembly believed that
the phrase “venue shall be determined” implicitly required that venue be
determined as of the date of trial given the fact that it adopted a provision that
explicitly required it to be determined at a different and much earlier date.
As a result of these flaws, it appears that the revised text of section
508.010—section like 508.012 and like the pretensive joinder case law—does not
provide a basis for dealing with strategically delayed joinder of claims; and it can
be argued that, without clear directives from the General Assembly, the courts
should not interfere with litigants’ efforts to take full advantage of the legislation
as written.661 Nonetheless, the tactic remains troublesome. It seems unlikely that
the legislature intended to permit a plaintiff to take advantage of an otherwise
unavailable venue by consciously filing a petition that states a fragment of the
case and immediately filing an amended petition that adds the remainder. While
the absence of clear direction from the legislature permits the Supreme Court to
leave existing doctrine unchanged, it does not compel it to do so.
If the Court does wish to deal with the problem of strategically delayed
joinder of claims, Rule 51.045 may provide an appropriate technique for doing
so. This technique is possible because of the interplay between the deadline for a
motion to transfer and the deadline for filing amendments as of right. In its most
recent iteration, the rule permits a party to move to transfer venue within sixty
days after service on that defendant.662 Such a motion does not extend the time

660

See supra text accompanying notes 125-45.
Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d, 307, 313 (Mo. 1977).
662
MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045 provides:
Transfer of Venue When Venue Improper
(a)
An action brought in a court where venue is improper shall be transferred to a
court where venue is proper if a motion for such transfer is timely filed. Any motion
to transfer venue shall be filed within sixty days of service on the party seeking
transfer. For good cause shown, the court may extend the time to file a motion to
transfer venue or allow the party to amend it.
If a motion to transfer venue is not timely filed, the issue of improper venue is waived.
If a timely motion to transfer venue is filed, the venue issue is not waived by any other
action in the case.
(b)
Within thirty days after the filing of a motion to transfer for improper venue, an
opposing party may file a reply. For good cause shown, the court may extend the time
to file the reply or allow the party to amend it.
The reply shall set forth the basis for venue in the forum. The court shall not consider
any basis not set forth in the reply, nor shall the court consider allegations relating to
fictitious defendants. If a reply is filed, the court may allow discovery on the issue of
venue and shall determine the issue.
(c)
If the issue is determined in favor of the movant or if no reply is filed, the court
shall order a transfer of venue to a court where venue is proper. When a transfer of
venue is ordered, the entire civil action shall be transferred unless a separate trial has
been ordered. If a separate trial is ordered, only that part of the civil action in which
the movant is involved shall be transferred.
661

2007]

VENUE IN MISSOURI AFTER TORT REFORM

703

for filing an answer,663 nor does filing an answer waive the right to move for
transfer.664 A plaintiff who wishes to amend as of right, must do so before the
defendant files an answer665—something that the defendant can do immediately
upon service and is ordinarily required to do within thirty days of service.666 As a
result, defendants will be able to file an answer (and thus cut off a plaintiff’s right
to strategically join additional counts) well before the sixty day deadline for
filing a motion to transfer; and plaintiffs who want to be sure to have the right to
add the additional counts will need to do so very promptly after filing the initial
petition.667 Thus, in virtually every case of strategically delayed joinder of
claims, the trial judge will face a petition that has already been amended to add
the additional, venue-changing allegations. For such cases, the Supreme Court
could adopt a standard similar to ones proposed by Judge Stith in State ex rel.
Linthicum v. Calvin668 and by Judge Limbaugh in State ex rel. DePaul Health
Center v. Mummert669 and hold that “the amended pleading, rather than the
original pleading, [should be] the basis for determining venue.”670 This standard
would eliminate the incentive for strategically delayed joinder while assuring that
venue determinations would be made early in the case, thus minimizing the
disruptions inherent in late changes of forum.671
There is some risk that plaintiffs might try to circumvent this standard by
attempting to defer amending until after the expiration of the sixty day period for
filing a motion to transfer. However, once an answer has been filed, an
(d) A request for transfer of venue under this Rule 51.045 shall not deprive a party of
the right to a change of venue under Rule 51.03 if the civil action is transferred to a
county having seventy-five thousand or fewer inhabitants. A party seeking a change
of venue under Rule 51.03, after transfer of venue pursuant to this Rule 51.045, shall
make application therefor within the later of:
(1) The time allowed by Rule 51.03, or
(2) Ten days of being served with notice of the docketing of the civil action in the
transferee court as provided by Rule 51.10.
663
Motions to transfer are no longer pre-answer motions under Rule 55.27; and, under Rule
55.25(c), only motions filed under Rule 55.27 extend the time for filing an answer.
664
Rule 51.045(a) expressly provides that “If a timely motion to transfer venue is filed, the venue
issue is not waived by any other action in the case.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045(a).
665

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.33(a).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.25(a).
667
To be safe, the plaintiff would probably file the amended petition before service. A plaintiff
could gamble that a defendant would file a pre-answer motion rather than an answer but that would
be a risky strategy, particularly since a defendant always has the option to forgo such motions and
instead assert any of the Rule 55.27(a) defenses in the answer.
666

668

57 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Mo. 2001) (Stith, J., dissenting).
870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (Limbaugh, J., dissenting) (venue should be determined on the
basis of the status of the case at the time the court rules on the motion).
669

670

State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Mo. 2001).
There may be cases in which a plaintiff’s amends as of right for non-venue related reasons (e.g.,
because of newly discovered information) and it is merely coincidental that the new allegations
change the venue determination. One would expect these cases to be rare. However, even if they
occur, transferring venue so early in the proceeding is unlikely to impose substantial costs on the
system and does not seem inherently unfair.
671
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amendment can be filed only with leave of court.672 While Rule 55.33 requires
that leave be “freely granted when justice so requires,” justice does not require
granting leave when the amendment is not the result of newly discovered
information and will prejudice the other party.673 As a result, when leave is
sought for an amendment that adds allegations that would have changed the
venue determination, the Supreme Court should urge the trial courts to deny
leave if a careful inquiry demonstrates that the failure to include the allegations
in the initial petition was a stratagem used to obtain a favorable venue.
Alternatively, the trial courts could condition leave on a written agreement to
change venue.674 If leave is denied, the plaintiff would have the option of
proceeding without the additional allegations or filing a voluntary non-suit and
refiling a new petition—in which case, venue would be determined based on the
allegations in the new petition.
C. Failure to Rule on Motions Within 90 Days—The Effect of 508.010.10 on
Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 55.27(a)
Newly enacted section 508.010.10675 sets a ninety-day deadline for trial
court rulings on motions to transfer for improper venue and provides that, if the
trial court fails to comply with the deadline, the motion for transfer shall be
deemed granted. While some may doubt the wisdom or constitutionality676 of
this apparently unique provision,677 it is unlikely to create significant problems so
long as plaintiffs’ attorneys monitor the deadline and bring it to the trial court’s
attention. However, it also appears that the language of the provision will have
an unintended consequence that could have a surprising and troubling impact.
Section 508.010.10 now provides, “All motions to dismiss or to transfer
based upon a claim of improper venue shall be deemed granted if not denied
within ninety days of filing of the motion unless such time period is waived in

672

MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.33(a). Such an amendment could also be filed in the unlikely event that the
defendant consented to the amendment.
673

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971) (motion to amend should
be denied where other party will be prejudiced); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Lutman, 406 F.2d 11 (3d
Cir. 1969) (motion to amend should be denied where the knowledge was available from the
beginning); David v. Crompton & Knowles Corp. 58 F.R.D. 444, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
674

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.13 (2005).
§ 508.010.10.
676
It might be argued that section 508.010.10 “amend[s]” MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045 by effectively
restricting the trial court’s right to “extend the time to file the reply,” its right to “allow discovery
on the issue of venue,” or its implicit right to decide the issue after as much consideration as it
deems necessary. If the section does amend the rule, it would be subject to constitutional challenge
under Article V, Section 5 similar to that discussed in Part IV.A.3 above. However, it is not clear
that, for purposes of the constitutional restriction, a statutory deadline should be treated as an
“amend[ment]” to a rule that imposes certain obligations but does not discuss a deadline for their
completion.
675

677

While the author has not performed a comprehensive search, he has not been able to find a
comparable provision in the laws of any other state.
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writing by all parties.”678 While it is clear that the ninety-day “deemed granted if
not denied” provision applies to motions “to transfer based upon a claim of
improper venue” under Rule 51.045, the text strongly suggests that it also
applies to all motions to dismiss—regardless of the basis for the motion to
dismiss. While it is possible that this result may have been unintended,
established maxims of statutory interpretation virtually compel the conclusion
that the limiting phrase “based upon a claim of improper venue” modifies and
restricts only the immediately preceding antecedent (“to transfer”) and not the
earlier phrase (“to dismiss”).
Missouri has long recognized the “last antecedent rule” under which
“qualifying words, phrases or clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase
immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including
others more remote."679 The United States Supreme Court recently illustrated
this maxim with the following example:
Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage
son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, "You will be punished if
you throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the house." If
the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught, he should hardly be able to
avoid punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged. The parents
proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the house.680

In the same way, the maxim dictates interpreting the statute to require trial
judges to rule with ninety days on (1) motions to dismiss simpliciter and (2)
motions to transfer based upon a claim of improper venue.681
The rule of the last antecedent is not, of course, an inflexible command and
should not be followed if, after considering the act as a whole, the alternative
interpretation is “clearly required by consideration of the entire act.”682 But the
alternative interpretation—reading the deadline as not applying to motions to
dismiss unless those motions are based upon a claim of improper venue—faces a

678

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.10 (2005).
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 639 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. 1982) quoting Elliot
v. James Patrick Hauling, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). See also Thompson v.
Comm. on Legislative Research, 932 S.W.2d 392, 395 n.3 (Mo. 1996) (“The ‘last antecedent rule’
requires that qualifying phrases are applied to the phrase immediately preceding”). Missouri’s
recognition of this rule dates back to the nineteenth century. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harris v.
Laughlin, 75 Mo. 147 (Mo. 1881).
679

680
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27 (2003). The example given in Barnhart is actually a more
troubling application of the maxim because of the word “other.”
681
The language of section 508.010.10 poses a second level of ambiguity because the modifying
phrase could also be interpreted as modifying the noun “motion.” However, the maxim requires
that the modifying phrase be applied only to the last possible antecedent even if there are more than
one earlier possibilities. Moreover, there is no reason that the phrase “based upon a claim of
improper venue” must be treated as adjectival rather than adverbial. The sentence “The case was
transferred based upon a claim of improper venue” is just as grammatically correct as the sentence
“Your motion based upon a claim of improper venue is hereby denied.”
682

Norberg v. Montgomery, 351 Mo. 180, 173 S.W.2d 387, 390 (1943).
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second difficulty: It would make the reference to “motions to dismiss”
meaningless since, under Missouri law, there is no such thing as a motion to
dismiss “based upon a claim of improper venue.”
For more than fifteen years, Missouri statutes have provided that transfer,
rather than dismissal, is the proper remedy for improper venue. Until 1990,
defendants who were sued in the wrong county were entitled to have the suit
dismissed.683 However, in 1989, in direct response to a Supreme Court decision
that invited legislative correction of what was seen as the overly harsh rule
requiring dismissal, the General Assembly enacted section 476.410.684 That
statute provided that dismissal would no longer be proper685 and that the circuit
courts should instead “transfer the [improperly venued] case to any division or
circuit in which it could have been brought.”686 As a result, for more than fifteen
years, it has not been proper to file a motion to dismiss for improper venue since
dismissal was not a remedy that the trial court was authorized to grant.687
If there was any doubt about the abolition of motions to dismiss for
improper venue, that doubt was eliminated by the May 26, 2000 amendments to
the Missouri Rules.688 Those amendments explicitly created a separate motion to
transfer for improper venue689 and removed “improper venue” from the list of
defenses or objections that could be raised by a Rule 55.27(a) pre-answer
motion.690 By 2005—fifteen years after the enactment of section 476.410 and
five years after the adoption of Rule 51.045—the legislature certainly must be

683

State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. 1991).
Section 476.410 was enacted in 1989 in direct response to Oney v. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137
(Mo. 1988), which had noted the harshness of the previous rule requiring dismissal and had invited
the General Assembly to correct the problem legislatively. State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v.
Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994); State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v.
Hedspeth, 788 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) overruled on other grounds, State ex rel.
Govero v. Kehm, 850 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1993). In response to the same decision, the legislature
also enacted section 478.062 which provided that filing in the wrong portion of the 16th Judicial
Circuit (Jackson County) would also not be grounds for dismissal but only grounds for transfer.
State ex rel. Edu-Dyne Sys., Inc. v. Trout, 781 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo. 1989).
684

685

Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197; Hedspeth, 788 S.W.2d at 344 (Mo. Ct. App.1990).
MO. REV. STAT. § 476.410 (2005).
687
MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.26(a) requires motions to “set forth the relief or order sought.”
Even before the enactment of Rule 51.045, which became effective on Jan. 1, 2001, a motion to
transfer could be filed under the then existing Rule 55.27(a) that permitted “objections” (as well as
“defenses”) to be raised by pre-answer motion.
686

688

Order dated May 26, 2000 re: Supreme Court Rule 51 Venue etc., 55.27(a) Pleadings and
Motions, How Presented, 61.01(h) Enforcement of Discovery: Sanctions, Objections to Approved
Discovery, 74.01(a) Judgments, Orders and Proceedings Thereon, Included Matters, 81.04(c) and
(d) Appeals, Docket Fees and Duty to Notify, and 84 Procedure in All Appellate Courts. The
amendments enacted by this order became effective Jan. 1, 2001.
689

See current Rule 51.045
Compare Rule 55.27(a) (2000) (containing a Subsection (a)(3) “improper venue”) with Rule
55.27(a)(2001)(containing no such subsection).
690
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presumed to have known that there was no such thing as a “motion to dismiss . . .
based upon a claim of improper venue” under Missouri law.691
Since no motions to dismiss can properly be “based upon a claim of
improper venue,” the interpretation that applies the ninety-day rule only to
motions to dismiss that are made on that basis is an interpretation under which
the rule would apply to no motions to dismiss at all. Such an interpretation
would violate the rule against surplusage since it would drain all meaning from
section 508.010.10’s use of “motion to dismiss.” Missouri case law has long
rejected such interpretations, holding that every phrase in a statute should be
given some effect and that courts should not presumed that the legislature
inserted “idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.”692 Under an
interpretation under which the only motions to dismiss that are covered by the
ninety-day rule are ones that do not exist, the phrase “motion to dismiss” would
be a quintessential example of “idle verbiage or superfluous language”: language
that applies to nothing.693
691

There is one limited sense in which “motions to dismiss for improper venue” continue to exist in
Missouri. Sometimes lawyers still use that name—improperly—to refer to motions that are
properly called “motions to transfer,” see, e.g., State ex rel. Bugg v. Roper, 179 S.W.3d 893 (Mo.
2005) (motion improperly designated “Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue”) or to refer to
motions that are actually motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., State ex rel.
J.C. Penney Corp. v. Schroeder, 108 S.W.3d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (motion to dismissed based
on forum selection clause that restricted the parties to Texas state or federal courts described as
“Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue”). It is difficult to imagine that the legislature added the
phrase “motion to dismiss” for the sole purpose of directing trial judges to grant motions that are
not authorized (under MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045) and which seek relief that trial judges are
specifically forbidden to grant under section 476.410.
692

Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of St. Louis v. Members of Bd. of Aldermen of City of St. Louis, 92
S.W.3d 785, 788 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Hyde Park Hous. P’ship v. Dir. of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82,
84 (Mo. 1993)). See also Dodd v. Independence Stove & Furnace Co., 51 S.W.2d 114, 118
(Mo.1932) (“Legislature will not be presumed to have intended using superfluous or meaningless
words in a statute.”); Knob Noster Educ. Ass’n v. Knob Noster R-VIII Sch. Dist., 101 S.W.3d 356
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“We should not interpret statutes in a way which will render some of their
phrases to be mere surplusage.”) (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Local Gov't Ret. Sys. v. Bill, 935
S.W.2d 659, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
693

While there is also a plausible argument that the phrase “based upon a claim of improper venue”
would be superfluous unless it applied to motions to dismiss, that argument is flawed. It rests on
the fact that, under the Missouri rules, all motions to transfer are necessarily based on a claim of
improper venue. (Other motions to move cases from one county to another are denominated
“Applications for Change of Venue” rather than as “Motions to Transfer.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.03,
51.04, 51.06.). Given this fact, the inclusion of the phrase “based upon a claim of improper venue”
would add no additional meaning to the statute unless it applied to something other than motions to
transfer. Under the rule against surplusage, the phrase should have some function, and the only
available function is to serve as a limitation of the types of motion to dismiss covered by the ninety
day rule.
This argument is inconsistent with the common usage. Attorneys and courts regularly use the
technically redundant phrase “motion to transfer for improper venue” despite the fact that all
motions to transfer are based upon claims of improper venue. See, e.g., State ex rel. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. David, 158 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Mo. 2005) (“motion to transfer for improper venue”);

708

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

Finally, such an interpretation would lead to an anomalous result that can
only be described as a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that the ninety-day
“deemed granted if not denied” rule were actually interpreted to apply only to
one form of motion to dismiss, ones that are filed on the basis of improper venue.
Under that interpretation, the effect of the phrase “motion to dismiss” would be
to sometimes cause such motions to be granted, i.e., to dismiss cases that are filed
in the wrong venue. In other words, if that interpretation were correct, one would
have to conclude that the legislature inserted the phrase “motion to dismiss” for
the sole purpose of requiring trial courts to grant a form of relief (dismissal)
which the legislature has forbidden them to grant, and to do so based on a type of
motion (motions to dismiss for improper venue) which the Supreme Court Rules
have forbidden lawyers to file.
Thus, the text of the statute, read in light of the ordinary canons of
construction, appears to dictate that the ninety day “deemed granted if not
denied” rule should apply to all motions to dismiss, not just ones based upon a
claim of improper venue. Faced with this situation, one might argue that the
Missouri Supreme Court should reject such a reading based on the rule against
absurdity.694 Missouri Courts have long recognized that literal, text-based
State ex rel. McDonald's Corp. v. Bryant, 151 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“motion to
dismiss that alleges improper venue”); State ex rel. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. David, 114 S.W.3d 447,
447-48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“motion to transfer for improper venue”)). MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045
itself is titled “Transfer of Venue When Venue Improper,” and MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.045(b) describes
the appropriate motion as a “motion to transfer for improper venue.” This particular type of
linguistic redundancy (the use of a logically unnecessary modifying phrase to remind the reader of
a fact that is already necessarily implied even without the phrase) is common both for lawyers and
lay persons. Lawyers commonly refer to a “Rule 55.27(a)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim”—even though every Rule 55.27(a)(6) motion to dismiss is necessarily based on failure to
state a claim—or to a “Rule 55.27(d) motion for more definite statement”—even though every
Rule 55.27(d) motion is necessarily a motion for more definite statement. See, e.g., J.H. Cosgrove
Contractors, Inc. v. Kaster, 851 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Similarly, a lay person
might say, “I love fattening ice cream”—even though all ice cream is fattening—as a way of
emphasizing the characteristic that is salient to the conversation. See MARIE GILLETTE & ERNSTJAN C. WIT, WHAT IS LINGUISTIC REDUNDANCY?, at § 2.3 Category 2 (1998), at
http://galton.uchicago.edu/~wit/redundan.html (on file with the author) (discussing the use of
redundancy to isolate and stress a particular aspect). Since this type of usage explains the inclusion
of the phrase and gives it a function, the rule against surplusage does not apply.
694
Parties may also be tempted to argue that title of section 508.010 (“Venue for nontort and tort
suits -- principal place of residence, defined.”) is a basis for limiting the ninety day rule to motions
relating to venue. However, while “[T]he title of an act as enacted by the General Assembly is
necessarily a part thereof and is to be considered in construing the act,” Harry H. Houf & Sons
Contractors, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 796 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added), the title of section 508.010 was not part of the act as enacted by the General Assembly.
Headings or titles that do not appear in the act as passed by the legislature and signed by the
Governor are not “titles,” provide no evidence of the legislature’s intent, and cannot be used to aid
in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Mo. 1970)
(headings inserted by the compiler of statutes are not “titles” and are not to be considered); Sisney
v. Clay, 829 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). The actual title of H. B. 393 is “To repeal sections
[listing section numbers] and to enact in lieu thereof twenty-three new sections relating to claims
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interpretation of a statute must not be permitted to lead to an absurd result clearly
at odds with the probable intent of the legislature.695 In extreme cases, the
Supreme Court has gone so far as to explicitly delete words from a statute to
avoid absurd results.696
However, it is not at all clear that a plain language reading of section
508.010.10 would necessarily be absurd and inconsistent with the intent of the
legislature that enacted the Tort Reform Act. Reading the act as a whole,
particularly in light of its well known history, it is clear that the legislature
intended to shift the balance of litigation advantages in a way that was
significantly more favorable to defendants. A requirement that all motions to
dismiss be deemed granted unless denied within ninety days is certainly
unusual697 and some (including the author) may believe it to be unwise, but that
does not mean that it is absurd to think that defense-oriented legislators could
have intended to enact such a requirement. Such legislators may have believed
that it was important that all dispositive motions be ruled on promptly and that
ninety days was presumptively adequate time for such a ruling.698 They may
have believed that defendants already had adequate incentives to expedite

for damages and the payment thereof.” That title is entirely consistent with the broader application
of the ninety day rule.
695

Care & Treatment of Schottel v. State, 159 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Mo. 2005) (presumption that the
legislature did not intend an absurd result justifies favoring constructions that avoid such results);
State ex rel. McNary v. Hais, 670 S.W.2d 494 (Mo.1984) (same); Citizens' Nat‘l Bank of Kansas
Kan. City v. Graham, 48 S.W. 910, 911 (Mo. 1898) (explicitly rejecting literal interpretation of
statute because it would lead to an absurd result); Bell v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 750 S.W.2d 708
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (same); State ex rel. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Gehner, 292 S.W. 1028
(Mo. 1927) (while statute should generally be read according to the natural meaning of its
language, there is an exception when such a reading leads to an absurd result). Missouri’s
recognition of the rule against absurdity dates back at least to State to Use of Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo.
120, 146 (1835).
696

Lincoln Univ. v. Hackmann, 243 S.W. 320, 320-21 (Mo. 1922) (explicitly deleting word from a
statute because doing so necessary to avoid an absurd result); Bingham v. Birmingham, 15 S.W.
533, 535 (Mo. 1891) (explicitly striking phrase from statute to avoid absurd result); Leibson v.
Henry, 204 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1947) (explicitly deleting words from a statute because their inclusion
appeared inadvertent and was not in harmony with the remainder of the statute); City of Kirkwood
v. Mo. State Bd. of Mediation, 478 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (deleting requirement that
state mediation board use the services of the “state hearing officer” from the statute since no such
officer exists); State ex rel. Harvey v. Sheehan, 190 S.W. 864, 865 (1916) (“We have frequently
said that doubtful words of a statute will be enlarged, restricted, supplied, or even stricken out in
order to make them conform to the true intent of the lawmakers, when such intent is manifested by
the aid of sound principles of interpretation.”).
697
While a “deemed granted if not denied” rule is unusual and may be unique, the converse type of
rule is well-known. For example, authorized post trial motions are deemed denied if not rule on
within ninety days after the last such motion is filed. MO. SUP. CT. R. 78.06.
698
The legislators could believe that, in the unusual situations in which the trial court believed
more time was needed, the trial judge could (either through persuasion or by implicitly or explicitly
threatening to deny the motion) induce the parties to agree to an extension.
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consideration of such motions699 and that the threat of automatic grant of such
motions would serve as an appropriate equivalent incentive for plaintiffs to avoid
delay. They may have believed that the burden of the trial judge’s failure to rule
promptly should fall on the plaintiffs—since they are the parties seeking to
invoke the court’s aid to change the pre-suit status quo—rather than on the
defendants. They may have believed that these perceived advantages of such a
rule outweighed any disruption or other procedural problems that the rule would
create.700 These beliefs may not be correct and they may not be shared by the
Court, but it does not seem absurd to think that defense-oriented legislators could
have held those beliefs and enacted legislation based on them.
While the Court may ultimately find a way of limiting section 508.010.10
to motions to transfer,701 plaintiffs’ lawyers and trial judges will need to deal with
the risk that all motions to dismiss will be “deemed granted if not denied within
ninety days of filing.” The first and most important response should be to do
everything possible to assure that trial courts rule on such motions before the
statutory deadline. If there is a legitimate reason why that is not feasible, every
effort should be made to obtain a written waiver of the deadline from all
parties.702
Even if the deadline is inadvertently missed, the situation should still be
salvageable. Section 508.010.10 did not purport to repeal or modify Rule 74.01;
and under that rule, even an order granting a motion to dismiss—much less a
“deemed” dismissal—is not a judgment unless it is reduced to writing, signed by
the judge, filed, and denominated either a “judgment” or “decree.”703 Until those
requirements are met, such an order (and, a fortiori, a “deemed” dismissal) is
merely interlocutory.704 Until the entry of such a judgment, “the court retains
jurisdiction over the matter so that the court may be allowed to reconsider its

699

The legislators could believe, for example that defendants would receive little benefit from
delay in the resolution of dispositive motions since discovery and trial preparation would proceed
while the motion was pending.
700

It is also possible that they simply wanted to give an additional advantage to defendants, either
because they believed that it was necessary to redress what they perceived to be an excessively proplaintiff system or from less praiseworthy motives.
701

One possibility would be to find that section 508.010.10, to the extent that it applies to Rule
55.27(a) motions, violates Article V, Section 5 by annulling a portion of Rule 55.27(c). That rule
implicitly authorizes the trial court to “order[] that the hearing and determination [of Rule
55.27(a)(1)-(12) motions] be deferred until trial.” Section 508.010.10, if applied to Rule 55.27(a)
motions, would make such deferral impossible in almost any case. For a discussion of Article V,
section 5, see supra Part IV.A.3.
702

MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010.10 (2005).
MO. SUP. CT. R. 74.01(a). Briggs v. Orf, 148 S.W. 3d 853, 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). Even
prior to the enactment of Rule 74.01(a), it was well recognized that an order granting a motion to
dismiss was not a judgment. See, e.g., Kipper v. Vokolek, 546 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977).
703

704

Peet v. Randolph, 103 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
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action, correct any errors, and modify or set aside its order.”705 Thus, even
though the motion to dismiss may be “deemed granted,” the dismissal can be set
aside by the trial judge until a judgment is properly entered. In addition, in the
unlikely event that the “deemed” dismissal was held to be the equivalent of the
proper entry of a judgment, the trial court would retain control over that
judgment for thirty days and could, “after giving the parties an opportunity to be
heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its
judgment.”706 Thus, the plaintiff should promptly seek to have any “deemed”
dismissal vacated and, if possible, should do so in time for the trial judge to act
on the issue within thirty days of the deemed dismissal.
Finally, the ninety day rule creates a particular problem for a trial judge
who concludes that the decision on a motion to dismiss should be postponed to
trial on the merits.707 Under section 508.010.10, a motion is deemed granted
unless it is “denied within ninety days of filing,” and a postponement to trial on
the merits is not a denial. As a result, a trial judge’s express decision to postpone
will lead to a “deemed” dismissal. To avoid this result, trial judges who believes
a particular motion to dismiss should be deferred to trial will be able to achieve
that result only by denying the motion without prejudice, explicitly granting the
movant leave to raise the issue again at trial.708

705

Id. at 876 (court had authority to modify involuntary dismissal without prejudice to one with
prejudice despite entry of order and despite passage of thirty days). See also MO. SUP. CT. R.
74.01(b) (Without a Rule 74.01 certification, any order is “subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment).
A dismissal resulting from the failure of the court to act within 90 days is not the equivalent of a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice filed by the plaintiff since it is the court’s inaction, rather
than the voluntary choice by the plaintiff, that leads to the dismissal.
706

MO. SUP. CT. R. 75.01. To be effective under Rule 75.01, the court must give the parties an
opportunity to be heard and the order must actually be entered within thirty days. Id.
Alternatively, the plaintiff could file a motion for a new trial or a motion to alter or amend the
judgment within thirty days, and the court would then have ninety days to act.
707

Such postponement is expressly contemplated by the rules and statutes. See MO. SUP. CT. R.
55.25(c), 55.27(c); MO. REV. STAT. § 509.260 (2005).
708
See In re Care & Treatment of Johnson, 161 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (denial of
motion for summary judgment merely postpones the issues for decision at trial).

